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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on exploring the behaviours of high-tech start-up finns in response to 
the policy interventions undertaken to promote regional innovation in South Korea since 
1997. High-tech start-ups and their technological entrepreneurship are increasingly 
considered by policy makers and academics to playa crucial role in the generation of 
innovation and economic development. However, this study started from a basic concem 
of why government intervention does not necessarily result in an increase of regional 
innovation capacity. 
To explain this concern, which comes from the researcher's personal observation in the 
field, this thesis attempts to construct a new conceptual framework of 'government 
dependency' and to apply this to 'Daedeok', a region in South Korea, to explore the 
reproduction of this kind of dependency. This conceptual framework was developed by 
remodeling path dependency theories through a systemic and interactive lens. The 
empirical study used secondary data analysis and qualitative interviews of start-up 
founders to delineate the emergence of a new development path and the extent to which 
dependency was reproduced in the Daedeok regional innovation system. 
The research fmdings from this empirical study reveal that the perception of risk held by 
founders of start-up finns was lowered by a belief in their technology and the 
government's risk sharing policy. Such perceptions generated a regional development 
path of policy reliance in the case region. The emergence of this path gained momentum 
due to its practical benefits to business. As a consequence, policy reliance was connected 
to behavioural persistence of benefit-seeking. Empirical analysis suggested that 
'reliance' and 'persistence' were the crucial factors in the production and reproduction 
of the government dependency. Some firms accepted dependency as reliance, but others 
regarded it as policy utilization. Thus, a critical juncture could not be clearly identified 
in actors' behaviour. It was also unclear if dependency had hindered innovation, but it 
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was shown that the regional and institutional contexts strongly influenced the 
reproduction process. The thesis concludes that the construct of government dependency 
can also provide useful insights into policy learning as well as the success of 
government interventions. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research aim and background 
The broad research aim of this thesis is to contribute to our knowledge about regional 
development processes, and to explore the role of high-teclmology start-up businesses in 
economic readjustment. In particular, it seeks to explain why government intervention 
does not necessarily result in an increase of regional innovation capacity. High-tech 
based start-up firms and their entrepreneurship have been widely recognised to play 
critical role in regional innovation and national economic development. Therefore, 
policy makers in many countries have been very keen on intervening to promote high-
tech start-ups in various ways. Policy intervention seems to have a wide range of 
impacts on regional innovation both intended and unintended. This thesis is interested in 
the impact of policy support for start-ups in promoting spatial development and 
strengthening regional innovation capacity. 
Silicon Valley has come to represent a 'successful' model of creating and funding high 
teclmology businesses, and also promoting regional development. Much literature has 
focused on identifying the formula of this success (Miller and Cote, 1987; Saxenian, 
1994; Rosenberg, 2002). Many countries tried to implant the Silicon Valley concept into 
selected geographical spaces, but these experiments often produced disappointing results 
in terms of national and/or regional innovation. This demonstrates that the ingredients of 
successful story in a specific locality can not necessarily guarantee the same success in 
another locality. Behind Silicon Valley's success, the local strengths and the business 
friendly culture have more frequently been cited rather than government policy 
intervention. This implies that policy intervention does not also necessarily guarantee 
the cultivation of regional innovation. Policy interventions by governments in the 
process of innovation have been justified in terms of market failure and/or system failure. 
However, at the same time, policy support or regulations can cause different problems or 
inefficiencies at any time. In particular, there have been concerns that direct financial 
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support to start-ups may weaken entrepreneurship and deepen dependency on 
government policy. In this regard, it seems to be quite important to understand the 
responses of start-ups to policy support for both academic and practical purposes. 
This thesis focuses on investigating the policy responses of high-tech start-ups in terms 
of regional development particularly in Daedeok, South Korea (hereafter referred to as 
just Korea). This research was partly motivated by the researcher's own working 
experiences in a local authority in Korea for fifteen years. However, more importantly, 
Daedeok is expected as a relevant study area in that there is a large-scale science park 
and considerable number of spin-offs from it, and there have been quite long efforts of 
policy support to promote innovative activities such as R&D and start-ups. 
The Korean economy has experienced many fundamental changes over the last three 
decades. Particularly since the outbreak of an IMF economic crisis in 1997, the Korean 
government has struggled to find a new impetus for sustainable economic development. 
In this situation, high-tech start-ups emerged as a promising actor to replace the 
dominant role of the traditional chaebols (large conglomerates) and the perceived 
weaknesses in the performance of the national economy. The government began to 
prepare legislative frameworks and develop several assistance schemes to foster 
technology based new start-ups. Start-up support policy in Korea needs to be reviewed 
in association with other interrelated policies. In case of Daedeok, start-up phenomenon 
needs to be understood in the context of science and technology policy over the last 
three decades. 'Daedeok' has a quite unique position in terms of both national and 
regional innovation in Korea that mainly comes from the existence of Daedeok Science 
Town (DST), a large-scale research and development centre built by the central 
government. DST has been part of a national innovation system since the early 1970s 
when it was transplanted in Daejeon Metropolitan City (DMC). DST has been backed by 
the national government through the subsidy of R&D, and as a consequence, many 
resources for innovation became more concentrated in Daedeok compared to other 
periphery regions. 
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Generally speaking, the agglomeration of R&D resources is seen to offer positive 
potential for regional innovation. However, in 2001, the city council of Daejeon began 
to regard the DST as an 'island' of economic activity (Daedeok Valley Master Plan, 
2001), and believed that there was a lack of close cooperation between start-ups and 
PRIs (Public Research Institutes); a lack of local positive spill-over effects with Seoul 
still providing the major markets for the companies in Daedeok; a lack of new industrial 
inward investment needed to create a more diversified regional economy; and a lack of 
firms in the region to provide private capital, such as venture capitalists. To address 
these problems, Daedeok Valley Master Plan (2001) emphasised the importance of 
securing more budget and policy support from the central government. On the one hand, 
it seems to be an easy and natural solution considering the fiscal and power relations 
between the central government and local authorities in Korea. But on the other hand, an 
interesting phenomenon can be found that there has already been relatively large policy 
concentration on Daedeok, particularly in the field of R&D and related infrastructure 
investment. According to a linear model of innovation, the more resources that are put in 
to the process of innovation, the more innovation that should be produced. Then, a few 
significant questions can be asked why such advantageous factors and continuous policy 
support have not been sufficiently connected to regional innovation? Why has 
continuous policy support not necessarily resulted in an increase of regional innovation 
capacity? Is it really because policy support for Daedeok has not been sufficiently 
provided? This study tries to answer these questions through the investigation of policy 
responses of spin-off start-ups .in Daedeok. 
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
Today, most of policy measures, particularly 'interactive' policy tools from systems 
approach, aim to change actor's behaviour in principle (Diez at aI, 2000). Policy can 
affect the innovative behaviour of firms directly via subsidies or indirectly via the 
provision of public infrastructure and institutions. In a neo-classical linear model, 
subsidising R&D has been emphasised as an input to the innovation process. This type 
of intervention can affect the innovative behaviour of firms directly by influencing 
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choices based on the costlbenefit calculations of agents. However, according to the 
systems approach, innovation cannot be easily promoted by just increasing input factors. 
Supportive policy from this systemic perspective mainly aims for more dynamic and 
long lasting effects on innovative behaviour even after the support stops (Nauwelaers el 
ai, 2002). 
The provision of financial support has been the most common and powerful policy 
measure considered by policy makers. However, as Stiglitz (1999) argues, external 
incentives can modify short-term behaviour of actors, but they usually override the 
intrinsic motivation system rather than change it. Thus, when the 'extrinsic incentives' 
are removed, behaviour reverts to the previous motives. Sometimes, direct government 
support can also cause unexpected inefficiency or dependency on government which 
might be connected to moral hazard, grant-seeking behaviour and loss of 
entrepreneurship. O'Farrell (1990) points out that 'government-induced distortions' in 
the marketplace and the dependency on government subsidies can undermine the 
willingness and ability of regional firms to form relationships with outside firms. This 
dependency can be connected to the lack of entrepreneurship. He terms this 
'grantrepreneurship'. He also argues that the 'grantrepreneur' mentality is widespread 
and suggests: "if you can 'I compete without grants, you won 'I compete with them" 
(0 'Farrell and Hitchens, 1988, p. 410; O'Farrell, 1990, p. 16). According to O'Farrell, 
"public policy appears inadvertently to have reinforced market failure to some. extent by 
cushioning profits via grants,. subsidies and preferential purchasing thereby reducing 
the incentive to change ... "(O'Farrell, 1990, p. 24). 
As many studies in other fields like welfare policy have pointed out, government support 
can weaken welfare recipient's self-reliance and deepen dependency on continuous 
support (Cox, 2004; Ebbinghaus, 2005). This lesson seems to be also valid in start-up 
business sector. Start-ups have been understood as crucial actors in the innovation 
system at national and regional levels. The promotion of technological entrepreneurship 
has been recognized as a significant policy tool to increase regional innovation capacity. 
Many countries are interested in facilitating new firm formation by supportive policy 
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measures. In the linear model perspective, policy makers can expect higher levels of 
start-ups by increasing support. However, policy intervention can often produce serious 
distortions of market mechanisms. Direct financial policy support for start-ups may 
paradoxically result in the loss of entrepreneurship in their business. 
This study attempts to address this problematic phenomenon in terms of the dependency 
of start-up firms on policy support. This study is grounded on such a systemic approach 
to innovation as a basic frame for understanding the innovation process. At the same 
time, it highlights the role of a region as the space where innovation takes place. In this 
regard, territorial and systemic dimension of innovation is emphasised in this study. This 
thesis is, most importantly, anchored in path dependency theory as a theoretical lens to 
see the reproduction of start-up finn's responses induced by policy intervention, 
particularly in terms of regional innovation capacity. Basically this thesis accepts that a 
wide range of behavioural responses to supportive policies can exist somewhere between 
two extremes of fully independent (self-reliance) and fully dependent response. Thus, it 
assumes that policy support for start-ups can bring about some extent of reliance on it 
and this reliance may become the source of persistence in their behavioural dependency 
on it. 
In line with this, the research objectives of this thesis are: 
• To construct a conceptual framework that allows an examination of regional 
development through a lens' of path dependency theory, and also addresses regional 
innovation behaviour through a systemic approach; 
• To apply this framework to a study region in Korea to explore the reproduction of 
dependency on policy support by understanding the processes of reliance and 
persistence. 
Considering these research obJectives, two primary research questions are raised: 
• How and why has the reliance of start-up firms been produced in the process of 
starting their business? 
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• How have start-up finns responded to support measures of government in getting on 
their business and why they came to respond in that way? 
The empirical research setting specifically focuses on 'Daedeok' in Korea. The impact 
of economic readjustment varies from country to country depending on the national 
economic, social, political structures, and as mentioned above, certainly dramatic 
structural changes have occurred in Korea since the financial crisis in 1997. The 
economic transition has not only caused severe economic disruption but also made 
numerous impacts on Korean society. One of notable changes since 1997 was that high-
tech start-ups began to emerge as a main actor in the Korean economy. As stated already, 
this study started with the identification of an empirical concern that originated from the 
researcher's personal observations of practice. In order to address these observations, a 
conceptual framework of 'government dependency' was produced on the basis of 
various theoretical discussions and the modification of classical path dependency 
approach. This is operationalized through the two concepts of 'reliance' and 
'persistence'. The reliance on government support by start-ups was investigated through 
an examination of the change in 'risk perception' held by start-up entrepreneurs. At the 
same time, the persistence of this reliance was examined through the continuous benefit 
seeking, a self-reinforcing expectation held by the entrepreneurs. 
In order to examine the primary questions through empirical research, four more specific 
sub-questions are raised: 
- What makes potential high-tech entrepreneurs become start-up founders? 
- How has policy support influenced changes in the perception of risk during the 
process of start-up? 
- What sort of entrepreneurial responses have been induced by this change in risk 
perception? 
- How have these responses been reproduced as a form of behavioural persistence in 
their business history? 
The conceptual framework was applied to the empirical world to answer the research 
questions. Relevant data was collected from secondary sources and field work consisting 
of qualitative semi-structured interviews. In this regard, the study can be seen as a 
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journey between academia and empiria. Academia is seen as the general world which 
consists of theories and constructs. In contrast, empiria represents the specific world 
which contains the case area and other contexts of this study, like the specific policies. 
The development of a conceptual framework provided a bridge between those two 
worlds. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter Two consists of two sections. First section discusses entrepreneurship and high-
tech start-ups. This explores some critical issues, such as how the inventor comes to 
choose the risky route of becoming a start-up; what technological features are involved; 
what incentive mechanisms trigger the inventor to found a start-up. Second section 
provides some ovemll information and knowledge to understand the chamcteristics of 
high-tech start-ups in Daedeok as a study area. This chapter becomes a starting point to 
interweave crucial issues in la~er chapters with regard to start-up, innovation, region and 
policy. 
Chapter Three examines the process of innovation. There are two important issues 
associated with the nature of innovation process. First, it is considered whether the 
innovation process can be seen as a path dependent or a path breaking process. Second, 
it is asked whether this process is linear or systemic. The territorial dimension of 
innovation is also reviewed in terms of systems approach. In addition, the rationale for 
policy intervention is discussed from the traditional market failure perspective and the 
more recent system failure perspective. At the same time, the matter of intervention 
mode is considered in terms of differentiated circumstances in time and space. 
Chapter Four, in first section, reviews the theoretical expansion of path dependency 
approach in different fields such as technological, institutional, organisational and 
regional change. Particularly, institutional path dependency is reviewed as the main 
intemction between policy intervention and changes at the organisational or regional 
level. In second section, conceptual framework is established to explore policy induced 
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'government dependency'. The conceptualisation of the government dependency 
mechanism is based on the modification of the classical path dependency approach: 
moving from a linear and deterministic perspective to a non-linear and more flexible one. 
As a result, this thesis suggests a circulating type of path dependency approach. This is 
intended to help understanding of the phenomenon of both new path creation by policy 
intervention, and the emergence of second-round path dependency. This chapter 
develops two concepts of policy reliance and behavioural persistence to apply the new 
model to the field. 
In Chapter Five, the methodology of the empirical work is discussed. This chapter 
outlines the methodological underpinnings of this thesis and the issues raised by 
fieldwork based on qualitative research methods and an analysis of secondary sources. 
Chapter Six explores the broader institutional factors which affect on the reproduction of 
government dependency at the actor's level. Daedeok regional innovation system is 
analysed through a path dependency perspective in association with the national context 
of Korea. This analytical chapter provides understanding of institutional inertia in 
shaping regional and entrepreneurial trajectories. 
Chapters Seven and Eight reveal the findings from qualitative interview data analysis. 
Chapter Seven focuses on the changes of risk perception of start-up firms in the process 
of new firm formation. Chapter Eight examines the behavioural persistence of start-ups 
in seeking benefit from policy support by focusing on four entrepreneurial activities: 
venture certification, fmancing choice, grant or subsidy chasing, and location choice. 
The concluding chapter attempts to make discursive expansion on the basis of research 
fmdings. Research findings from the empirical interview data analysis are critically 
reflected on a wider context, and the policy implications of this thesis are suggested. 
Finally, this chapter reflects on the limitations of this study and outlines the possible 
directions for further research. 
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2 HIGH-TECH START-UPS AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN DAEDEOK, KOREA 
2.1 Introduction 
REGIONAL 
This chapter discusses how knowledge workers like researchers or engineers become 
start-up entrepreneurs and outlines the role of high-tech start-up as the unit of analysis in 
this thesis. It also explores the characteristics of Daedeok in specific Korean locality 
over the last thirty year of period. High-tech start-ups and their technological 
entrepreneurship are increasingly considered to play a crucial role in the generation of 
both regional innovation and economic development. As witnessed in the case of Silicon 
Valley, there has been significant interest in the agglomeration of 'technopreneurial' 
activities and the ways in which they can contribute to regional transformation and high 
economic growth. In this respect, governments in many countries have attempted to 
promote 'technopreneurship' (Lek and AI-Hawamdeh, 2001; Venkataraman, 2004; 
Milton-Smith, 2006) by pursuing various policy initiatives. There are, however, a few 
issues with regard to this transformation process from technology to market and business. 
Starting up technology-based firms can be influenced by the nature of technology itself 
and people's perception of risk. When a certain technology has an 'embryonic' and/or 
'tacit' nature, there would be information asymmetry between the inventors and the 
people who try to commercialize their inventions (for further detail see Section 2.2.2). In 
this situation, technology transfer by way of licensing might be limited by possible risks 
if the inventors do not relevantly involved in commercialization process. Previous 
literature suggests inventor-founded start-ups rather than licensing tend to be emerged in 
this situation and incentive structure plays an important role for the inventors to decide 
which pathway they choose. This chapter discusses the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and risk-taking, the role of high-tech start-ups in regional innovation, 
and the rationale for choosing high-tech start-ups. In following section, it provides the 
understanding of start-ups in Daedeok in the context of specific Korean locality. 
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2.2 Rationale of high-tech entrepreneurship 
2.2.1 Entrepreneurship and risk-taking 
Although a ground-breaking contribution to the analysis of entrepreneurship was made 
by Schwnpeter (1934), start-up entrepreneurship has not drawn much attention as an 
academic theme until the late 1970s. This might partly be because research interest 
focused on large firms which were seen as the main vehicle of achieving economic 
growth. However, these views had to be revised after the world-wide crisis in the 1970s. 
People have seen that small firms are able to adapt to changing economic conditions 
better than large firms. Since the 1980s many researchers and policy makers have 
focused on SMEs and entrepreneurship. The concept of entrepreneurship has been 
defined in various ways in different disciplines. It seems to involve the discovery, 
creation and exploitation of opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Schwnpeter 
described entrepreneurs as active agents that seek to organise resources and actively 
refine the environment to be conducive to their pursuit (Schwnpeter, 1942). According 
to Sahlman and Stevenson (1991, p. 1), "entrepreneurship is a way of managing that 
involves pursuing opportunity without regard to the resources currently controlled. 
Entrepreneurs identify opportunities, assemble required resources, implement a 
practical action plan, and harvest the reward in a timely, flexible way". 
Entrepreneurship is apparently "a multi-faceted phenomenon that can be viewed from 
different angles" (Nijkamp, 2003, p. 397), but many researchers in the mean time have 
focused on 'risk-taking' as an important feature of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs, by 
their nature, have been understood as typical 'risk takers' who know how to properly 
deal with uncertain situations and willingly bear (or accept) riskiness. The feature of 
risk-taking by entrepreneurs is found in the dictionary defmition of an entrepreneur, who 
is a person that "organizes, operates, and assumes the risk for a business venture" 
(American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, 2000). 
Traditional entrepreneurship literature tends to attribute the success and failure of such 
behaviour to heroic individuals or specific individuals who possess special traits. But 
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recently, it is widely agreed that entrepreneurship is a complex social and economic 
phenomenon. In the broadest sense, it is defmed as "activities to promote socio-
economic stabilization and effective utilization of resources by stimulating socio-
economic progress. creating new values. and providing employment opportunities" 
(Yamada, 2002, p. 4). As Miller (1983) suggests, entrepreneurs are likely to take 
proactive action with risk bearing to explore business opportunities and promote 
innovation. Entrepreneurs must confront uncertainty and effectively cope with it in the 
real market particularly at the early stage of a start-up. Uncertainty can be created by a 
lack of information about environmental factors and their likely impact on the 
organisation and an inability to assign probabilities to events with any degree of 
confidence (Mokry, 1988). As Mokry argues, to some extent uncertainty can give firms 
opportunities for profit, but too much uncertainty can block a start-up or slow it down. 
Start-up motivation depends largely on the entrepreneur's prior knowledge and context, 
but it is also influenced by networks and environment (Dubini and Aldrich, 1991). 
Luger and Koo (2003) suggest that most of the literature on start-ups uses three different 
definitional criteria: 'new', 'active' and 'independent'. As they argue, these three criteria 
are closely interrelated. The 'independent' criterion, in particular, raises an important 
question on start-ups: should start-ups and spin-offs be distinguished? Spin:-offs are 
defined as "new firms created by individuals breaking off from existing ones to. establish 
competing companies of their own" (Garvin in ibid, p. 18). In this respect, some spin-
offs may not meet the 'independent' criterion. They argue that "whether a new firm can 
satisfy the 'independent' criterion depends on the relationship between a newly created 
start-up company and the firm for which its founder(s) originally workecf' (ibid, p. 19). 
In Korea, a legal definition of venture firms has been in common use, but the number of 
certified ventures by the government can not cover the growth of various start-ups. 
Particularly, there are around 60% of spin-offs from DST among the total number of 
high-tech start-ups in Daedeok Valley (Daedeok Valley Master Plan, 2001), but some of 
these spin-offs could not officially be certified as venture finns. How to define start-ups 
is closely associated with measuring their entrepreneurial activities or performance. 
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Small business owners commence their business for a variety of reasons. An 
understanding of the reasons why people start businesses would give useful insights into 
the nature of start-up businesses and entrepreneurship (Souter and Still, 2000). Many 
previous researches suggest that the motivation to start-up a business comes from 
various psychological or lifestyle reasons such as a desire to make more money, or to 
build wealth and social position for the family, or to work independently (Buttner and 
Moore, 1997; LeCornu et ai, 1996). However, the motivation of start-ups can be 
influenced by broader factors besides the entrepreneur's personal traits or abilities. 
Entrepreneurship and the growth pattern of start-ups can also be understood in the 
broader institutional, social and economic context. Nijkamp (2001, p. 399) suggests 
three complementary factors which may be used in an explanatory framework as follows: 
personal motivation; social environment; and external business culture. Personal 
motivation is the psychological factors to drive an individual to become an entrepreneur 
such as need for achievement or risk-taking propensity. The above-mentioned several 
characteristics can be generally identified from successful entrepreneurs in many cases. 
However, it has been criticized as many empirical studies have demonstrated that these 
psychological traits or propensities are also found among those people who are not self-
employed or are unsuccessful entrepreneurs. Social environment appears to be another 
important factor for entrepreneurship. It contains various situational contexts, 
encompassing entrepreneurs' dissatisfaction with a current job, the loss of job, 
encouraging circumstance of' start-up, organisational restructuring. But this approach 
alone is not enough to offer a necessary and sufficient condition for explaining 
entrepreneurship. External business culture indicates mainly cultural, political and 
institutional factors. Cultural factors like 'societal appreciation of entrepreneurship' or 
'recognition profile of successful entrepreneurs' can affect the level of new firm 
fonnation. Also political and institutional factors, like strong policy support for 
enterprises or the establishment of legislation for regulating firms can playa decisive 
role in stimulating entrepreneurship. 
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2.2.2 Rationale for choosing high-tech start-up firms 
Technological innovation and entrepreneurship have long been recognised as one of the 
most crucial driving forces for the development of capitalism. Newly developed 
technology can be commercialised through technology transfer or start-ups. In this 
process from technology to market and business, some technologies have led to great 
commercial success but others have disappeared from the market. There may be a big 
gap between laboratory research and commercial products. In this sense, the commercial 
value of a certain technologies is detennined in the market. However, inventors who 
developed new technologies do not always start their own business. Here, inventors 
mean the people who develop and hold certain technologies in the form of patents or 
knowledge. There are, generally speaking, technology producers and technology users in 
the market. Universities or research institutes are representative technology producers, 
and existing firms are typical technology users. When an inventor develops a certain 
new technology in the research lab, the inventor is likely to think about how to deal with 
it in terms of further development or commercialisation. There might be two possible 
choices for an inventor in this situation: licensing to existing firms or starting-up new 
ftrms. Licensing means that inventors make a contract to license their technologies to 
existing firms. In this case, licensees usually pay royalties to inventors for the 
intellectual property rights. ~ey must also consider several complicated factors related 
to market opportunity. In contrast, inventors can just take royalties and provide 
necessary consulting in line with a licensing contract. Thus, inventors are relatively 
taking less risk in this case than start-up. For inventors, founding their own firms must 
be more difficult route compared to licensing. Start-up might, of course, bring bigger 
rewards to inventors, if their challenges are successful. However, it seems to be riskier 
than licensing in that most inventors do not initially have enough business experiences 
and other resources. 
Consequently, significant questions can be asked with regard to the above argument: 
why do inventors become start-up entrepreneurs? What drives inventors to start high-
tech firms, and why don't inventors always license their inventions to existing firms? 
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Why are some technologies commercialised in start-up firms but others are not? To 
answer these questions, previous literature has focused on two features of technology: 
technological 'uncertainty' and 'tacitness' (Jensen and Thursby, 200 I; Lowe, 2002; 
Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Thursby and Thursby, 2002). In other words, when a certain 
technology has the nature of uncertain and tacit knowledge, then it is not easily 
transferred to existing firms in the market and consequently inventor-founded start-ups 
emerge (Lowe, 2002). There is likely to exist a sort of market failure in technology 
transfer or commercialisation when a technology has the characteristics of uncertainty or 
tacitness. Jensen and Thursby' (2001) used survey evidence to show that the start-ups 
were founded to develop inventions that were at an early or pre-prototype stage of 
development. These inventions can be characterised by considerable technological 
uncertainty. Inventions developed in research labs are 'embryonic' in many cases, thus 
may need further development by commercialising firms. This technological uncertainty 
can deter existing firms from initially licensing early-stage inventions. On the other hand, 
when the inventor holds 'tacit' and consequently 'not codifiable' knowledge related to 
hislher inventions, then the success or failure of technology commercialisation may 
strongly depend on the inventor's further efforts. The inventor's personal knowledge or 
experiences are usually gained in the process of working with the invention for a long 
period of time. Hence, the personal or tacit knowledge of the inventor is often critical 
and can be invaluable in shaping the outcome of technology commercialisation. It also 
requires the inventor's continuous involvement in transferring knowledge. These two 
matters may be solved by the inventor-founded start-up but also by inventor 
involvement in the process of commercialisation. Inventors can be associated with the 
firms which try to commercialise their technologies in different forms. For example, 
they can participate in the process of further development or provide necessary 
consulting activities. In some' cases, the inventor takes part in the management of the 
firm as a stakeholder. The licensing firm can propose various forms of incentives to the 
inventor for acquiring the successful outcome of technology commercialisation. 
The above problems can be logically distinguished and may have different implications. 
In this respect, two types of technologies can be considered: one is the case of 
24 
embryonic but codifiable technology, and the other is the case of reasonably developed 
but tacit technology. For successful commercialisation, the former case requires further 
development activities, and the latter needs close inventor affiliation. Uncertain and 
embryonic technology is difficult to fully assess since its commercial value is not yet 
proven in the market, and as a result its technological success is also uncertain. When an 
existing finn tries to commercialise an embryonic technology by a licensing contract 
with the inventor, the firm may fmd it difficult to predict the probability of its success. 
In contrast, tacit knowledge is difficult to write down or codify because it is embodied in 
human capital. As Shane (2002) argued, the skills or know-how involved in technology 
development are largely tacit and can not be easily sold or exchanged in the market. 
Thus, continuous and close personal contacts between the inventor and the licensee are 
necessary for successful technology transfer. Such distinction between tacit knowledge 
and embryonic knowledge can suggest different theoretical predictions about the 
outcome of technology commercialisation. However, this distinction is often obscure 
and even meaningless in the real field, as newly developed high technologies 
simultaneously have embryonic and tacit nature in many cases. This distinction is 
closely correlated with not only the problems of 'information asymmetry' or 'moral 
hazard' between the inventor and the licensee, but also the matter of incentives to induce 
the inventor to commercialise in both post-licensing and pre-licensing. Jensen and 
Thursby (2001) argued the inventor can privately maintain valuable information which 
belongs to the invention but non-contained in the licensing contract or patent 
documentation. They also argued that the inventor can decide to not transfer vital 
information related to the invention after the licensing contract is executed, if the 
transfer of technology requires costly effort on the part of the inventor. 
As argued above, inventors usually face the choice between different alternatives, when 
they try to commercialise their inventions. Generally speaking, inventor-founded start-
ups seem to be riskier than licensing or just simple affiliation. In this sense, it may be 
assumed that inventor-founded start-ups would be rare in the market, without any 
appropriate incentive mechanisms to induce inventor's risk taking. This sort of market 
failure can be more likely to occur when the inventor is relatively risk averse. On the 
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other hand, inventor's motivation to start-up can be affected by the organisational setting 
of technology producers or the institutional environment associated with technology 
commercialisation. Research institutes or universities may have fixed rules which endow 
more favourable conditions to the organisation itself rather than to the inventors on the 
occasion of their intellectual property rights being transferred. In particular, 'patent 
rights' usually belong to the research organisation rather the individual inventor when it 
is developed through a government sponsored R&D project. In this case, the inventor is 
an employee of the research organisation, and any eventual royalty is earned by the 
research organisations with only a certain proportion of incentives being given to the 
inventor. Inventors might need to license their inventions from the organisation which 
maintains all title or rights even when they want to start a new firm. 
Research organisations, whether they are public or private, are basically interested in 
technology transfer. At the same time, existing firms which require new technologies 
must be also keen on it. However, potential licensee can be confronted with the above 
mentioned two problems. Technological uncertainty and tacitness can be seen as the 
obstacles blocking successful technology transfer. Even in this case, however, inventors 
may willingly found their own firms, if incentive structures can properly induce their 
motivation. This is because they can have sufficient information about the potential 
value of their invention, and also they have adequate experience and ability for further 
commercialised development. In cases where a researcher tries to license hislher 
invention which legally belongs to hislher research organisation for starting up a new 
firm, but the licensing cost is bigger than hislher expectation, a start-up decision can be 
deterred. In this case, however, the inventor may choose the route of new development 
after start-up on the basis ofhi~er already embodied knowledge rather than the route of 
costly licensing. In this regard, it can be said that inventor's start-up decision depends 
largely on incentive structures associated with technology commercialisation. 
Start-up support policy can motivate inventors to found their new firms through the 
influence on 'opportunity recognition' (Park, 2005) or through incentive structures. 
Inventors or scientists who are potential entrepreneurs can be assumed to make start-up 
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decisions through their own risk-reward calculations. In the process of exploiting 
business opportunity, they may choose the difficult route of start-up rather than other 
routes like licensing, when they think any reward from a start-up venture would be 
bigger than the possible risks from it; or they believe risks of the challenge can be 
properly mitigated by their own potential capabilities. Inventions developed in labs are 
likely to be embryonic, particularly in case of R&D results from universities or public 
research institutes which are oriented in the field of basic research or pure science. These 
inventions are not developed in response to commercial market needs. As a result, the 
commercial potential of these inventions that are still in a pre-prototype fonn is 
uncertain, and the likelihood of their success is also quite small. The value of these 
uncertain inventions is difficult to evaluate in the market. Moreover, technology tends to 
be embodied in inventors in the fonn of tacit knowledge and hence is not easily 
codifiable. Infonnation asymmetry and contracting mechanisms are likely to make 
inventors drive new firm formation. As Lowe (2002) argues, embryonic technologies 
developed on basic research or in the field of new science, and/or inventions associated 
with high degree of tacit knowledge will be more likely to be commercialised in 
inventor-founded start-ups. 
2.2.3 The role of high-tech start-ups in regional innovation 
Entrepreneurship has been regarded as a critical factor for regional economic 
development. Researchers particularly in economic geography have long been interested 
in innovation in the geographical context. There have been many studies on industrial 
agglomeration in tenns of technology transfer, innovation, development of start-ups 
(Athreye, 2001; Zoltan and Attila, 2005; Roland et aI, 2005). There have also been 
studies with regard to regional learning infrastructure and environment as the 
detenninants of competitiveness and innovation (Yamada, 2002; Capello and Faggian, 
2005). New firm formation and the entrepreneurial activities of new start-ups can 
contribute to job creation and economic growth at a regional level through accelerating 
innovation and promoting the full use of resources (Potter, 2005). In this respect, 
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entrepreneurship can be said to be closely and inextricably linked with regional 
institutions or culture; 
"Because entrepreneurs make active use of external resources particularly at the 
start-up stage, entrepreneurs playa dualistic, contradictory role, one of agent of 
change, but the other of carrier of regional legacy" (Aoyama, 2003, p. 8). 
As seen in the case of United States, technological entrepreneurship indeed plays a 
central role in regional transformation, and the example of Silicon Valley has been 
frequently associated with entrepreneurship and regional innovation. The concept of a 
start-up eco-system can show how high-tech entrepreneurship is linked to regional 
innovation. High-tech start-ups can provide a region with wealth and vitality through 
continuous job creation and increased investment. At the same time, an innovative 
region can provide a favourable 'habitat' (Lee et aI, 2000) for breeding high-tech start-
ups. Considering this critical role of high-tech start-ups, policy makers have struggled to 
build a 'venture habitat' for nurturing their entrepreneurship. In the meantime, many 
countries have attempted to duplicate the case of Silicon Valley story through policy 
initiatives and conscious planning. However, scholars like Saxenian (1994) have argued 
that provision of tangible infrastructure or active policy intervention does not necessarily 
bring about a virtuous and spontaneous cycle of regional innovation. Instead, the 
'intangibles of entrepreneurship' (Venkataraman, 2004) such as risk-taking culture or 
the mobility of the workforce have been given more emphasis as the crucial factors of a 
region's success. Favourable legal systems or transparent market systems can be seen 
necessary prerequisites for nurturing high-tech entrepreneurship, and are factors usually 
conditioned by the development of the nation state. However, the above mentioned 
intangibles are largely influenced by the potential of regions. Thus regional institutions 
can play an important role in shaping regional entrepreneurship and consequently 
detennine the variations of it in each region. At the same time, the entrepreneurship of 
regional actors like high-tech start-up plays a critical role in facilitating regional 
transformation. 
A region can remain in a state of stable equilibrium when it has evolved over time 
through historical and regionai contingencies, and becomes settled into specific regional 
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institutions. In this case, these institutions, by repeatedly practicing certain cultural and 
economic activities in the same ways, contribute to the reproduction of a certain pattern 
of behaviours in a region (Venkataraman, 2004). As discussed above, knowledge 
workers' start-up decision depends not omy on the nature of technology which they hold 
but also on the incentive structure associated with technology commercialisation. This 
means that an incentive structure which is formulated by both private and public 
institutions can encourage knowledge workers to choose one of two possible pathways 
between starting up their own business and making licensing contract. In this respect, 
regional institutions and high-tech entrepreneurship are closely intertwined in 
transforming a region. A region can generate the impetus of continuous innovation when 
there is a virtuous and spontaneous cycle between actors and institutions within it. 
In summary, uncertain and/or tacit technology can be commercialised more often in 
inventor-founded (or at least, inventor-affiliated) start-ups, and it can be influenced by 
not only market incentives but also non-market incentive mechanisms like government 
policy support. In this transformation process from technology to business, institutions 
also have an influence through the formation of incentive structures. Thus, it can be said 
that high-tech entrepreneurship plays a central role in regional innovation and 
simultaneously, regional institutions influence the entrepreneurship of high-tech start-
ups. This chapter attempted to understand the rationale of technological entrepreneurship 
and the role of high-tech start-ups in regional transformation. This is linked to the 
discussion in following chapter about more expanded issues on innovation and policy. 
2.3 High-tech start-ups in 'Daedeok', Korea 
Daedeok in Korea was chosen as a study area for this research. Considering the purpose 
of this study, it is expected to be a relevant choice in that there is a large-scale science 
park (DST) and considerable number of spin-offs from it, and there have been quite long 
efforts of policy support to promote innovative activities such as R&D and start-ups. 
Daedeok has a unique position in the Korean national innovation system in that it has 
played a central role in generating knowledge through public R&D subsidization. DST 
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has long been understood as a national R&D hub, but more recently, many spin-off start-
ups have emerged in Daedeok. According to this change, there have been increased 
attempts to understand Daedeok not just as a 'technopole' but as an innovative cluster, a 
venture ecosystem or a regional innovation system (Han, 2000; Seol et ai, 2002; Kwon, 
2004; Lim et ai, 2006). How to understand Daedeok seems to be still controversial 
although it can be a starting point for the study on Daedeok. This study, as mentioned 
already, accepts a systems approach to innovation. In this sense, Daedeok is basically 
understood as a regional innovation system in this study. However, it needs to be 
understood under the consideration of Korean national innovation system. Thus, this 
section starts with the overview of Korean economic system and start-up sector. In 
addition, it presents the characteristics of Daedeok as a national R&D hub and a hotbed 
of high-tech based start-ups, particularly in tenns ofKorean-NIS and Daedeok-RIS. 
2.3.1 Growth of start-up sector In Korea 
The Korean economy, which was once admired in the world as an 'economic miracle' 
(Lucas, 1993), is now facing serious problems and limitations after the success of 'catch-
up' model. It has been quite successful in accomplishing 'condensed economic growth' 
in a short period of time through 1970s. This catching-up strategy based on cheap labour 
costs and the strong motivation to be rich was the main impetus which made this rapid 
growth possible. In addition, strong political leadership took the central role for pushing 
economic policies. Much of literature studying the Korean economic development 
recognised the Korean government as one of a few relatively successful developmental 
states (Evans, 1995). Since' a military coup in 1961, the military government 
concentrated its political power on mobilisation and allocation of national resources for 
rapid economic growth. In 1960s and 1970s, the government was quite competent to 
implement strategies and policies for its ambitious goals particularly in tenns of their 
effectiveness. On the strength of this active government initiative, Korean people were 
strongly motivated to work hard and bear poor working conditions with cheap wage 
levels. It could transfonn South Korea from one of the most starving nation after the 
Korean War (1950-1953) into the twelfth largest exporter ranked on the list of world 
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trade by volume in thirty years. This spectacular Korean growth was achieved through 
high investment and saving rates and vigorous export expansion which could be induced 
by policy intervention. 
However, the comparative advantages of the Korean economy diminished during the 
process of democratisation in 1980s. Increasing wage levels and the lack of core 
technology made the Korean economy slow down in the face of harsh global 
competition just as it was on the threshold of entering the group of advanced nations. 
Furthermore, the expansion and rigidity of the government sector has been increasingly 
experienced in this process (Kim, 2001). As a result, several symptoms began to appear 
on the surface of the overall Korean systems since the 1980s. Too frequent government 
intervention in the market, authoritative and unnecessary regulation, collusion between 
bureaucrats and businessmen were hindering the development of the free market 
economy and the adaptation to a rapidly changing economic environment. The result of 
these structural problems led to the erosion of national competitiveness. According to 
the World Competitiveness Report (IMO, 1998), the competitiveness of the Korean 
government sector as a whole was ranked 34th, management efficiency 44th , and the 
degree of its intervention at the bottom of 46 countries. In this respect, the economic 
crisis in 1997 might be an already foreseen consequence of the structural weakness of 
the Korean systems. After the crisis, the government has implemented strong reform 
programs throughout the overall Korean systems. As a result of these reforms, Korea 
was able to recover from the crisis in comparatively short period of time, and the IMO 
ranking of competitiveness in the government sector has ascended from 34th to 26th in 
the two years (IMO, 2000). However, in the aftermath of this unprecedented crisis, 
fundamental skepticism about the effectiveness of the traditional development strategies 
of the Korean economy began to emerge. 
The economic system within the country can be understood in the context of its 
complicated mixture of politics, social system, culture and history. There is an overall 
agreement that the Korean economy has worked on the basis of the following several 
factors: state-dominated system, imbalanced development strategy, large conglomerates 
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oriented economy rather thanSMEs, public investment for technological development. 
These factors could be very effective in the era of mass production and in the early stage 
of economic development. However the paradigm shift to a knowledge-based economy 
and globalisation required a different system and strategy for sustainable development. 
The Korean economy failed to adapt promptly to this rapidly changing environment. 
This might be explained well by the perspective of path dependency in that the whole 
system and strategy for the Korean economy was locked into a path which was 
successful in the past. In particular, the government-led economic development 
strategies and the concentration in the capital area (the Capital, 'Seoul' and its 
surrounding regions) were challenged by the rapid growth of the private sector and the 
necessity for balanced regional development. In Korea, as a result of an imbalanced 
development strategy, most of the population and the national government function have 
been traditionally concentrated on Seoul. The land area of Seoul and its surrounding 
region is just 11.8% of the total national territory of Korea, but 46.3% of the population, 
56.6% of the manufacturing companies, 46.2% of GRDP, 83% of government-
sponsored organisations, and 95% of 100 major companies' headquarters are 
concentrated in that area as of 2002 (Han, 2004). This phenomenon is still creating 
varied and serious problems to the national economy, but it seems difficult to find a 
solution to sort out these problems in the near future. The concept of path dependency 
can be very effective in addressing this phenomenon. Recently, the Korean government 
has been struggling to breakthrough this 'lock-in' situation by encouraging regional 
innovation and creating a more balanced regional development strategy. 
As mentioned above, the Korean economy has experienced radical changes and 
institutional contradictions particularly since 1997. As a matter of fact, Korea's 
miraculous economic performance was not achieved in a policy vacuum. Instead, the 
role of the government was regarded as a 'change agent' during the period of economic 
drive. However, public sector has its 'Janus-faced' feature; on the one hand, it is being 
promoted for sustaining economic development, but on the other hand, it is quite often 
seen as the hotbed of corruption and inefficiency. This dual standard is also applied to 
the large conglomerates, known as the 'chaebols' - family-owned large business 
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conglomerates (Shin and Chang, 2003). The chaebols were at the heart of production, 
employment and export growth for the Korean economy, particularly during the period 
of 1970s when the policy focus was concentrated on the setting up of heavy and 
chemical industries. They had been "backed by government-administered credit 
allocation to enable them to achieve the government's industrial targeting by taking 
advantage of economies of scale" (Abo, 2001, p. 454). The Korean government 
controlled and directed banks to meet these policy measures. In consequence, the 
chaebols could expand and diversify their business domain through aggressive debt-
financing. They generally focused on increasing market share and external expansion. 
They acted as guarantors to their affiliates and subsidiaries in order to secure loan 
financing from the banks. This meant that the banking and the corporate sectors in Korea 
became intertwined. For years, the Korean government had treated "the banks as tools of 
state industrial policy, ordering them to make loan to un creditworthy companies and 
industries" (the Economist, 15 November, 1997 in Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 42). Not 
surprisingly, the banks had to take on the serious burden of bad debts, due to the 
increase in the rate of bankruptcy of corporations since the fmancial crisis. According to 
the MOFE (Ministry of Finance and Economy, 2000, p. 35), huge amounts of public 
funds (a total of 64 trillion Korean Won by the end of 1999) have been injected to rescue 
the troubled banks. Shin and Chang (2003) describe this Korean catching-up model as 
'the state-banks-chaebols nexus' which means close collaboration between the state, a 
dominant player, and other players. 
However, by the 1980s these chaebol-oriented policies became increasingly questioned 
as a result of the revelation of their serious inefficiency and problems. It is apparent that 
they contributed to rapid economic growth, but at the same time they are being criticized 
as 'the villain of the piece' because of their serious bad effects on the national economy. 
In the meantime, the chaebols bad been closely connected to politicians. This created a 
moral hazard which was prevalent in the overall economy, and also produced a deeply 
rooted chain of corruption between the conglomerates and politics. 
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Consequently, the Korean government began to pay attention to the development of 
SMEs which, in a rapidly changing economic environment, have greater efficiency and 
economic benefits compared to the large enterprises. Since 1997, the chaebols 
experienced a rapid dismantling process. Some of them merged with foreign companies 
and some were divided into several sectoral companies or forced into bankruptcy 
themselves as a consequence of their credit burden. During the post-crisis IMF 
programmes, thirteen out of the top-thirty chaebols went into court-supervised 
restructuring (Pyo, 2004). For example, the Daewoo Group, Korea's second largest 
chaebol in terms of asset size was dismantled due to its excessive debt burden. This 
shocking story demonstrated that the traditional belief of "chaebol should never fail" no 
longer holds true in the Korean economy (Ahn, 200 I, p. 460). As a consequence of this 
logic of 'too big to fail', there had been a kind of moral hazard (in the form of excessive 
risk-taking) that "the government cannot afford to sit and watch them go bankrupt for 
fear of large-scale 'ripple effects' such as large-scale unemployment and bankruptcy of 
subcontracting firms" (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 47). 
These series of phenomena could be interpreted as the result of 'the failure to adapt' due 
to their insensibility as seen in the case of the extinction of dinosaurs. Another target 
seriously criticized after the crisis was the banking system which had been controlled or 
influenced by the government. The Korean government began to push the restructuring 
of the corporate and financial sectors. In this process, the Korean government needed to 
find a new driving force to replace the chaebols to create sustainable economic growth 
and found the answer to solve this problem in high tech start-ups (these have been called 
'venture firms'). Originally this 'venture policy' adopted in the 'Kim Dae-jung' (fanner 
president of Korea elected shortly after the crisis) administration was targeted on job 
creation in order to reduce the unemployment rate which was increasing sharply after the 
IMF crisis. This policy aim was quite effectively achieved on the initial stage of 
struggling efforts from the crisis, and it seemed to be a clever contrivance of 'killing two 
birds (job creation and the replacement of the chaebols) with one stone'. 
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The tart-up ct r in Korea began to emerge from the mid 1980s. However, until the 
mid 1990 , Kor an tart-up firms were labelled 'high-risk but low-return' rather than 
'high-ri k and high-return'. This low profitability hampered the growth of risk 
inve tment in the market. As a matter of fact, the co-evolution between start-up firms 
and venture capital companies is seen as a 'which-came-first-the-chicken-or-the-egg 
qu tion'. Thu it can be said that there was a sort of vicious circle between the poor 
profitability nd th lack of equity investment in overall start-up sector in Korea. 
IIm: ever, thi ector turned around the comer since the late 1990s for market-driven 
growth. A rapid growth and wide dissemination of infom1ation technology (IT) like 
oftware or int met paved the broad way for a leap in the nwnber of high-tech start-ups. 
As e n n th graph in Figure 1, the number of high-tech start-ups (certified venture 
firm ) b gan t harply increase from 1998 after the government launched 'venture 
prom tion' programme in 1997. This increasing trend reached to a peak in 2001 and it 
b gan to decrea from 2002. 
Fi'Sllr I. limber of certified venture firms by the governmen t in Korea 
12,000 -r--------------., 
10,000 +-------
ou MBA ( mall and Medium Business Administration) 
In m fmancial cri i can be seen as providing a good opportunity for high-
t h tart-up m rg from the shadows and come to public attention. However, tillS 
remarkabl gr \! tll f high-tech tart-ups during this period was largely influenced by 
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the thriving Korean IT industry despite overall setbacks in the economy. The Korean 
government set out a clear aim to ensure it did not lag behind in the information era 
reflecting the painful lesson it experienced because of its industrial backwardness. 
Consequently, the transition towards information-oriented society has progressed quite 
speedily. Korean people are well known as 'early adopters' in the IT product markets as 
evidenced by fast adoption of mobile and internet-related services. On the basis of these 
institutional factors and strong government support, the importance of IT startups 
particularly 'dot-com' businesses increased dramatically during this period. Over the 
past a few years after 1997, a large proportion of the budget was concentrated on 
fostering 'ventures' in this field. 
However, the government support policies for 'venture firms' stirred up the controversy 
of 'venture bubble' after a short booming period. After the dramatic boom of new 'dot-
com ventures' and the related financial markets, the optimistic outlook began to be 
changed as most of the companies which had no concrete profit models collapsed in 
spite of desperate government supporting efforts (Shin and Chang, 2003). This 
shockwave, not surprisingly, damaged many individual investors who invested money in 
'dot-coms'. In this process, several problems were revealed such as fraud incidents or 
'rent-seeking' behaviour like lobbying, presumably arising from moral hazards related to 
corruption and stock market manipulation. Since then, both policy makers and the public 
began to fundamentally question not only the effectiveness of this venture support policy 
but also the viability of the 'ventures'. Critics attributed this 'unexpected' side effect to 
both the moral hazard created by the ventures and the government's policy failure (Kim 
and Lee, 2003; Kim and Doh, 2004). In this vein, it seems that indiscrete attempts to 
evaluate this policy in the short term are not only impossible but also. not desirable. 
However, it seems quite obvious that these unintended effects have been produced from 
the policy responses of actors. 
5MBA (Small and Medium Business Administration) which was established in 1996 to 
support SMEs at the sub-ministry level administration launched a special institution 
termed 'venture business certification' since 1997 by the legislation of the Act on 
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Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture Businesses (this was time limited 
legislation - for 10 years until 2007). 5MBA has designated those small size high-tech 
companies who meet any of the following four criteria in the below box as 'venture 
fmns', and provides various policy support for such certified ventures. This unique 
institution in Korea has been regarded as a hidden contributor to the rapid growth of 
start-up sector. However, the increased number of certified ventures by the government 
does not necessarily mean a significant expansion of market potential. It means this 
selection mechanism by the government would be always under the risk of market 
distortion by several reasons like 'government failure', if market forces are not matured 
enough to buffer this type of direct policy intervention (Jung, 2004). These four types or 
definitions of venture fmn were transformed into three types by the revision of the Act 
in 2002. The third and fourth types in previous criteria were integrated as a type of 'new 
technology finns'. 
The category of legally defined 'venture' firms 
• Venture cllpital-bQCked firms: more than 10 percent of the stake should be 
invested by venture capital companies 
• R&D intensive firms: R&D investment should account for more than 5 percent of 
the total revenue of the preceding fiscal year 
• New technology based patent firms: new technology-based products should 
account for more than 50 percent of the previous year's total revenue or more than 
2S percent of exports. In this case, new technologies include patents, utility 
models, or other new technologies developed by R&D projects designated under 
Presidential ordinances . 
• Positively evaluated high-tech firms: firm's technologies should be evaluated as 
excellent and promising ones from designated institutions empowered to conduct 
technology evaluation by the government. 
The purpose of this policy measure was basically to select firms which have strong 
upside potential and to provide them with some favoured even in some cases exceptional 
benefit or financial assistance. Given the logic of 'selection and concentration', this 
selecting mechanism can be very effective, and seems to be invaluable criteria for the 
government who allocates scarce resources. Although there have been many criticisms 
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in the meantime and it has been adjusted from the government-led certification to the 
more private sector-oriented selection, it is still in operation in Korea. 
Powered by the growing number of venture businesses, venture financing markets such 
as venture capitalists, stock market and 'angel' networks grew explosively during that 
period. Following Silicon Valley, new start-ups are likely to resort to equity or risk 
financing rather than debt fmancing. Start-ups usually do not have sufficient tangible 
assets or market revenues, so it is not so easy for them to borrow money from 
commercial banks. Venture capitalists provide seed money to early-stage start-ups and 
support them to grow fast to create rapid increases in turnovers from the investment. 
Startup-oriented stock markets like KOSDAQ (Korea Security Dealers Association 
Automated Quotation system) or its US counterpart NADAQ (National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system) make the virtuous circulation of 
venture investment possible through direct equity fmancing both for start-ups and 
venture capitalists. It means that the stock market offers exit opportunities to private 
investors such as venture capitalists and angel investors. In Korea, the government took 
a central role in the growth of the venture capital industry. Unlike the typical US venture 
capital, 'start-up investment companies' which were established under the supervision or 
investment of 5MBA have led the equity fmancing for ventures in Korea. This type of 
Korean venture capital has formed investment funds with outside investors mostly 
government, institutional investors and corporations. 
KOSDAQ market was opened officially in 1996. It began to grow significantly in terms 
of size and volume since 1998. The existence of KOSDAQ market has been 
undoubtedly crucial for the growth of venture business even though once again there has 
been the social stigma of it being a hotbed of venture corruption. The peak in market 
valuation in 1999 appears to have been a 'venture bubble', but since then, KOSDAQ 
market has been showing at least a solid growth path. As of the year 2001, KOSDAQ 
enjoyed a head-to-head stance in terms of listings and transaction volumes with Korea 
Stock Exchange (Kim and Lee, 2002). Venture firms have played a crucial role in 
growth of the KOSDAQ market. Many government-certified ventures have used 
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K SO for their initial public offerings (IPO). At the same time, the existence of an 
' exit route' mad venture capitalists optimistic that they can get capital gains from their 
inve tment within a certain period of time. 
2.3.2 Unique position of Oaedeok in Korean·NIS 
At the initial tage of economic development, Korea could enjoy a comparative 
ad antage on the ba i of cheap labour costs. The import of foreign capital and advanced 
techn logi fr m the developed countries was quite easy and cheap. However, when 
Korea ntered into the next stage of economic development based on heavy and high-
technology indu trie , it became more difficult for Korea to maintain the higb level of 
econ mic gr wth in the following decades without independent innovative capability in 
scienc and t chn logy. Thus, the central government of Korea decided to create a large 
scale cience t \ n at the centre of South Korea to compensate the lack of private sector 
R D capacity. In 1973, the government initiated the construction plan for Daedeok 
Science own (DST) in Daejeon. 
SeolJl 
Geor ga:"lgfR. vel 
Oaedeok Science Town 
Bt-sun 
HtlII'ltA 
FifIur 2. Location of Daedeok Science Town (DST) 
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The above maps (Figure 2) show that DST is geographically surrounded by the DMC 
(Daejeon Metropolitan City), the fifth largest city in Korea. Daejeon is located at the 
distance of two hours by car from the Capital Seoul, and it is well connected to other 
regions within two or three hours by motorways or railways. At this point, it is necessary 
to think about why the decision was made to locate the DST in Daejeon not Seoul. Some 
researcher who studied the DST argue that the DST project appears to be a purely 
political deci ion by the late president Park to locate a new centre of excellence in a 
'non-Seoul ' region so as to mark his efforts at decentralization (Castells and Hall, 1994). 
They seem to conclude that neither functionally nor industrially was DST a viable 
project. According to their opinion, Seoul and the suburban belt around the capital was 
the only place in Korea where they could fmd the necessary synergy, dynamism, and 
network for science and teclmology (Ko and Kim, 1997). 
Table 1. A brie/history 0/ 'DST' 
1\lay 1973 Basic plans for town construction decided by the Ministry of Science and Technology. 
Construction work of basic fa cilities and institutes started. The speed of 
t\lar. 1974 construction was slowed until 1976 due to the po litical apathy and resistance of 
residents aga inst the land acquisition . 
Dec. 1977 
Apr. 1978 
Aug. 1981 
May 1985 
ov. 1992 
Aug. 1993 
Dec. 1993 
Jan. 1997 
-Sep. 2000 
The t\1inistry of Construction took the charge of building DST. and designated 
Daedeok as the Indus trial Base Development Area. 
Research institutes started to moving in. 
The basic planning for Daedeok Industrial Based Development project was 
anno unced by the Ministry of Construction. 
Plans for public land development began (Korea Land Development Corporation). 
The site was developed by the public development scheme. 
The construction of foundation faciliti es completed. 
International exposition, Daejeon Expo '93, was held. commemorat ing the 
completion of DST construction. 
The Daedeok Science Town Administration Act was enacted. 
Daedeok R sea rch Complex Manage me nt Plan announced to the public 
Proc lamation of 'Dae deok Valley' 
Dec 200·1 Dnedeok was designated as a 'specialised R&D zone' 
Source: Daedeok Science Town Management Office, 2004 
A hown in Table 1, it took almost two decades to plan and construct the whole project. 
The proces of developing DST was far from smooth. The basic plan was modified more 
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than three times, and the government agencies which were responsible for plarirung and 
coordinating the development of OST, were changed from time to time. 
From the beginning, OST was conceived as a pure science town entirely devoted to 
research institutions, supported by scientific and engineering universities. The intended 
linkage with private finns was to be established through the research organisations of the 
private sector (Ko and Kim, 1997). The total land area developed was 27.61cm2 and 48% 
of the site is used for accommodating research and educational institutions. As of the 
end of 2004, total of 251 organizations are housed and more than 21 ,849 people are 
working in OST. Among them, there are 19 (8,003 employees) government founded 
research institutes, 9 (2,535 employees) government invested research institutes, and 11 
(728 employees) public service agencies. Table 2 shows the concentration of a high 
quality labour force in OST. It means that OST can be seen as the pool of knowledge 
and human resources. 
Table 2. Personnel of DST 
Researchers 
Total Research assistants Administrative staff 
PhD Masters Undergraduate Total 
21,849 5,687 6,464 2,604 14,755 2,287 4,807 
Source: Daedeok Science Town Management Office, 2004 
Historically, only seven research institutes were moved into Oaedeok before 1980. The 
relocation of government research institutes was quite slow during the 1980s. The total 
number of re earch organisations moved into OST is 11, and out of these orgarusations 
only 1 is from the private sector. It means that before 1990, the central government was 
the main actor because 15 out of 18 institutes established in Oaedeok were government 
or public research institutes, only 3 were R&D branches of private finns . However, the 
pri ate e tor began to take a leading role in the development of OST during the fust 
half of 1990s. Research institutes from industry were moved into OST and 7 others 
follow d during the econd half of 1990s. As shown in Table 3, the fields of research in 
D T h wa wide range of heterogeneity. 
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Table 3. Major Fields of research in DST 
Field of Research and Development No. of research institutes No. of venture labs 
Telecommunications 
Biotechnology 
Mechanics/Aerospace 
Energy 
Material Science 
Fine (synthetic) chemistry 
Standard/Fundamental science 
Others 
Total 
9 
8 
6 
11 
5 
11 
4 
4 
58 
Source: Daedeok Science Town Management Office, 2004 
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28 
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Owing to the existence of DST, DMC has relatively high potential in the field of R&D 
and innovation (See Table 4). Daejeon has a total of 436 research organisations (5 .6% of 
national total , ranked 3rd after capital regions such as ' Seoul ' and 'Gyungi ' province), 
and among them, there are 20 public research institutes, 26 universities, and 390 private 
company R&D organisations. 
Table 4. R&D expenditure of Daejeon 
Nation total (A) DaeJeon (8) 
Million Won Million Won B/A(%) 
University 1,932,663 180,414 9.3 
Public sector 2,626,326 1,324,349 50.4 
Private sector 14,509,663 893,012 6.1 
Total 19,068,682 2,397,775 11 .4 
R&D expenditure 110 thousand people 3,336 13,009 
National R&DlTotai R&D 4,121,666 25.6 1,092,125 59.6 
Regional R&DlTotal R&D 383,154 0.02 8,281 0.0 
R&D/Local authority's budget 0.76 0.53 
Source: Survey Report (2004, MOST and KISTEP) 
The number of R&D engineers in Daejeon is 18,428 persons (9.3% of nation total) and 
ranks 2nd after Seoul. On the other hand, the total amount of R&D expenditure in 
Daejeon is 2,397.7 billion Won (as of 2003) and particularly the R&D spending of 
Daejeon per 10 thousand people is 13,009 million Korean Won (ranked 1 st among a total 
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16 local authority). But as shown in below table, the portion of national R&D 
expenditure in this total is 59.6%. It means that R&D in Daejeon is largely dependent on 
the central government. Contrastingly the portion of the local authority 's R&D 
expenditure among its annual budget is only 0.53% (ranked 14th among 16 local 
authorities). 
Tables 5 and 6 show the regional distribution of R&D resources in Korea. In these statistics, 
Daejeon appears to have a relatively high portion in respect of criteria such as R&D 
expenditure, research organisations and the number of researchers. Tllis high potentiality in 
the field of R&D in Daejeon is obviously attributed to the existence ofDST. 
Table 5. Distribution of R&D resources in Korea 
R&D expenditure Research organisation Researchers 
Billion Won % No. % Person % 
Nation 19,068.7 100.0 7,820 100.0 198,171 100.0 
Seoul 3,678.3 19.3 2,521 32.2 52,787 26.6 
Busan 332.3 1.7 300 3.8 7,351 3.7 
Daegu 231 .5 1.2 244 3.1 4,799 2.4 
Incheon 582.4 3.1 347 4.4 6,022 3.0 
Gwangju 253.3 1.3 154 2.0 4,162 2.1 
Daejeon 2,397.7 12.4 436 5.6 18,428 9.3 
Table 6. Distribution of research organisations in Korea 
Public research Universities Private research total institutes organisations 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Nation 241 100.0 398 100.0 7,181 100.0 7,820 100.0 
Seoul 55 22.8 69 17.3 2,397 33.4 2,521 32.2 
Busan 9 3.7 27 6.8 264 3.7 300 3.8 
Daegu 7 2.9 17 4.3 220 3.1 244 3.1 
Incheon 6 2.5 10 2.5 331 4.6 347 4.4 
Gwangju 9 3.7 16 4.0 129 1.8 154 2.0 
Daejeon 20 8.3 26 6.5 390 5.4 436 5.6 
Source: Survey Report (2004, MOST and KISTEP) 
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According to the statistics of KOSEF (Korea Science and Engineering Foundation), 
there are 14 SRCs and ERCs (2 Science Research Centres and 12 Engineering Research 
Centres) which were designated by the government in Daejeon as of 2003. This 
represents 23% among the national total of 62 centres. This programme is aiming to 
foster high quality human resources centering around universities through the 
networking of the isolated capability among respective research organizations. On the 
other hand, there are 4 RRCs (Regional Research Centres) and 1 TIC (Technology 
Innovation Centre) in Daejeon as of 2003. These statistics and previous studies indicate 
that DST has been positioned, at the core of science and technology development as a 
national R&D hub. At the same time, DST endows Daejeon, its surrounding region, with 
the highest potential to be an innovative region except the capital Seoul. 
The development of DST was initiated by central government planning and anchored 
from the outset on the location of government research institutes. The development of 
science towns or science parks like DST has been regarded as a way of maximizing the 
use of limited R&D resources. Especially, it was expected that DST could enhance 
research efficiency through a systematic and comprehensive R&D investment to each 
institute, create an optimal research environment by mutual exchange and application of 
a variety of infonnation, knowledge and know-how, and promote investment 
effectiveness by the shared use of facilities, manpower and projects (Oh and Kang, 
1997). In order to achieve these aims, the development of DST in the initial stage was 
centered on public sector research institutes and nationally funded research programmes. 
It has been widely accepted that DST contributed to knowledge generation and high-
skilled human resource supply in overall Korean economic system. Particularly, when 
the R&D capability of universities and the private sector was not matured enough, it has 
taken a crucial role to correct 'market failure' in this field. For example, KAIST (Korea 
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology) has fulfilled annually about 1,000 
entrusted research contracts and supplied approximately 30,000 highly educated 
engineers to the public and private sectors since its opening. On the other hand, there 
have been many remarkable R&D perfonnances particularly in the field of basic and 
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core technology development. CDMA in mobile technology, new medicine for AIDS 
'Factive', nuclear reactor and artificial satellite development are representative 
achievements produced in DST. 
DST was originally designed as a kind of 'technopole' in terms of science and 
technology policy. It can be understood in a similar way to a 'growth pole' in economic 
development policy. Thus, in the initial stage, DST started from an isolated 'pole' like 
an island, but it has gradually developed as a 'R&D driven innovation cluster' (MOST 
and DMC, 2004). It means that the R&D function is situated at the top in the value chain 
of Daedeok. Of course, it might be controversial to describe DST as a 'cluster' in that 
industrial function has been excluded for nearly two decades. However, since the mid 
1 990s, DST began to be transformed from the characteristics of a simple R&D park into 
the innovative complex combined with industrial function through the start-up process. 
Thus it would not be wrong to describe 'Daedeok' as a 'cluster' under the current 
situation. On the other hand, when it comes to innovation system, it can be meaningful 
to look at DST through a lens of 'National Innovation System' (NIS). DST as a NIS has 
worked well under the catching-up strategy. The physical concentration of R&D 
facilities in a specific region and the provision of public R&D subsidies took a central 
role in terms of knowledge generation. As Table 7 shows, DMC has the biggest 
innovative potentiality in Korea at least in the field of technological innovation. Without 
doubt, this comes from the existence ofDST within its administrative boundary. 
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Table 7. Index o/regional technology innovation potentiality in Korea 
Concentration Concentration Concentration Concentration Index of Tec. of R&D of R&D of R&D of Inte"ectual 
labour forces expenditure organizations property right Innovation 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) potentiality 
Korea 1.17 3.01 0.24 0.33 4.75 
Seoul 1.59 4.33 0.38 0.67 6.96 
Busan 0.63 0.67 0.10 0.09 1.49 
Daegu 0.59 1.31 0.11 0.12 2.13 
Inchon 0.73 1.97 0.24 0.15 3.10 
Gwangju 0.76 1.32 0.12 0.22 2.42 
Oaejeon 4.08 14.40 0.44 0.52 19.44 
Ulsan 1.02 0.74 0.17 0.08 2.01 
Gyungi 1.50 5.49 0.34 0.48 7.82 
Ganwon 0.93 0.61 0.07 0.07 1.68 
Chungbuk 1.02 1.00 0.22 0.12 2.35 
Chungnam 0.98 1.19 0.21 0.15 2.52 
Jeonbuk 0.76 0.57 0.09 0.08 1.50 
Jeonnam 0.39 0.38 0.07 0.05 0.89 
Gyungbuk 0.71 1.73 0.14 0.32 289 
Gyungnam 0.79 1.25 0.18 0.10 2.31 
Jeju 0.43 0.53 0.06 0.04 1.05 
Source: Modified from the Survey of SCIence and technology StatIStICS, Intellectual 
property statistics (2002, The Korean Intellectual Property Office) 
(Note) 
(I) Numberofresearchersl economically active population x 100 
(2) R&D expenditure/G ROP x 100 
(3) Number of research institutesltotal number of corporation x 100 
(4) umber of patent application! economically active population x 100 
However, despite the large scale of DST and the long period of policy concentration on 
it, spatial concentration of R&D functions seems to have had little spill-over effect on 
regional development at least until the mid of 1990s (Daedeok Valley Master Plan, 
2001). This is partly a result of the absence of substantial programmes to favour synergy 
and of specific mechanisms to implement such a program. If the goal of creating a 
science town is to provide the research basis for economic productivity and 
competitiveness, the integration of public agencies and private firms at the very onset of 
the design is a precondition for future linkages between basic research, R&D, and 
industrial applications (Castells and Hall, 1994). As mentioned above, DST is currently 
experiencing gradual changes to that of an innovative industrial cluster. But in the 
meantime (even until more recently), the main actors in DST were public research 
institutes and the government as their strong supporter. In this regard, it might be 
assumed that there has been very limited learning mechanism between tlle limited actors 
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in DST. The function of knowledge transfer was relatively weak compared to the 
function of knowledge generation. According to NIS approach, innovative activities are 
not solely and dominantly dependent on just entrepreneurial actors like flnns, but instead 
interconnected with many other actors like universities or public actors. In the same 
manner, several factors related to innovative activities also need to be considered: 
knowledge generation, product and process innovations, and other determinants of 
innovation such as incentive structures or the availability of skilled labour. In this regard, 
technological innovation might be just one of several successful factors in a NIS. 
Considering the existence of DST, Daedeok must be having a unique position in the 
Korean-NIS, particularly in the fleld of high-tech R&D. It points out that policy 
initiatives were quite well functioned for organisational buildings, fmancing and 
performing R&D, and promotion of human resource development. However, as DMC 
recognised in Daedeok Valley Master Plan (2001), Daedeok revealed a few weaknesses 
particularly in institutional Interactions and technological entrepreneurship. R&D 
collaborations and technology diffusions were not well facilitated in Daedeok. In 
addition, informal interactions and personnel mobility were not activated beyond the 
boundary of the R&D domain. 
The NIS, in Korea, was important when economic development and technological 
innovation were mainly directed by the government policies, but more recently, RIS 
approaches have become increasingly important for regional development under the 
globalisation of economic processes (Park, 2001). In the RIS perspective, regional actors 
and factors such as the role of local authorities and the local innovative milieu need to be 
taken into account as more critical ingredients of innovation system. From the viewpoint 
of RIS, the weakness of Daedeok can be identified easily such as the lack of 
collaboration between R&D and industrial sector, the lack of diversity of actors and 
networks with other regional actors, the weak role of local governments (Seol et ai, 
2002; Kim and Jung, 2005). Basically it might be impossible to understand 'Daedeok' 
through a single theoretical model, hut a lens of RIS appears to be very helpful to 
analyse Daedeok in association with NIS. 
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2.3.3 Characteristics of Daedeok-RIS 
Until the mid 1990s, it seems that DST attained the critical mass of researchers and 
institutions large enough to spawn high-technology spin-offs at least from an external 
and quantitative point of view. Actually the history of spin-offs in DST goes back to the 
end of 1980s, but its increased pace in numbers began to grow explosively since 1998, 
the period of venture boom as seen on Table 8. 
Table 8. Change in numbers of start-ups in Daedeok 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total 250 300 493 776 811 814 824 
Certified 30 170 340 503 413 393 367 
Uncertified 220 130 153 273 398 421 457 
Source: 5MBA, Daejeon Metropolitan City 
Figures in this table might be very confusing for non-Koreans. Some of figures 
(particularly in the case of uncertified start-ups) are estimated numbers. This complexity 
in statistics comes from the special institution of 'venture certification system' in Korea. 
The term 'venture fmn' has been widely used, but there is not a fixed definition in its 
concept. In general, it means a certified company by the government in Korea, but it is 
obviously not enough to cover the various typologies of start-ups. Nevertheless, statistics 
on start-up numbers could be collected by this legal defmition after 1997 in Korea. Thus, 
in the above table, the number of certified start-ups means the firms officially certified 
by the government as venture finns, and the number of uncertified start-ups contains 
estimated figures of non-certified start-ups in Daejeon. Unfortunately, statistics of start-
ups before 1997 can not be gained because there was no officia l scheme to make 
statistical data on start-up firms. 
According to Daejeon city, in 1998 when venture certification was started, the total 
number of start-ups was estimated to be 250 including 30 certified venture firms . In 
these statistics, uncertified venture finns mean generally ' newly established technology-
oriented finns ' even though they are not certified by the government (Seol et aI, 2002). 
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As seen on the below chart (Figure 3), the number of start-ups began to increase sharply 
from 1999, but the number of certified venture finns began to decrease in 2002. This 
tendency was not confined to Daedeok but was general nationwide: total 11,392 venture 
finns in 200 I but 8,778 in 2002. 
Figure 3. Changes in number of certified venture firms in Daedeok 
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In the early 1990s, few researchers formed their own business and the nwnber increased 
gradually. KAIST opened an incubation centre in 1994 to encourage starting up and 
technology innovation. In 1996, these start-ups made an informal gathering, named 
'Daedeok 21 st Century'. Its membership was originally limited to the start-up company 
spin-offs from DST, but later it was gradually opened to other start-ups from 
neighbouring regions. This .spontaneous start-up phenomenon contributed to the 
transformation of DST from a research and academic agglomeration to an innovative 
cluster with an industrial function as well. 
Seol et al. (ibid) suggest that the reason for this significant change in DST can be found 
in some of economic, social and institutional changes such as the improvement of living 
condition of DST, govemnlent policy and legislative supports, the influence of 
nationwide restructuring particularly since the crisis in 1997. DST was isolated from the 
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outside until the early 1990s, so most of the researchers felt some inconvenience to live 
in OST. Even though OST was originally designed as an ideal place for R&O which has 
good amenity in terms of a living environment, other factors such as cultural and 
educational provision were quite restricted compared to other urban areas. But, 
following the incorporation of DST into Daejeon City in 1989 and the 'International 
Exposition 1993' held in Oaejeon, the urban infrastructure around DST in particular 
began to be improved remarkably. In terms of institutional changes, there have been a 
few significant institutional reforms in Daedeok. The government (MOST) launched a 
support program for researcher's start-up from 1990. This program contains some 
unconventional benefits which are enough to stimulate researcher's motivation for start-
ups: to allow researchers to use technologies which are developed in research institutes 
after start-up; to permit researchers to spend as many as three years away from their 
jobs; to approve unofficial fundraising inside research institutes for making seed money 
for business starts. On the other hand, industrial facilities were not allowed in DST from 
the beginning stage of its planning by special legislation. But, as 'DST Management 
Act' was revised in 1996, a 'technology commercialisation area' was added as a possible 
way of land utilisation. Since then, industrial facilities such as incubation centres, small-
scale venture business complexes, etc. could be developed or could move into DST. The 
far-reaching restructuring in Korea after the IMF crisis also has an impact. This affected 
private sector research institutes first and public research institutes later. In the case of 
private research institutes, there were around 30-40% staff reductions and organisation 
curtailment for the year of 1998. Some of the research institutes were closed following 
the bankruptcy of their mother corporations. In the case of public research institutes, 
personnel reduction was inevitable due to budget cutbacks. It was implemented mainly 
through early retirement. Approximately half of these retired staff was absorbed into 
newly created start-ups. Spontaneous retirements for start-ups began to increase from 
the end of 1990s. This phenomenon can be seen to be partly influenced by the social 
atmosphere at that time due to 'venture boom'. Many researchers or engineers in PRIs 
(Public Research Institutes) retired and rushed into venture business. On the other hand, 
it was partly affected by the changes in operating 'PBS' (Project Base system) in PRIs 
after IMF crisis. This system, started in 1994, requires all public research institutes to 
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appropriate their expenses from undertaking research projects. It means that researchers 
should seek contracts for research projects to meet their own personnel expenses. Not 
surprisingly this system was a source of many complaints from researchers in PRIs. The 
government strengthened this system to enhance the efficiency of R&D activities in 
PRIs as a step to reform public sector after the crisis. This action was, however, 
connected to increased complaints of PRI researchers and consequently it triggered 
'start-up rush' in Daedeok. 
Up to 1998, there were 65 spin-off start-ups from DST (based on the membership of 
'Daedeok 21 st Century') and their major mother organisations were ETRI (27 flrms), 
KRISS (11 flrms), KAIST (11). In particular, ETRI has been a cradle for start-ups in 
DST. According to EV A (ETRI Venture Association), up to 1998, 104 flrms were spun 
out from ETRI (ETRI and EVA internal statistics). The number of start-up flrms has 
increased sharply since 1999 as seen on the above graph, and around 90 companies 
moved into Daedeok from outside (mainly from the capital area) during the three years 
from 1999 to 2002 (Daejeon City internal statistics, Hankook Economic News dated on 
9/Mar/2002). However, this remarkable expansion of start-ups began to decrease from 
2001. According to ETRI, the number of spin-offs increased by 34 in 1998, 30 in 1999, 
and 72 in 2000, but it fell by 19 in 2001 and 9 in 2002. 
As stated already, Daedeok can be understood as a regional innovation system rather 
than a region itself. It means looking at Daedeok as not simply a geographical space but 
a system. A systemic approach can provide a few advantages. One of signiflcant 
advantages comes from its flexibility in setting system boundaries beyond .the flxed 
administrative boundary. In this respect, it can be assumed that start-up flrms in 
Daedeok interact with not only regional actors but also external actors out of the 
regional boundary of Daejeon. Considering the weak industrial basis of Daejeon, they 
may often have to make important business connections with firms in other regions. In 
this case, fixing Daedeok into the regional boundary of Daejeon can make it hard to 
grasp the overall fabrics of dynamic interactions among various actors. However, when 
Daedeok is understood through RIS perspective, its systemic boundary can include this 
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wider range of interactions. In addition, understanding Daedeok as a RIS gives a 
significant methodological meaning associated with the matter of representativeness. 
Tilis study tries to approach regional issues through studying start-up fmns. Field work 
of this study is focusing on mainly spin-of fed start-up finns from PRIs in DST. The 
selection of specific high-tech start-ups, particularly spin-offs from PRIs as the main 
research target can be justified in terms of representativeness, when Daedeok is 
understood as a regional innovation system which is largely based on DST. 
Table 9. Business categories of venture firms in Daejeon, 2001 
High-tech manufacturing Information R&D 
Total IT BT Service relating 
Firms 335 102 82 140 23 
Daejeon 
% 66.6 20.3 16.3 27.8 4.6 
Firms 
Korea 
6,889 1,236 869 3,715 333 
% 60.5 10.8 7.6 32.6 2.9 
* Firms: certified venture firms by the government 
Source: 5MBA statistics in Seol et al (2002, p. 108) 
Others 
5 
1.0 
455 
4.0 
Total 
503 
100.0 
11,392 
100.0 
As shown in Table 9, the category of venture businesses 10 Daedeok is mainly 
concentrated on high-tech and manufacturing fields like IT, BT. The portion of IT and 
BT as of the end of 2001 is respectively 20.3% and 16.3%. It is higher than national 
average (respectively 10.8% and 7.6%). On the other hand, the portion of service 
business related to information processing systems is relatively lower than national 
portion (27.8% in Daejeon, 32.6% in Korea). This indicates that start-ups in Daedeok 
have relatively more manufacturing basis than the start-ups in other regions even though 
they are similarly classified as . high-tech fmus to others. Manufacturing basis means that 
firms require more spaces and facilities for production such as plants, assembly lines, 
testing machineries, etc. This feature of start-ups in Daedeok seemed to make them out 
of much attention from investors during venture booming period . From the investor's 
point of view, manufacturing basis ntight be seen too ' heavy ' and 'slow' in terms of 
' turnover' of invested money. The number of IPO start-ups in Daedeok is 12 firms in 
KOSDAQ market as of 2006. It looks quite small comparing total number of KOSDAQ 
firms in Korea . According to KOSDAQ market statistics in 2006 (website -
52 
http://km.krx.co.kr/- accessed,Dec. 2006), total KOSDAQ firms are 967, and 387 firms 
among them are registered as venture firms. In the meantime, there have been many 
debates on the reason of this phenomenon: why the performance of Daedeok start-ups in 
KOSDAQ market at least in numbers is not well matched with the potential of Daedeok. 
On the basis of systems approach, 'Daedeok' is regarded as a RIS (Regional Innovation 
System) in this study. It contains various actors, components and their networks. DST is 
obviously located within the geographical area of Daejeon Metropolitan City, but the 
networks in DST are being extended to surrounding or neighbouring regions beyond its 
immediate geographical proximity. As stated in Daedeok Valley Master Plan (200 I), its 
'relational proximity' (Amin et ai, 2003) is reaching to neighbouring regions such as 
'Chonan' and 'Asan' in Chung-nam Province, 'Ohsong' and 'Ochang' in Chung-buk 
Province, even 'Jeonju' and 'Iksan' in Jeon-buk Province. For the first time, since 1999, 
the concept of 'Daedeok Valley' began to be used as an administrative term to describe 
the changed characteristics of Daedeok, not just a R&D centre but an innovative cluster 
or system. But it became a common and popular term after the official declaration of 
Daedeok Valley on 28th September in 2000 by the former president Kim Dae-jung. 
Daejeon Metropolitan City prepared an ambitious master plan for the future of Daedeok 
Valley in 2001, titled 'Ideal and realization of Daedeok Valley'. In this respect, it can be 
seen that 'Daedeok' has been evolved from DST to 'Daedeok Valley'. As of now, the 
result of searching 'DST' through 'Google' search engine (www.google.co.kr) indicates 
around 39,800 hits, but in the case of'Daedeok Valley' it indicates 194,000 hits, which is 
nearly five times more than DST (Accessed on Oct 2005). 
According to the Daedeok Valley Master Plan (2001), Daedeok Valley has a growth axis 
which means a functional relationship between the main components of the Daedeok 
innovation system. As seen on the diagram in Figure 4, there are four components of 
DST as a R&D centre, Daedeok Techno-valley as a technology commercialization zone, 
the 3rd and 4th Industrial Complexes as a manufacturing zone, and lastly the 'Dunsan' 
and 'Yousung' area providing residential and cultural functions. These functional links 
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fonn an inner network ill Daedeok Valley and provide a basis [or close interaction 
between actors. 
Figure 4. The growth axis of Daedeok Valley 
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Source: Adapted from Daedeok Valley Master Plan (DMC, 2001) 
However, it has been pointed out through various previous studies that Daedeok Valley 
has some serious weaknesses from a systemic point of view. Firstly, its industrial basis 
is weak compared to its R&D function. The industrial structure of Daejeon City shows 
that it is concentrated largely on service industry (84.8%) but the portion of 
manufacturing industry is just 13.6%, as of the end of 200 I (Daejeon Metropolitan City, 
2001). The total area of industrial complexes in Daejeon is approximately 8.6 million 
square meters (as of2003), but most of these are already occupied by traditional existing 
finns, so the availability of industrial spaces for new high-tech start-ups has been quite 
limited. Even though 'Daedeok Techno Valley (DTV)' is currently under construction 
(expected to be completed in 2007), its proportion of industrial accommodation seems 
not to be enough to accommodate the growing number of start-ups. DTV is designed as 
a mixed concept of high-tech industrial accommodation with R&D, production and 
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business. As shown on above figure, DTV is situated between DST and the 3rd/4th 
Industrial complexes, so Daejeon City is expecting that it can take a central role for the 
commercialization of R&D performances from DST and the manufacturing of prototype 
products. On the other hand, the proportion of GRDP of Daejeon to the whole of the 
Korean economy is at the very best 2.3% (it has changed between 2.1 % and 2.4% for the 
last 10 years). According to KIET (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade), 
the portion of knowledge-based manufacturing industry in Daejeon is very low (from 
minimum 0.02% in the field of electronic/information device manufacturing to 
maximum 3.49% in precise chemical industry sector) compared to its R&D capacity 
(KIET, 2003). Unlike people's expectation, the main industry of Daejeon has been paper 
manufacturing and lens (for eyeglasses) producing industries: Hansol Paper Co. and 
Shinho Paper Co. are holding 30% of the total market share in Korea, and four of the top 
five leading lens producing companies based on a market share are located in Daejeon 
(Bank of Korea, 2002). This reflects that the industrial structure of Daejeon has not been 
closely connected to the commercialization of high-tech R&D performance. This 
weakness of this concentration of industry and manufacturing in the Daejeon economy 
has had an unfavourable affect on the growth of the start-up economy. 
Secondly, the diversity of actors in the Daedeok innovation system can also be a 
weakness. There are few large corporations or their branch factories which can be 
influential for regional economic development. Spontaneously established venture 
capitals and voluntarily formed angel networks are also very rare in Daedeok although a 
few public venture funds were established by the initiative of DMC and the considerable 
investment from the central government. These disadvantages are connected to the lack 
of a varied and dynamic interaction between the actors. Many researchers have pointed 
out the importance of the venture capital's role in innovation. Venture capitalists make 
high-risk equity investments in new start-up ventures and venture capital financed start-
ups contribute significantly to modem economic development (Callahan and Muegge, 
2003). As Gompers and Lerner (2001, p. 83) assert, "venture-backed firms grow more 
quickly and create far more value than non-venture-backed firms" and "similarly, 
venture capital generates a tremendous number of jobs and boosts corporate profits, 
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earnings, and workforce quality." In this respect, a lack of venture capital industry in 
Daedeok is obviously one of the disadvantageous factors in tenus of regional start-up 
ecosystem. As Cooke (2004) says, 'venture capital driven' regional innovation system 
has a virtuous cycle between start-up entrepreneurs, venture capitalists like Silicon 
Valley. However, as shown Table 10, the portion of risk financing organizations in 
Daejeon as of2002 is merely one or two percent of national totals. 
Table 10. Venture Capitals in Daejeon, 2002 
No. of 
Credit 
Angel Venture Capitals· 
Ventures 
Banks guarantee Clubs Public 
organizations Type I Type II 
venture funds 
Korea 11 ,392 6,148 
Daejeon 503 177 
(%) (4.4) .(2.9) 
Source: The Bank of Korea (2002) 
* (Note) 
154 6 6 146 
10 2 
- -(6.5) (1.4) 
- Type 1:' ew Technology Financing Companie • by the Law to A ist the Financing of ew 
Technology Ventures 
368 
2 
(O.5) 
- Type II : 'Venture Investment Companies' by the Law to Promote Small and Medium Size Companie 
onsidering the weak basis of the Korean venture capital industry, the limited 
availability of risk fmancing in Daejeon might not be such a surprising phenomenon, but 
it can be seen as a serious weakness in tenus of a ' business eco-system'. A survey 
(DM ,2001) incticated that the most serious obstacle for venture finus in the process of 
starting-up and business management was 'a difficulty in financing' (51.0%). In 
particular, for venture firm's ·CEOs who have an engineering background, fmancing 
problem are undoubtedly one of the most urgent matters. The immaturity of the venture 
capital market, in this respect, must be a factor restricting regional innovation in 
Daedeok. DMC, in this situation, has tried to support high-tech start-ups mainly by the 
way of low-interest bank loans. In this scheme, local authorities bear the gap between 
the normal market interest rate and the adjusted interest rate by allocating resources in 
their budget. This type of fmancial support is quite common in every region but its 
detailed operation such as the level of adjusted interest rate or the term of redemption 
arie according to the local ordinances in different local authorities. However, in pite 
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of its favored condition for start-ups, this measure is obviously a kind of debt financing 
which is far from the risk financing. Furthermore, this type of intervention could not 
only impede the development of the market for the venture capital industry, but also 
cause the distortion of the market mechanism and resource distribution (Ko and Shin, 
2000, p. 477). 
In summary, Daedeok is seen as a high-tech based regional innovation system rooted 
systematically in DST and geographically in DMC. It has a unique position in Korean-
NIS in terms of a national R&D hub. According to the proclaimed policy aims by 
Daejeon city, Daedeok needs to be transformed from a state-driven, R&D oriented 
agglomeration into a regionally embedded, business oriented cluster (Daedeok Valley 
Master Plan, 2001). 'Daedeok Valley' has a huge potentiality to be an innovative cluster, 
but it has several weaknesses in terms of a systemic point of view. In particular, as 
discussed before, it becomes clear that there has been very weak interaction amongst the 
actors and inclined toward the R&D function in Daedeok when observed through a lens 
of both RIS and business eco-system. Without doubt, 'Daedeok Valley' has developed 
on the basis of DST which was implanted into Daejeon by the central government as a 
'technopole' in Korea. In this respect, Daedeok can be seen as a kind of 'Dirigiste RIS' 
(Cooke, 1998) or 'the regionalised NIS' (Asheim, 2004). Main actors have been PRIs 
(public research institutes) and the central government in this system while other actors 
such as firms and universities and local governments have not been activated enough. It 
is not strange at all therefore that there have been no close interfaces among actors even 
between similar PRIs in Daedeok. According to the evolutionary economists like Nelson 
(1995), the core concepts of evolution in the process of innovation are 'variation', 
'selection' and 'reproduction'. In Daedeok, it was difficult to expect co-evolution 
between actors due to the limited variety of actors and the selection by the government, 
so not surprisingly systemic reproduction was also very weak. Even after the emergence 
of spin-off start-ups in Daedeok, the co-evolution between start-ups and venture 
capitalists which is considered as a crucial factor in terms of business eco-system never 
matured. 
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3 THE PROCESS OF INNOVATION 
3.1 Introduction 
As stated above, this study started from quite a narrow meaning of innovation, such as 
technological and entrepreneurial innovation. However, innovation has been 
increasingly approached with broader meanings from various disciplines. More recently, 
the territorial dimension of innovation is providing a very useful perspective for 
understanding it as a regional specific phenomenon. This chapter tries to open up the 
arguments about innovation in a broader sense. Debates regarding the nature of the 
innovation process and systems were introduced in the first section in particular; path-
breaking and path dependent processes of innovation; linear models and systemic 
models of innovation; and the territorial dimension was linked to the regional innovation 
system approach. These discussions provided an understanding about the rationale of 
policy intervention raising issues associated with 'why' and 'how' policy intervenes in 
the process of innovation, and with justifications of intervention such as the market 
failure and system failure perspectives. In addition, policy intervention can involve 
legislation, regulation, or support. Thus, the rationale of policy intervention is discussed 
in this chapter in terms of its justification logic and mode of intervention. 
3.2 The nature of innovation process 
Innovation has increasingly become ranked higher on policy agendas at national and 
regional levels, nurtured by the understanding that innovation is a main driver for 
sustainable economic, social, and regional development. Innovation includes process 
innovations, product innovations, and business innovations. Although innovation is 
often viewed as technology-oriented R&D activities, it is obviously much more than that. 
Innovation can result from new science and technology, from changes in business 
processes, or from the exploitation of new markets. The patterns and processes of 
innovation are also quite different across sectors, regions, and countries (HM Treasury, 
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2002). In this vein, this thesis uses the tenn 'innovation' in a broad sense to include both 
'technological innovation' in finns or industries and 'institutional innovation' in regions 
and countries (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). 
3.2.1 Schumpeter's legacy in innovation study 
Generally many scholars attribute the first use of the tenn 'innovation' in its modem 
sense to the economist JosefSchumpeter (1939). In his economic worldview, innovation 
is the process whereby a firm brings new technology into the economy: invention means 
generation of new idea, then innovation means development of new ideas into 
marketable products and processes, and diffusion means the broad use of new 
technologies. Schumpeter (1942) called the selection-culling mechanism of non-
innovative finns in this innovation process, 'creative destruction'. He argues that growth 
and progress will be hampered in a static economic system. A breakthrough can be 
created by innovative entrepreneurship (by a process of creative destruction). 
Consequently, static conditions can be changed and this change can lead markets to a 
new equilibrium (Nijkamp, 2003). 
In Darwinism, evolution is the result of natural selection. Plants and animals with 
hereditary traits that lessen their chances of survival die out, leaving those with genetic 
traits that increase their survival odds to prosper and multiply. Similarly, Schumpeter 
argued that firms change their traits through innovation, and the finns that innovate 
creatively, and in ways that consumers value most, come to dominate their markets. In 
contrast, firms that do not innovate are destroyed by their more creative competitors. 
Schumpeter called this process of economic selection 'creative destruction', which 
means creative finns prosper but non-innovative firms are destroyed. In this process, 
firms can "purposefully make . themselves the fittest by investing in innovation" (Morek 
and Yeung, 2001, p. 19). 
Although Schumpeter's works deeply influenced the development of evolutionary 
economics, there are also debates whether he can be classified as an evolutionary 
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economist. Nelson and Winter (1982) and Dosi (1988), for example, saw Schumpeter as 
an evolutionary theorist in that evolutionary ideas provide a workable approach to the 
problem of elaborating and formalizing the Schumpeterian view of capitalism as an 
engine of change. They base their models on a selection mechanism which is analogous 
to biological selection. On theother hand, Hodgson (1993) and Andersen (1995) argued 
that Schumpeter is not an evolutionary theorist in the modern sense, and emphasised the 
differences between Schumpeter and the evolutionary theorists in that Schumpeter 
eschewed the natural selection analogy for economics and adopted an entirely different 
conception of evolution. This difference and several other distinctions seem to 
demonstrate that the evolutionary ideas of the new evolutionary modellers have much 
more to do with Veblen and the old institutional economics than with Schumpeter. 
Schumpeter's approach takes a dynamic outlook with an emphasis on historical 
specificity from the (German) historical school, and the need for a micro-based approach 
from the neoclassical economics (Fagerberg, 2002). Schumpeter's idea that evolution of 
capitalism is driven by technological competition between firms seems to be taken from 
Marx who had suggested that the main way for capitalist firms to keep competitive was 
to increase productivity by introducing new and more efficient machinery (ibid, p. 7). 
Firms that succeeded in introducing new and more efficient technology would see their 
competitive position improved, while those who failed would be unprofitable and, 
eventually, driven out of the market. Schumpeter extended the Marxian argument by 
introducing a broader notion of innovation. He defined innovation as 'new 
combinations' of existing resources, equipment and so on (Schumpeter 1934). 
According to his view, one innovation tends to facilitate other innovations, and 
consequently tend to concentrate in certain sectors and their surroundings. However, one 
problem in the process of innovation is that a certain knowledge or habit once acquired 
becomes firmly rooted in individuals or organisations. It does not require continuous 
renewal and to be consciously reproduced, but sinks into the strata of the sub-
consciousness (ibid, p. 84). At the same time, this force which facilitates "the ordinary 
routine" at the individual as well as the collective level implies that "every step outside 
the boundary of routine" appears much more difficult (Fagerberg, 2002, p. 10-11). It 
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means there are many factors, working at the individual, organisational and social level 
that make it a very challenging task to succeed in innovation. 
3.2.2 Debates regarding the nature of innovation 
It is widely recognised that technological innovation does not take place in a vacuum or 
by a linear process. Especially in the fields of territorial development such as national or 
regional innovation, innovation needs to be understood as a broad and multifaceted 
concept. This thesis is looking at not only technological or entrepreneurial innovation 
but also spatial innovation. As reviewed above, Schumpeter described an uneven 
economic development process driven by new technologies that create opportunities for 
entrepreneurs. When his point of view is applied to regional innovation, it can be said 
that an innovative region must expect uneven regional development. This is associated 
with regional differences in innovation capacity. Before moving on to this territorial 
dimension of innovation, it is necessary to deeply understand the nature of innovation 
process by the examination of related debates. 
In its original usage by Schumpeter, innovation was taken to cover structural, dynamic, 
and unpredictable changes, but did not mean only radical and rapid changes. In some 
studies based on a long term perspective, innovation was often used as a concept to 
include incremental, gradual,' localized changes, where innovation occurred because 
these changes were able to generate a new trajectory rather than to strengthen an existing 
routine. Some scholars like Fagerberg (2002) point out a few shortcomings of 
Schumpeter's approach. Firstly, his sharp distinction between invention and innovation 
may be meaningless in that, for instance, most of firms today conduct both invention and 
innovation. In other words, firms are not just knowledge users any more but knowledge 
producers as well. Secondly, his emphasis of the crucial role of the entrepreneur and his 
deliberate neglect of the role of continuous learning (minor innovations) for economy-
wide socio-economic change may not be enough to understand the role of innovation in 
modern societies in all its complexity. Innovation, especially in the field of territorial 
innovation, needs to be recognised that it takes place in the process of collective and 
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interactive learning. There were some applied researchers of Schumpeter's insistence 
such as Dosi (1988), to start their research from a point that recognises the cumulative 
and path-dependent character of innovation process. Within this perspective, innovation 
is regarded as not exceptional but instead a ubiquitous phenomenon. 
Figure 5. Path-breaking and path dependent process of innovation 
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However, they do not insist that innovation itself has incremental or gradual 
characteristic, instead they argue that the process of innovation has interactive, collective 
and cumulative characteristic. On the other hand, this debate regarding the nature of 
innovation seems to be viewed differently considering the matter of time and scope in 
innovation process. Figure 5 shows that path-breaking innovations (circle 'a' and 'b') in 
the short-run can be seen as a path dependent process of innovation (a bold line) in the 
long-run. In other words, it can be said that innovation takes place in the collective and 
cumulative process of continuous path breaking attempts. 
3.2.3 Linear and systemic model of innovation 
Considering the above discussion, innovation might be constructed primarily as a 
process not as a single event. The original emphasis given to the isolated innovative act 
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or single event has been replaced by complex social interactions and mechanisms 
(Abrunhosa, 2003). Early understanding of this process of innovation was based on the 
legacy of neo-classical economics, where the generally accepted model of innovation 
was linear with research and development, production and commercialisation following 
one another consecutively. 
The linear model deals with the inputs to and outputs from the process of innovation 
being enclosed in a mysterious 'black box'. Innovation in this perspective is seen as a 
step-by-step process in which· R&D activities automatically lead to innovation. It is a 
simple and easily understandable model but it has critical flaw that regards R&D as the 
sole input to innovation. Consequently, this traditional linear idea has changed very 
rapidly over the last four decades. Evolutionary economists proposed more dynamic 
perspectives with feedback loops and with special focus on the role of knowledge. Some 
scholars like Kline and Rosenberg (1986) criticize that the linear model distorts the 
nature of the innovation process in several ways, especially because it considers R&D as 
the only source of innovation and since it ignores the existence of feedback loops and 
interactions among the distinct stages of the innovation process. Scholars such as Nelson 
and Winter (1977), Bijker et al. (1987) emphasise that innovation is the result of social 
and economic processes. Furthennore, authors like Freeman and Lundvall (1988), 
Gibbons et al. (1994) point out the numerous and frequent interactions and feedback 
loops between users and producers in innovation processes. They are concerned with 
'opening' the black box in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of 
innovation as a dynamic and interactive phenomenon. Opening the black box has 
rendered our understanding of innovation far more complex than the linear model, and 
this is where the systems approach fmds its place (Parr, 2004). 
During the 1980s and 1990s, many researchers came to embrace the Schumpeterian idea 
that the process of innovation and diffusion of technology has a strong systemic 
character, where the various stages of the innovation process tended to be filtered 
together in the web of feedback loops (rather than as a linear process). In his early work 
on the theory of economic development, Schumpeter (1934) pointed to entrepreneurs, 
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who act individually, as the most important economic agents bringing innovations into 
the economic system. He revised his theoretical scheme later by giving a critical role to 
the collective work in R&D laboratories. Schwnpeter's 'heroic entrepreneur' seems to 
be still vibrant in academic spheres of innovation, but more recently, scholars'who are 
interested in learning process put more emphasis on firms rather than individual 
entrepreneurs. Firm as the key agent of innovation is undoubtedly the main repository of 
productive knowledge (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). However, focusing just on individual 
firm seems to be not enough for better understanding of innovation process. Instead, as 
Cooke and Morgan say, it needs to focus "on the ensemble of relations in which firms, 
states, and systems interact" (ibid, p. 33). In this respect, innovation can be seen as a 
collective and social process. In other words, interactive learning and collective 
entrepreneurship are considered as a fundamental aspect of the innovation process. From 
the end of the 1980s a series of contributions emerged focusing on the systemic aspects 
of innovation and the relationship between social, institutional and political factors. 
Lundvall (1992, p. 2) defmes "a system of innovation is constituted by a number of 
elements and by the relationships between these elements". According to this defmition, 
innovation system can be understood as a social system. Learning is a central activity in 
innovation systems and it is a typical social activity which involves interaction between 
people. In this systems appro~ch, innovation system is seen as a dynamic one which is 
characterised both by feedback loops and reproduction. The feedback mechanism of the 
system means continual interaction with its environment. This reflects that innovation is 
an interactive and systemic process, and it means the innovation system influences on its 
external environment but simultaneously is influenced by surrounding environment. 
Nowadays, in response to these perspectives, more attention is paid to the factors that 
lead innovation system to social or regional 'embeddedness'. A great deal of research 
(Putnam, 1993; Morgan, 1997; Gertler et ai, 2000; Cooke, 2001; Fornahl and Brenner, 
2003) has been conducted which helps understanding the nature of community and 
solidarity, the foundations of social trust, the networked types of relationship among 
different actors, strong entrepreneurship and the social climate of tolerance, high 
mobility of human resources. 
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This systems approach basically considers that innovation does not take place in 
isolation but in the context. of a system. As a consequence, the performance of 
organisations in innovation system depends on the quality of that system, particularly on 
the quality of the sub-systems and on the mutual tuning of these sub-systems (Smits et 
al., 2004; OECD, 1997). According to Edquist (2005), a system consists of components, 
relations among them, and boundaries which enable us to discriminate between the 
system and the rest of the world. Basically innovation systems consist of organizations 
and institutions. 'Organisations' are ''formal structures that are conSciously created and 
have an explicit purpose". 'Institutions' are "sets of common habits, norms, routines, 
established practices, rules, or laws that regulate the relations and interactions between 
individuals, groups, and organizations" (ibid, p. 188). He points to ten 'activities' which 
have an important influence on the development, diffusion, and use of innovation. These 
activities include the provision of R&D, networking, financing, support services for 
firms. They are not themselves constituents of innovation systems, but rather patterns of 
behaviour and development which have shown to be particularly important to process of 
innovation. He also mentioned 'boundaries' as one more central concept of innovation 
systems. Boundaries which distinguish what lies within a system from what lies outside, 
may be defmed in terms of geography, sectoral characteristics, or activities (ibid, p. 199). 
The systems approach stresses some characteristics of innovation system: heterogeneous 
actors are involved in innovation processes at very different level, systems do have the 
tendency of path dependency as a memory of systems, entities are strongly interlinked 
and boundaries of systems are very fuzzy (Smits et a/., 2004). Within the context of this 
systems approach, innovation can also be understood as a network activity between 
different actors. It indicates not only the growing need for public-private partnerships 
(PPP) in the area of research, technology and development, but also the importance to 
reinforce the quality of the innovation systems by improving the interfaces between the 
research and industry (Faroult in Smits et a/., 2004, p. 7). 
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3.3 Territorial dimension of Innovation 
As discussed above, the understanding of innovation process has been changed in recent 
years away from a linear model towards an interactive or systemic model. Innovation is 
increasingly considered as an interactive process that goes beyond short-tenn market 
transactions and includes more durable trust-based relations like 'networks' (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1993) or 'untraded interdependencies' (Storper, 1997). In this respect, 
knowledge is seen as the most important resource for innovation and 'tacit knowledge' 
in particular is being more emphasized in tenns of knowledge transfer. There are usually 
a range of actors involved in the process of innovation such as customers, suppliers, 
competitors, and so on. Tacit knowledge is basically favoured by face to face contacts 
coming from spatial proximity. Finns as one of main actors can leam knowledge in 
different ways through interactive learning with other actors like other firms, universities 
or research organizations. As systemic model argues, institutions playa critical role in 
this interactive learning process. Institutions are bound to specific territories such as 
regions and countries (North, 1990; Edquist, 1999). In this regard, territorial dimension 
is emphasised in understanding innovation systems. 
3.3.1 Relationship between innovation and territory 
In the last two decades, innovation studies in a broad range of disciplines have 
increasingly stressed the importance of the national or regional production environment 
in creating sustainable competitive and comparative advantage (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). There have been a few attempts to deal with these 
matters of systemic approach and territorial dimensions of innovation, such as 'national 
system of innovation: NIS' (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Freeman, 1995), 'regional 
systems of innovation: RIS' (Cooke and Morgan, 1994; Cooke, 1997; Doloreux, 2002). 
The territorial dimension of innovation has been discussed mainly with regard to the 
matter of proximity and regional embeddedness. The fonner issue is connected to tacit 
knowledge transfer, and the latter issue is linked to spatial differences or specificities. 
Institutions in a broader sense play an important role in understanding these issues in 
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tenns of the interrelations between actors and territorial frameworks. As Kirat and Lung 
(1999, p. 27), "the relationship between innovation and territory actually pertains to the 
interactions between learning processes, their institutional contexts and space". RIS 
studies have investigated the innovation perfonnance of finns in tenns of the character 
of their networks and institutional factors. 
However, in spite of research progress, it remains unclear how to measure the 
effectiveness of systems as an instrument of regional innovation policy designed to 
stimulate knowledge-led economic development. Is it possible to gain the effects of 
regional innovation like the 'Silicon Valley Story' or 'Cambridge Phenomenon', if such 
an innovative region is established in other parts of the world? This question provides 
various implications for policy makers in many countries which tried to make 
implantation of successful cases by governmental policy implements in specific region. 
The high profile of Silicon Valley largely contributed to the rapid increase of science 
parks as a 'pole' of technological innovation particularly in the 1970s and 1980s (Miller 
and Cote, 1987; Castells and Hall, 1994; Rosenberg, 2002). It had been a kind of fashion 
in the world. Many countries tried to implant innovation system in selected geographical 
spaces by making agglomeration of research laboratories and firms, but it often 
produced rather disappointing results in tenns of the achievement of innovative 
synergetic effects. Of course, some of these attempts can be said to be quite successful in 
some extent, but it is really difficult to say clearly that some cases are successful or not 
at a certain point of time because innovation system evolves continuously reflecting 
environmental changes at that time. During this period, various attempts to explain what 
are the driving forces behind Silicon Valley's success were conducted and some 
theoretical approaches high1~ghted by many researchers such as cluster theory, 
technopole theory, industrial district theory, etc. These theories provided various 
implications for policy makers to involve in innovation processes. 
[n recent years, public innovation policies at different territorial levels have increasingly 
applied a systemic view on the processes of technological innovation and economic 
development. According to the systems approach, interaction among different actors in 
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the system as well as relation between system and external environment take a crucial 
role in the innovation processes. Thus, national or regional differences in technological 
performance can be attributed to variations in the institutional environment (Lundvall et 
al,2002). 
3.3.2 National and Regional Systems of Innovation 
Using a 'National Innovation System' (NIS) as a concept to explain the competitive 
advantage of nations is relatively new, having only appeared in the last two decades. At 
the end of 1980s, Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993), among others, 
developed this concept in order to study the interrelations between technological 
development and the institutional embeddedness of innovative organisations. NIS can be 
defined in many ways but, according to Galli and Teubal (1997, p. 345), it is defined as 
"the set of organizations, institutions, and linkages for the generation. diffusion. and 
application of scientific and technological knowledge operating in a specific country". 
Thus, NIS is characterized by a differentiated set of organisations and institutions. 
NIS rests on the premise that understanding the linkages among the actors involved in 
innovation is a key to encouraging technological progress. Innovation and technological 
progress are the result of a complex set of relationships among actors producing, 
distributing and applying various kinds of knowledge. This perspective came from a 
practical or empirical rather than a theoretical background and it appears to provide a 
guideline for economic success in specific countries. The innovative performance of a 
country depends to a large extent on how these actors relate to each other. These actors 
are primarily private firms, universities and public research institutes and individuals 
within them. 
There is no single accepted definition of national innovation system. Regarding 
economic success in last century, the predominant ideology was based on the 'Fordist' 
mass production model. Delivering the maximum number of standardised products 
while incurring minimum production costs, 'Fordism' was "compatible with the 
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macroeconomic dynamics of the post-war perio{/' (Boyer et ai, 1993, p. 3). However, as 
the economic climate changed, Fordism could no longer cope with new changes and by 
the 1980s almost all its elements appeared to be hampering competitiveness. 
Meanwhile, the Japanese economy was extremely successful with its emphasis on 
flexible specialisation and research and development (R&D). Freeman (1987), identified 
several major factors in the Japanese innovation system to which its economic and 
innovative success could be attributed. It was also within this work that he introduced 
the phrase "National Systems ofInnovation". He also emphasised that qualitative factors 
affecting the national system have to be taken into account as well as the purely 
quantitative ones in order to account for the unsatisfactory results that the linear 
production model was providing (Freeman, 1995). 
Lundvall went into more detail. His perspective was based on two assumptions, that "the 
most fundamental resource in the modern economy is knowledge. and accordingly that 
the most important process is learning" and that learning is "a social process which 
cannot be understood without taking into consideration its institutional and social 
context" (Lundvall, 1992, p.l). He determined that national systems of innovation are 
"constituted by elements and relationships which interact in the production diffusion and 
use of new. and economically useful. knowledge and that a national system encompasses 
elements and relationships, either located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation 
state" (ibid, p. 2). Within this kind of system, one of the most important factors is the 
relationships between the actors and institutions. The implication from these 
perspectives can be found that there is no single best way of stimulating an economy 
using the concept ofNIS, but there are common elements to each case that can be treated 
in a similar manner despite national differences (Golden et ai, 2003). 
Since 1980, a new paradigm of regional development has emerged. One interesting 
finding in the recent period has been that the innovation process tends to be highly 
localised. Social scientists have increasingly focused on the significance of the region as 
a fundamental basis of economic development (Cooke, 1997; Storper, 1997). In this new 
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approach, regions appear as focal points for learning and knowledge creation in this new 
age of global, knowledge-based economy. There were two observations in the 
background of the emergence of RIS perspective as a new concept and a new policy for 
regional growth; one is that NIS does not necessarily achieve a balanced regional 
development, and the other is that regions matter for the implementation ofNiS (Cooke, 
1997; Morgan, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998). As a consequence, the regions named 
as 'learning regions' are increasingly important sources of innovation. This increasing 
role of the region is rooted in 'untraded interdependencies' and that take the form of 
conventions and informal rules that co-ordinate economic actors under conditions of 
uncertainty (Storper, 1997, p. 5) 
Studies of innovation systems in a sub-national level began to be identified through case 
studies of innovative regions in the early 1990s (Davis, 1991; Cooke and Morgan, 1994; 
Saxenian, 1994). Since then, these theoretical approaches have been diversified by 
studies that recognised the evolution of autonomous systems of innovation at the local 
and the regional level. According to these perspectives, the impact of innovation on 
regional development will be changed depending on the extent and depth of the 
innovation systems within a specific region. Since the effects of knowledge spillover are 
seen to diminish with distance, this provides a key motivation for organisations to 
agglomerate, strengthening the established 'regional innovation system' (RIS). Thus 
disparities in regions can be seen to stem from different RISs that organisations work 
under, and through their own innovative activities these organisations also contribute 
back to their own innovation systems (Courvisanos, 2003). 
The concept of RIS combines· the focus on regions with a systems perspective. Region 
has its origin in the Latin regio which stems from regere, meaning 'to govern'. In 
general, region has been used in the sense of administrative dimension in the field of 
regional development. Following this definition, region is an administrative division of a 
country (Cooke el ai, 2005). However, region is very broad and abstract concept, so not 
surprisingly there are many different definitions. Moreover, some countries do not have 
regions but just have nation-states and local administrations. In Europe, a supranational 
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concept of regions can be also used in tenns of EU dimension. Regions are now 
becoming more important and.natural economic unit than nation-states which lose some 
strategic economic capabilities in an increasingly borderless, globalizing world. Thus 
how to define 'region' is very crucial but contestable to understand RIS and regional 
policy implications. Cooke (2003) says the boundaries of regions are not fixed once for 
all, in that they can change, new regions can emerge or old ones can perish. Therefore it 
is very important to distinguish different types of regions, and to understand a 
functioning unit of a region within a specific tenn. It is also important to analyse the 
relationship between national and regional innovation systems. 
As Doloreux (2002) indicates, the precise distinction between an NIS and an RIS is 
difficult to ascertain. Some scholars such as Wiig (1999), Archibugi and Michie (1997) 
recognise RIS as a subset of NIS in that it originated from the discussions about NIS. 
However, the concept of RIS has recently become very popular among academics of 
various disciplines. Doloreux (2002, p. 246) identifies three notable elements of RIS 
such as • interactive learning', 'institutional milieu' and 'embeddedness'. The translation 
of 'region' as well as the understanding of these three aspects is providing characteristics 
for RIS distinguishing it from other approaches. 
According to the systems approach, 'interactive learning' is a central concept of RIS, 
and it can be understood as the process that generates learning between actors who 
participate in the innovation process. Cooperation or networking for learning is closely 
related to innovation. At the same time, shared knowledge is a very important aspect of 
RIS because it helps increase its interactive learning capabilities (Doloreux, 2002). In 
relation to the concept of regions and interactive learning, the role of 'proximity' is 
emphasised in RIS. Generally speaking, the matter of proximity is related to the benefits 
generated by spatial or geographical agglomeration of finns and other organisations. In 
particular, it has been recognised as a crucial factor for tacit knowledge transfer because 
it can reduce transaction costs in sharing knowledge between actors. Face-to face contact, 
high trust and understanding (:an also contribute to tacit knowledge transfer. However, 
there is a growing acceptance that globalisation reduces this importance of geographical 
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agglomeration or physical proximity. Amin et al (2003) argues that relational proximity 
is more important than geographical proximity in supporting the flow of tacit knowledge, 
and it can be achieved at a distance. This argument explains why tacit knowledge 
transfer does not appear naturally in a few science or teclmology parks built by 
government planning, even though spatial agglomeration exists. In other words, 
geographical proximity is not directly connected to relational proximity or shared 
understandings. 
'Institutional milieu' and 'social embeddedness' are also contested factors constituting 
RIS. Institutions can be defined both narrowly and broadly. They can take the form of 
either a formal structure with an explicit pwpose, or an informal structure that determine 
the norms, rules, laws that influence innovation. In evolutionary economics, institutions 
are usually recognised as a broader concept such as the rules of the game. Following this 
understanding, institutional elements in RIS are largely shaped by national system due to 
the fact that they are dependent on historical tradition, cultural differences and policy 
decisions at the national level (Doloreux, 2002, p.248). 
3.3.3 Reglonallnnova~lon System and Start-up ecosystem 
As mentioned above, innovation in knowledge-based economy can be understood as an 
interactive learning process, which is territorially embedded and institutionally 
contextualized (Lundvall, 1992). In this respect, RIS perspective provides a useful lens 
through which to view the innovation process in a regional, systemic, and institutional 
context. However, it is a normative and ideal type of approach in terms of its theoretical 
and conceptual foundation. It contains very abstract and elusive constructs such as 
region, innovation and system. Moreover, its basic factors such as interactive learning, 
institutional milieu, social embeddedness and the matter of proximity are also 
contestable and problematic. Thus a system and its outcome depend largely on different 
regional contexts. At the same time, these weaknesses of RIS can be contrastingly 
understood as a strong point iIi terms of applicability. RIS needs to be recognised as not 
a fixed but still developing theory. No synthetic solution or panacea for every case can 
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be expected from this theory. Drawing on a more persuasive framework from various 
case studies which are adopting RIS perspective would be appropriate at this point, and 
it might be very helpful for making up for the weaknesses of RIS. 
RIS has developed in a European context, and it emphasises institutional innovation. 
Contrastingly, the wide range of studies of Silicon Valley phenomenon, which has been 
undoubtedly accepted as a most successful innovation story, adopt mainly 'cluster' 
theory (Porter, 1990) or 'business ecosystem' theory (Moore, 1993; 1996; Rothschild, 
1990). These two different flows of studies between Europe and America have their own 
emphases, strengths and weakness respectively. Business ecosystems or 'business 
ecology' (Abe et ai, 1998), in particular, are worth consideration as they are also based 
on a systemic approach. These focus especially on 'self organisation' and 'co-evolution' 
of various actors within the system, and also emphasise the role of 'start-ups', 'venture 
capital' and 'exit market' (e.g. NASDAQ). 
Scholars who are interested in business ecosystem agree that the biological metaphor of 
'ecology' is useful because it takes account of the structural and social forces that 
contribute to innovation (Moore, 1993; Abe et ai, 1998; Iansiti and Levin, 2004). Moore 
(1996, p. 26) defines a business ecosystem as "an economic community supported by a 
foundation of interacting organizations and individuals - the organisms of the business 
world." According to Moore, the member organisms include suppliers, lead producers, 
competitors, and other stakeholders who co-evolve their capabilities and roles. The key 
to a business ecosystem are leadership companies ("the keystone species") who have the 
most crucial influence over .the co-evolutionary processes (ibid, p. 9). Despite his 
definition, the lack of its clearness still causes conceptual confusion. Hence, it is used as 
slightly different terms in related contexts such as 'industrial ecosystem', 'start-up 
ecosystem' and 'digital business ecosystem'. 
However, business ecosystem is a highly descriptive expression for the complex 
business environment which is the reality for most companies nowadays. This approach 
has its root in systems theory, complexity theory, and chaos theory. Systems theory, as 
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noted above, concentrates on the interest of the whole system instead of its parts, thus its 
goal is to define the relationships and communication between the parts within a system. 
Complexity theory defmes complexity as depending on the ambiguity of cause and 
effect (Sammut-Bonnici and Wens ley, 2002). Chaos theory is based on the assumptions 
of any kind of stable situation being only temporary, while chaos is seen as the dominant 
state of affairs (ibid, p. 309). On the basis of these theoretical roots, business ecosystems 
are closely associated with some concepts such as self-organisation, co-evolution, fitness, 
adaptability, selection. 
It provides very useful insights to make a more persuasive conceptual framework for 
understanding regional innovation systems. While business ecosystem puts more stress 
on market oriented innovation, RIS emphasises institutional innovation. Consequently, it 
is important to link the larger institutional frameworks of the national innovation and the 
character of regional innovation systems, and business ecosystems. Recently there has 
been an attempt to make the distinction between the institutional regional innovation 
system (IRIS), and the entrepreneurial regional innovation system (ERIS). Cooke (2004-
a) states that IRIS is driven by the government and public sector institutions such as 
public laboratories, universities, government ministries and teclmology. transfer 
institutions whereas ERIS is driven by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The former 
(IRIS: typically in the case of German regions or regions in the Nordic countries) is 
characterized by the positive effects of systemic relationships between the production 
structure and the knowledge infrastructure embedded in networking governance 
structures regionally and supporting regulatory and institutional frameworks at the 
national level. In contrast, the'latter (ERIS: found typically in the United States) lacks 
these strong systemic elements, and instead gets its dynamism from local venture capital, 
entrepreneurs, scientists, market demand and incubators to support innovation that draws 
primarily from an analytical knowledge base (Cooke, 2003, p. 57; Asheim et ai, 2004, p. 
304). Critics ofERIS argue that it lacks the longevity and stability oflRIS in that IRIS is 
closely coupled with social systems favouring stable, predictable paths of innovation 
(Asheim and Coenen, 2006). On the basis of this clarification, RIS is seen to emphasise 
the importance of institutions, and business ecosystem is seen to stress the role of start-
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up, nture capital and market forces. On the other hand, both of these perspectives 
ha imilaritie in that they are commonly based on systems approach and 
e olutionary co nomic , and they have a perspective of regiona l dimension, dynamism, 
and mpl ity. In addition, both of perspectives emphasise the interdependence of all 
entitie , interaction, and evolution. Despite the fuzziness of border between these two 
m distinction can be made (see Table 11). 
Table 11. Comparison of RlS and SES 
RIS(Regionallnnovation System) SES(Start-up Eco System) 
Assumption of 
Meehani m Organism 
Dynaml process Habitat 
system 
Value chnm Food chain 
BasIc 
- Inslitutional approach - Market oriented approach 
perspective (related to n twork theory) (related to cluster theory) 
- EconomiC ~eogmphy - Business Ecological economics 
Main flow Flo\ of knowledge 
Flow of knowledge 
+ capital, workforce 
- knowledge producer (univ.) - producer (univ. research institutes) 
Main actors - kn wlcdge user (finn) - consumer (fimls : start-ups) 
- knowledge diffuser (institutions) - decomposer (VC, stock market) 
- competitors 
Assumption of 
Behaviours Species 
- mtern t, oopemte - evolve - inleract, adapl 
actors 
- compete - evolve - extinct 
Focused on Intemcllve leaming 
Sel f organization (adaptation) 
Coopemuve networking Co-evolution (fitness, selection) 
- geogmphlcal proximity - market competition 
- mternctive learning - strategic alliance 
Key elements - 11\ IItutlonal milieu - fiml fonnation (start-up) 
for innovallon 
-
tal embeddednes - entrepreneurship (social capital) 
- food chain (VC-stock market, 
labour mobility-head hunting, etc) 
Onglnated uropean context American context 
from (originated from NIS) (especially, from Silicon Valley story) 
Dimension of - If 1\ i embedded in regional and socio- - if it is healthy, facilitative, stimulative 
cultuml enVironment, then the SYSTEM is for the actors, then that region is more 
recogOIllon 
more likely to be innovative likely to be ilUlovative 
ur uth r 
hi di tin ti n m to mainly stem fro m the different dimension of recognition or 
n th ugh two theories see sam e phenomena. However, policy implication 
h p ition has been accepted quite contrastingly in a various range of 
. In genera l, the ro le of public policy has been emphasised in RIS 
n th ther hand, it has been relatively neglected in ' business (start-ups) 
y'tem and in t ad the role of market fo rces has been more emphasized. In the case 
cmpm 
p 
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of Silicon Valley, market mechanisms and strong entrepreneurship seems to be more 
important rather than public intervention. 
However, the role and extent of public policy can differ in different time and space. 
Moreover, it can be variously viewed from different angle. Rosenberg (2002) argues that 
even in America, one of the strongest advocates of free enterprise and market economy, 
government's contribution was a major factor in the growth and development of Silicon 
Valley. He suggests that government helps most when it creates mechanisms for 
improving the risk-reward ratio for private entrepreneurs, rather than trying to get into 
the business itself by forming investment funds or by picking industries through trade 
protection or tax incentives. As he argues, "continuing with programmes that have 
already set the wheels of the private sector in motion eventually causes more harm than 
good by distorting market incentives" (Rosenberg, 2002, p. 18). It means that the success 
of government intervention, even in case of SES perspective, depends on the proper 
timing for intervention and wide ranging policy support. In summary, policy 
intervention can be compared like a 'double-edged' sword in that it can facilitate 
innovation but at the same time it also can deter innovation. 
3.4 Rationale of policy intervention and regional innovation 
According to systemic approach, the innovation process is indeed far from simple in that 
various actors and elements are involved in the process. It means that there are many 
issues to be tackled by policy intervention. Traditional science and technology policy 
based on the linear model emphasised increases of the input factors such as the R&D 
budget. However, the focus of recent innovation policy is shifting from just supporting 
R&D or technology diffusion to promoting interactive learning activities in terms of a 
wider systemic point of view. In the background of this change, as stated above, there is 
a concern that policy intervention can facilitate innovation but can also produce serious 
distortions in the market. This section discusses two issues relating to the rationale of 
policy intervention in the process of innovation. One is the issue about 'why' intervene 
and the other is about 'how' to intervene. In other words, the former is associated with 
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the justification of policy intervention and the latter is related to the mode of 
intervention. These issues are closely interlinked with the nature and dimension of 
innovation which were discussed above. 
It is widely held that most economic functions in a modem society are best fulfilled by 
the market mechanism which co-ordinates the behaviour and resources of private and 
public actors - often in a smooth and flexible manner. However, there are sometimes 
reasons to complement or replace or duplicate the market mechanism through public 
intervention. Edquist (1999, p. 3) argues that two conditions must be fulfilled for there to 
be reasons for public intervention in a market economy: Firstly, there must be a 
problem' - which is not automatically solved by market forces and capitalist actors - for 
public intervention to be considered. Secondly, the state and its public agencies must 
also have the 'ability' to solve or mitigate the problem. If not, there should be no 
intervention, since the result would be a failure. Adding second condition means that the 
existence of a 'problem' is a necessary but not sufficient condition for public 
intervention. In traditional economics, this 'problem' is often explained as 'market 
failure'. But according to evolutionary economics, innovation processes have systemic 
characteristics, and the system never achieves equilibrium and optimality. Thereby, 
Edquist argues that 'market failure' perspective loses its meaning and applicability. 
Following Edquist's argument, governments need to develop their 'ability' to solve the 
'problem'. New policy instruments or the creation of new organizations and institutions 
to carry out the intervention might also be necessary. Institutions constitute the 'rules of 
the game' (e.g. laws, rules, habits, routines, etc), and organisations are the actors or 
players, the action of which are shaped by (and shape) the rules (Edquist, 1999, p. 4). 
Governments usually use non-market mechanisms such as regulation to solve or mitigate 
problems. These mechanisms are quite different from market mechanisms such as 
'invisible hand' (mechanisms· of demand and supply). Taxation, subsidising, service 
providing are representative policy instruments, and sometimes technology standard 
creations, public funding for R&D can be other kinds of examples. On the other hand, 
governments try to improve market functions or create new markets. These policies are 
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focusing on a matter of increasing the degree of competition in a market. In bo.th cases, 
policies result in a matter of creating, changing, or getting rid of institutions. 
In this vein, policy can be seen as the main regulatory mechanism of the environment in 
which innovation takes place. While most theories have accepted a regulatory function 
of the state for basic institutional settings, there has been little or no political agreement 
about the normative role of the state or government. Cooke and Morgan (1998) delineate 
the changes in the state's development role according to shifting ideological waves: the 
State-Centred Repertoire, the Neo-Liberal Repertoire, and the Associational Repertoire. 
As the waves were dramatically changed from the first one which was called as the 
Keynesian state or the interventionist state to the third wave which is called as 
associational or interactive state, the key issue has been also changed from the scale of 
intervention or boundary between state and market to the mode of intervention or the 
framework for effective interaction (ibid, p. 22). The Keynesianism basically believes in 
the ability of state to intervene in markets, and stresses the offer of state incentives to 
individual firms to improve their competitiveness. On the other hand, the neo-liberal 
approach has its faith in the market mechanism, and seeks to deregulate markets and to 
underpin spontaneous entrepreneurship. In terms of regional policy, both of these two 
strands seemed to be not always successful in the mean time. Keynesian regional 
policies failed to encourage self-sustaining growth based on the mobilization of local 
resources and interdependencies due to the dependency on state aid, and neo-liberal 
regional policies did not succeed in securing developmental potential of the less 
favoured regions due to the failure to improve the weak economic basis of those regions 
(Amin, 1999). As Amin argues, the consequence of following one of these two 
approaches can be the choice between "dependent development and no development" 
(Amin, 1999, p. 365). This section tries to discuss the rationale of policy intervention in 
two points: the justification and the mode of government intervention. 
3.4.1 Justification of policy Intervention 
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Two contrasting models of innovation (linear model and interactive model) offer 
different kinds of implications for policy makers because the process of policy-making 
and its implementation is very complex and similar problems may be solved through the 
use of different types of policy measure. In linear model, it is important to manage 
interfaces between users and producers of innovation. This management should focus 
not only on knowledge transfer and technological competence, but also on stimulating 
demand articulation by providing tailor-made strategic information and bridging gaps 
between actors with different institutional backgrounds. The systems approach has two 
important implications for policy makers. The first one is the need to embed innovation 
policies in a broader socio-economic context. This implies a considerable expansion of 
the policy domain, better opportunities for tuning actions, and a shift from top down to 
network steering. The other one is about 'system failure' which is even more important. 
In the legitimisation of innovation policy, mainstream neo-classical economics point to a 
mix of market and government failures, whereas evolutionary economics emphasise 
system failure as an additional reason to intervene (Smits et al., 2004, p. 6-7). 
According to systems approach, system failure stems from the imperfection of system 
itself. However, the distinction between market failures and system failures is confusing, 
especially if one considers the systems to be the sum of markets and government (Hers 
el al., 2004). Basically neo-classical economics assumes that free markets usually bring 
about an efficient allocation of resources, so it recognises market failure as an 
exceptional phenomenon. Hence, government intervention can be justified to correct 
market failures and to establish the rules of the game, but it might lead to government 
failure. As Stiglitz (1989, p. 56) says, we have to take into account the inevitable 
government failures for some types of public intervention, in that the full costs of 
government intervention may be less than the benefits arising from correcting (or 
improving upon) market failure. 
Tl'llditionfll mtuket failure perspective 
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Nco-classical economists accept the fact that a variety of reasons may lead markets to 
fail: the existence of natural monopoly, public goods, external effects which stem from 
incomplete market and imperfect information (i.e. moral hazard, adverse selection). 
Market failure perspective in the process of innovation has been discussed mainly in 
relation to 'production of knowledge' and 'infant industry protection.' The former logic 
is associated with the recognition that production of knowledge (such as R&D, one of 
the most important activities in innovation system) by market system is insufficient to 
achieve optimality. It is because R&D activities have the characteristics of (quasi-) 
public good. Accordingly, a social optimum of knowledge production through private 
profit optimisation is not easy to be attained due to several factors such as the 
appropriability problem, positive externalities, duplication, and uncertainty (Geroski, 
1990; Hauknes et al., 1999). On the other hand, the latter logic of market failure 
perspective has been advocated in association with 'infant industry protection' in 
industrial policy. Government intervention for catching-up in many countries was 
largely motivated by this logic of supporting and protecting infant industry. In case of 
start-up sector, policy measures for promoting new high-tech firm formation and 
facilitating venture capital investments could be advocated by this market failure 
perspective. These sources of market failure arouse the 'finance gap' issue in the process 
of innovation. In other words, the market does fail by the above mentioned factors, and 
governments may need to intervene to address this issue of a less than socially optimal 
level of investment in promoting R&D activities or providing suitable protection for 
infant industries. 
Proper policy measures can effectively address the matter of market failure as seen in 
extensive cases of successful policy intervention in many countries. For example, 
government intervention in the United States has been quite active and creative in the 
field of start-up support and venture capital promotion. This can be seen in terms of 
government funding for R&D" via the university system. In addition there has been the 
use of a hidden but de facto industrial policy via the Pentagon and other areas of 
government in terms of the procurement and stimulation of high-technology products 
over many years, including computers, aerospace and semi-conductors (Geroski, 1990). 
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Overall, it can be said that there has been quite extensive public policy intervention in 
the United States, but this is often opaque and hidden (Bailey and Cowling, 2006). There 
is another case of successful experience of policy intervention in Israel for venture 
capital industry. The development of Israeli VC industry was not market-led but 
triggered by an appropriate design of a targeted VC policy programme such as 'Yozma 
Fund' (Gelvan and Teubal, 1997). In spite of this extensive evidence of the successes of 
policy intervention, various sources may lead governments to mistaken intervention. As 
a consequence, the effectiveness of policy instruments depends on the occurrence of 
'government failure' which is basically caused by limited information, bounded 
rationality, limited control over bureaucracy, the influence of lobbying. Also, rent 
seeking behaviour and high transaction costs can also increase the risk of government 
failure. 
In the traditional market failure perspective, government itself is considered as an 
important actor in market. Government has several advantages over the market 
compared to other private actors. It not only has some privileges and power to tax and 
punish, but also a great ability to reduce transaction costs. This provides an opportunity 
for governments to put pressure on the various market players to produce innovative 
solutions to societal problems. However, government failure may reduce the 
effectiveness of policy intervention, and sometimes can be more serious than non-
intervention. Furthermore, policy makers have to consider the possibility that the 
fmancing of policy initiative's can cause distortion of taxation (Hers et al., 2004; 
Hauknes el al., 1999). 
Market failure rationale provides the basis of science and technology policy or other 
innovation policies. However, limitations of this analysis with regard to technological 
progress and innovation have been analysed in the 1980s and 1990s (Baldwin and Scott, 
1987; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). The complexity of 
the innovation processes makes it very difficult to identify market failure; firstly, it 
ignores the broader institutional framework that defines how markets work; secondly it 
implicitly assumes that the market mechanisms have a competitive advantage over other 
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mechanisms in all industrial technological and intervening activities relevant for policy 
purposes; lastly it may fail in providing direction to policies when externalities are 
pervasive (Teubal, 1998, p. 139). 
System failure perspective 
Innovation policy is public action that influences technical change and innovations. It 
includes a wide range of policies such as R&D policy, infrastructure policy, regional 
policy and education policy, etc. It is also naturally associated with change, flexibility, 
dynamism and the future (Edquist, 2001). Traditional market failure analysis is used as a 
reason for R&D or S&T policy despite many critiques of its limitations (Martin and 
Scott, 2000). However, additional types of failure have been emphasised as the basis of 
justification for innovation policy (Smith, 1996, 2000; Malerba, 1998, 2002; OECD, 
1999; Edquist, 2001, 2002). Those insights that innovation is systemic and multi-
organisational lead to the need of rethinking the basic arguments for innovation policy. 
The 'systems of innovation' perspective evolved in the 1980s through analyses of the 
path dependent evolution of national economies and their innovation infrastructures 
(Freeman, 1988; Lundvall, 1988; Nelson, 1988). These studies have emphasised the 
importance of learning and its diffusion as a core process of innovation. Thus innovation 
is characterised by constant interactive learning between different actors, e,g. firms 
establish relations with other organisations such as other firms, universities and R&D 
institutes through their innovative activities. The systems approach has been extended to 
studies on regions (Cooke, 1997; Morgan, 1997) and sectors (Malerba, 2002). 
As Hauknes el al. (1999) says, if there are mismatches between elements in an 
innovation system (e.g. a lack of interaction between actors), then innovation may be 
slowed or retarded. It means that modem innovation policies have to deal with the 
matter of system failure due to system imperfections. This perspective argues that 
governments should also address system failures which block the functioning of the 
innovation system and hinder the flow of knowledge (OECD, 1999). According to the 
OECD (ibid), system failures mainly encompass mismatches between the elements of an 
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innovation system leading to a lack of communication and networking and institutional 
rigidities. However, the concept of system failure is described quite differently in the 
literature and it may be somewhat confusing to understand this concept. Furthermore, 
there are some debates about the distinction between market and system failure. Some 
scholars like Teubal (1998) insist that it is important because it may be indicative of the 
root problem blocking the adaptation of enterprises to a changing environment, and also 
be indicative of the policy priorities that might have to be undertaken. On the other hand, 
in some literature, system failure is seen just as different type of market failure, and it is 
caused by underlying incentive problems which can be traced back to market or 
government failures (Hers et al., 2004). Considering these debates, the concept of 
system failure needs to be discussed in more depth. 
The sources of system failures have been identified quite variously by different scholars. 
Smith (1996, 2000) pointed to some of the policy issues arising from the complexities 
concerning the nature of innovation and its underlying learning processes. He argued 
that traditional market failure analysis links up with 'linear model' approaches and leads 
in practice to policies consisting of subsidies to R&D, but it is very weak in identifying 
where those subsidies should go, and what their level should be. Smith also indicated 
that any market-based system is likely to generate other areas of systematically weak 
performance, which might be termed 'failures', and which provide a justification for 
policy intervention. He distingwshed four types of system failures that include failures 
in infrastructure provision and investment, transition failures, lock-in failures, and 
institutional failures. Smith (1996, p. 41-46) also added 'policy capabilities' on the basis 
of this rationale for policy action. In a systems context, policy makers need some 
competences, skills and resources to operate policies: the assessment of system 
specificities, understanding of relevant knowledge bases, assessment of system 
dynamics, system co-ordination, and identification of untraded knowledge flows. 
Malerba (1998, 2002) put emphasis on four main types of system failures such as 
learning failure, exploitation-exploration and variety-selection trade off, appropriability 
traps, dynamic complementarities failures. His term 'failure' is not used with respect to 
any optimality situation, as compared with the term 'market failure' used in the 
83 
neoclassical literature. Whereas 'market failures' refer mostly to a static framework and 
call for government policy intervention due to missing markets, the lack or 
appropriability and the public good aspects of scientific research, and the indivisibility 
and uncertainty related to R&D projects, Malerba's 'evolutionary system failure' refers 
to the absence or the mismatches and traps in the key evolutionary mechanisms 
(Malerba, 1998, p. 5-6). Edquist (2001, 2002) suggests that market failures are irrelevant 
in a system approach and recognises four system failures; missing functions, 
organisations and institutions and a lack of interaction in the innovation system. Bemer 
et al (2001) identify three types of system failures. These are too much or too little 
interaction, path dependency and lock-in, missing or inadequate institutions (Hers et al., 
2004). While market failure perspective addresses failure in the generation of knowledge 
due to associated risks or uncertainties, the system failure perspective focuses on within-
system interactions and system dynamics in knowledge exploration and exploitation. 
3.4.2 Limitations of systems approach 
The perspectives of market failure and system failure are controversial areas for policy 
makers. In reality, these are not mutually exclusive rather complementary in some sense 
in that they have their own theoretical basis and limitations in terms of policy 
implication. As mentioned above, the traditional rationale for policy intervention has 
been that of market failure, but this assumes that governments have enough ability to 
tackle the problems caused by market imperfections. However, governments cannot be 
assumed to do better than markets, even when the latter fail. This is government failure. 
Beyond this, the basis for and implementation of innovation policy is subject to systemic 
issues. It means that innovation systems deal with system failures caused by the 
imperfection of system itself. 'Consequently, the justification for policy intervention in 
innovation processes depends on country or regional specific context including market 
forces, government's capabilities, and institutional environment. Table 12 shows the 
basic distinction of two approaches between market failure and system failure. 
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Tabl / •. ompari on of market failure and systemfai/llre perspective 
eo- la ical Economic Evolutionary Economics 
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ituati n , p licy intervention would be in vain or even worse than non-
n. P Ii Y actions in the market are usually implemented in the form of non-
hani m mainly using regulation such as taxations, redistribution, subsidising. 
f intervention may cause serious distortion of market mechanisms, 
qu n e, it can be connected to another market failure as an impact of 
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Systems approach for innovation implies that policy making itself becomes an adaptive 
and learning-based activity. As stated before, market and system failures are not 
mutually exclusive but that both require attention by policy makers. Each has its 
limitations and pitfalls. Andersson (1998, p. 17) identifies three such pitfalls relating to 
the application of systems approach; Firstly, "there are no doubt limitations to 
governments' ability, as well as high opportunity costs in employing those capabilities". 
These limitations stem from mainly the competence of government officials, the time 
available to them and the possibility of rent-seeking behaviour. These are recognised as 
the reason of government failure. Secondly, "the limitations on government capacity 
make it important to determine priorities". Setting priorities regarding the issues which 
need to be addressed by policy "becomes very important in the systems approach as it 
may produce a range of suggested policy adjustments". Thirdly, "a systems approach 
raises issues with respect to the generalisation of policy principles and lessons." (ibid, p. 
18). Country specific conditions are important in that policy objectives and instruments 
are influenced by the specific issues in different countries. Hence, a systemic framework 
makes it difficult to draw policy lessons from the experience of others. 
Among above pitfalls of the systems approach, the second one may be related to the 
selectivity of policy. Edquist (1999) argues that most of innovation policy is selective 
rather than general, especially when governments do not use the market mechanism. It 
means that the consequences of policy are not uniformly distributed between different 
activities. According to him, a policy for basic research has a selective nature. Policy 
makers must allocate public funds between various research fields. Someone has to 
decide which fields of research that shall be given priority. He suggests that regional 
policies seem to be also seleGtive in a similar point of view in that someone decides 
which regions to favour, why and how. Furthermore, such decisions for selective 
resource allocation are made every year, but what's going on inside the black box of this 
political decision making is seldom, if ever, discussed explicitly and publicly. This 
selectivity of government policy might deepen the distortion of market mechanisms. 
Financial support or subsidising for high-tech start-up companies can reflect relative 
disadvantages for existing manufacturing companies. Supporting innovative and 
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advanced regions may amplify the gap of innovation with lagging regions, as the term 
'regional innovation paradox' implies well (Oughton et ai, 2002). 
According to the system failure perspective, path dependency is one of the main sources 
of failure. As discussed above, in the systems approach, policy measures to correct the 
'system failures' mainly focus on increasing interaction and stimulating innovative 
demand by stimulating cooperation, information brokerage, or public consultancy. This 
point of view provides additional reasons why government should intervene in the 
process of innovation. However, there are some criticisms of this idea that most sources 
of system failure can be explained by market forces view points. Dealing deeply with 
these debates is not relevant for this research, but they provide very interesting insight in 
terms of different mechanisms between market and policy being operated in the systems 
of innovation. Various empirical studies show that market-driven innovation and policy-
driven innovation are quite different in terms of performances and mechanisms. As Hers 
el al. (2004) argue, if the problems are caused by market power of firms, these measures 
are not likely to be very effective. For example, if governments stimulate cooperation 
between firms under these circumstances, then market failure can be enlarged. In 
addition, the scope for governments to solve information problems (e.g. a lack of 
capability in acquiring or processing information) is limited as government agencies 
suffer from information problems themselves. Moreover, government intervention in the 
form of public consultancy might replace more efficient private initiatives. TJ:tus some 
sources of system failures can be seen just as a different side of market failure analysis, 
although path dependency and lock-in raise more fundamental issues. 
In conclusion, system failure 'rationale for government intervention provides different 
implications for policy makers in that policy needs to be much more complex issue than 
in the market failure rationale (Smits et ai., 2004; Hers et ai., 2004). In other words, the 
systems approach has contributed not only to provide a useful concept to visualise the 
complexity of the innovation process, but also particularly to identify the concept of path 
dependency and lock-in as a potential source of failure and a reason of government 
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intervention. Hence, the matter of path dependency in the process of innovation and 
other issues relating to this matter need to be deeply discussed below. 
3.4.3 Mode of intervention 
Generally speaking, policy does not exist in a political or social vacuWD. It means policy 
reflects the changes in time and space. While the justification of government 
intervention is associated with the issue 'why' governments should intervene in the 
process of innovation, the mode of policy intervention is linked to the issue 'how' 
governments should intervene. As noted before, these two issues are closely intertwined 
with each other. This matter can also be seen a quite normative issue. Although the 
justification of government intervention can be accepted in spite of the possibility of 
government failures, the matter of intervention mode can still remain as a crucial issue in 
association with the role of governments. Governments can have various roles to play, 
for example, in supporting or facilitating entrepreneurship. There are, however, strong 
pressures on these public initiatives that any government intervention in the market has 
to pass the test of the three 'D's: Dead-weight, Distortion and Displacement (Arzeni, 
1997/1998). Firstly, the matter of 'dead-weight costs' may be produced if taxpayers 
have to finance a potential entrepreneur who would have started a new business in any 
case. Secondly, fostering new start-ups may also distort the market mechanism if doing 
so gives certain firms an unfair competitive advantage. Thirdly, new firms may displace 
old jobs instead of creating new ones. These concerns point out that it is important for 
governments to think over how to step in support. 
With respect to the mode of intervention, two aspects exist to be argued. One is related 
to the consideration of fum specific factors, and the other is associated with the 
reflection of spatial differences. As mentioned already, the linear model of innovation 
policy was dominant until the 1990s in western countries. It focused mainly on R&D 
infrasbUcture provision, fmancial support for start-ups, and technology transfer. This 
type of policy emphasised the'inputs and support instruments in the innovation process. 
However, it often neglects firm's capacity or demand for innovation such as absorptive 
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capability, behavioural characteristics, organisational deficits (Lagendijk, 2000). 
Moreover, it did not pay much attention to regional specific factors like regional 
differences in less favoured or well-performing regions. Many studies have focused on 
key concepts from new growth theory (Romer, 1986; Krugman, 1991; Lucas, 1998) such 
as high-tech cluster (Porter, 1990) or innovative milieu (Aydalot and Keeble, 1988; Ratti 
el ai, 1997, Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999). These began to deal with the questions of why 
such industries agglomerate in particular locations, and what kinds of networks exist. 
Basically these approaches tried to analyse the cases of well-performing and more 
advanced regions. However, the problem of these efforts is that successful stories in 
advanced regions are not easy to apply to less favoured regions (Cooke et ai, 2000; 
Isaksen, 2001; Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2003). In other words, 'best practice' can not be 
easily transplanted from one innovation system to another (Lundvall and Borras, 2005). 
It does not indicate that policy lessons can not be drawn from the cases of leading 
dynamic regions. Instead, it means that innovation policy needs to take a specific 
regional context sufficiently into account. As argued in previous section, RIS approach 
provides a useful framework for more differentiated innovation policies. It pays more 
attention to firms, institutions, systems, and specific policy options or strategies. In 
accordance with this RIS approach, it can be said that policy intervention needs to be 
more interactive and more differentiated. 
The discussion above shows that there is no single best practice innovation policy 
applicable everywhere. There can of course be some policy lessons derived from past 
policy experiences or new theoretical approaches. However, at least one thing seems to 
be certain that the policy approach to fmd an ideal model or 'one size fit all' policy 
instruments is likely to be impossible and even not desirable in some cases. As Lundvall 
and Borras (ibid, p. 617) argue, it points out "why innovation policies that focus on 
subsidizing and protecting suppliers of knowledge at best are incomplete - at worst they 
increase the gap between technological opportunities and absorptive capacity". 
This chapter explored a few critical debates regarding the nature of innovation process. 
According to the RIS perspective, innovation is an interactive process shaped by a 
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variety of institutional functions between actors and the wider institutional milieu 
(Morgan, 1997). The interactive process can be regarded as a localized process of 
interactive learning, emphasising the importance of cooperation and mutual trust in 
promoting competitiveness, further promoted by proximity (Asheim and Isaksen, 2000). 
Many geographical studies suggest locally embedded social, cultural and institutional 
arrangements as a source of knowledge creation and learning (Amin and Thrift, 1995; 
Storper, 1996). In this regard, regional advantages are considered as an important policy 
issue, and RIS can be a policy tool for the construction of supportive innovation systems 
at a regional scale (park, 2001). When considering RIS as a policy tool, there is a need 
to recognise the interdependent connection between RIS policy and the changes of 
regional context. In other words, policy intervention can influence the formation of 
regional development trajectory, and simultaneously, the impact of same policy can be 
differently presented in differen.t regions due to their varied regional contexts. 
Innovation can be seen, as argued above, both path breaking and path dependent process 
according to the view point of seeing innovation in terms of time scale. Many 
accumulated path breaking innovations in short term perspective can formulate path 
dependent innovation processes in longer term basis of understanding. In addition, 
systemic approach of innovation provides very useful understandings about path 
dependency approach and regional innovation system. Furthermore, system failure 
perspective on the basis of systemic approach suggests additional rationale for the 
justification of policy intervention in the process of innovation besides market failure. 
Systemic approach does also provide very meaningful insights into how the mode of 
intervention can influence innovation process and how even the same intervention can 
bring about different outcomes in different situation. This chapter provides the basic 
understanding for the discussion in following chapter about path dependency perspective 
and regional innovation. Path dependency is basically seen as one of the sources of 
system failure, but it can be understood in broader sense as a useful tool for 
understanding the changes in entrepreneurial and regional innovation. 
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4 THE PATH DEPENDENCY APPROACH 
4.1 Introduction 
In the above chapters, various issues and arguments regarding high-tech start-ups, 
innovation processes, and the rationale for policy intervention were critically reviewed. 
On the basis of these wide ranging reviews of literature, this chapter discusses how the 
concept of path dependency has been examined in different domains and disciplines and 
how it can be connected to regional development. In addition, this chapter tries to 
develop a conceptual framework of 'government dependency'. As noted before, path 
dependency has been understood as one source of system failure which takes place due 
to the imperfection of the innovation system itself. The notion of path dependency was 
fIrst employed to explain technological changes, but it has been expanded to the fIeld of 
explaining institutional changes or regional changes. Basically, path dependency as a 
rhetoric indicates a sort of inertia or resistance to change. In more academic usages, it 
has been used to criticize some of the assumptions in neo-classical economics. More 
specifIcally, unlike the neo-~lassical economic view, suboptimal technologies can 
survive in markets as a result of random or chance events in the past, and this inefficient 
equilibrium can persist in the future. David (1985; 1994) and Arthur (1989; 1994)'s 
rigorous modelling of path dependency have greatly affected later studies in explaining 
path dependent institutional changes. 
More recently, path dependency has also been adopted to understand why regions find it 
hard to break regional inertia or deviate from existing trajectories. The concept of 
institutional path dependency provides meaningful insights to understand this 
problematic issue. It is also connected to an interesting question: why do regional 
changes retard or take place in an incremental manner although a wide range of public 
policies for innovation have been concentrated on a specifIc region? Most of the recent 
literature on this issue focus on 'lock-in' problems in lagging or less-favoured regions 
(Visser and Boschma, 2004; Kaufmann and Wagner, 2005). In addition, it is also 
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interesting that policy intervention can contribute to the fonnation of regional legacy via 
the operating mechanism of actor's behavioural change. Many recent policies (in 
particular, innovation policy) aim to change behaviours in principle. The change of 
actor's innovative behaviour shapes a collective behavioural pattern in the innovation 
system. It consequently is combined with regional characteristics and builds a certain 
type of regional legacy through cumulative interactions between actors (Aoyama, 2003). 
Thus, path dependency and regional lock-in can take place in regions even in which 
policy measures have been concentrated. 
Conceptualising 'policy induced government dependency' has three meanings in this 
study. Firstly, it is necessary to have a container to represent the problematic 
phenomenon as raised in introduction. Secondly, a tool is necessary to look inside a 
black box located between input and output of an innovation system. Thirdly, it is 
necessary to develop an analytical frame for empirical research in the field. First of all, 
the notion of path dependency needs to be unpacked in tenns of space and policy. In 
addition, a modification of the classical path dependency approach is undertaken to 
produce a non-linear and more flexible frame for recognising and understanding a new 
path creation by policy intervention. This modification produces a 'circulating' type of 
dependency which can be helpful to understand the phenomenon of government 
dependency. On the basis of this modification, two gearing concepts of policy 'reliance' 
and behavioural 'persistence' are developed to delineate the mechanism of government 
dependency. Policy reliance refers to start-up finn's perceived reliance on policy support, 
and it is addressed by probing the change of risk perception in the process of business 
start-up. Persistence refers to start-up firms' behavioural persistence in seeking benefit 
from policy support, and it is approached by probing their self-reinforcing expectation of 
continuous benefit-seeking in business. 
4.2 Theoretical expansion of path dependency approach 
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4.2.1 Path dependency in technological change 
Neo-c1assical economics is based on an assumed rational choice made by individuals, 
such as cost minimizing or utility maximizing behaviour. It assumes that institutional 
change driven by rational choice of individuals would lead to an ideal institution, if free 
negotiation over contracts is ensured. It means that, as North (1990) asserts, institutional 
changes can be driven by the individual entrepreneur's response to incentives embodied 
in the institutional framework. However, there are many limitations or obstacles to 
hinder institutional changes towards efficient market equilibrium in the real world. 
Moreover, the individual economic actors can not be expected to always behave 
rationally due to their 'bounded rationality' (Simon, 1986). The path dependency 
argument from evolutionary 'economics starts from the critique of these unrealistic 
premises or assumptions. In this approach, institutional changes tend to occur 
incrementally and the market may lead to inefficient equilibrium due to the path 
dependency. 
Evolutionary theorists focus on the importance of uncertain and unexpected outcomes in 
an economy, and emphasise how the future of an economic system is affected by the 
path it has traced in the past. They also put a lot of effort to explain why change is 
unlikely to take place, and why change is often incremental and gradual of nature. They 
make use of evolutionary concepts such as bounded rationality, routines, trajectories, 
lock-in, rigid institutions, path dependency to answer these questions. According to them, 
current decisions and events are not determined by past ones, but they are conditioned 
by them (Boschma, 2004). The fact, that some developmental paths produce ineffective 
solutions and suboptimal outcomes, is a precondition for evolutionary selection: 'no 
variety, no evolution'. Accordingly, the evolutionary process can entail development 
through failure, and imperfections are the primary proofs of evolution (Grabher, 2004). 
Path dependency is a concept that has appears to have become very widely-used across a 
wide range of disciplines, but it is also being used to mean a various range of possible 
phenomena (Scherrer, 2004). It was first elaborated in the field of economic history for 
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understanding technological change and the possibility of a lock-in to durably inefficient 
solutions because of increasing returns and the influence of historical matters. 
Technological path dependency is based on relatively precise economic mechanisms, but 
there are a few controversial issues in applying this concept to institutional change 
(Vincensini, 2001). To understand the underlying mechanisms of how technological 
path dependency can be transposed to institutional path dependency is a useful step 
towards developing an analytical perspective for explaining the relationship between 
innovation policy and regional path dependency. 
The argument that technological change is path dependent has been developed by Arthur 
and David in 1980s. According to David (1985), path dependency refers to a property of 
contingent, allocative, non-reversible dynamical processes, including a wide array of 
biological and social processes that can properly be described as 'evolutionary'. 
"It may be defined either with regard to the relationship between the process 
dynamics and the outcome(s) to which it converges, or the limiting probability 
distribution o/the stochastic process under consideration" (David, 2000, p. 4). 
David tries to explain why 'QWERTY' keyboard became 'locked in' as the dominant 
keyboard arrangement even though it was not convenient compared to DSK (Dvorak 
Simplified Keyboard). Through this case, he specified three conditions which make the 
process of technological change path dependent: the technical interrelatedness of system 
components, quasi-irreversibility of investments (matter of switching costs), and system 
scale economies due to positive externalities (David, 1985). 
Arthur (1989) emphasised the importance of increasing returns as a necessary condition 
for technological lock in. He particularly focused on the dynamics of allocation in a 
context where 'increasing returns' arise naturally. In an industry characterised by 
increasing returns, small random events can drive the adoption process into developing a 
technology that has inferior long run potential (Arthur, 1989). Under increasing returns, 
even trivial circumstances can be magnified by positive feedback to tip the system into 
the actual outcome 'selected' (ibid, p. 127). It shows how increasing returns can 
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dynamically cause the economy to lock in to an outcome not necessarily efficient to 
alternatives, and entirely unpredictable in advance (ibid, p. 128). 
According to Arthur, increasing returns may arise either on the supply side of a market 
as a result of 'learning effects' or on the demand side as a result of positive 'network 
externalities'. He argues that network externalities are important not only because of 
their impact on each direction of technological development, but also because they 
represent a source of market failure and call for public intervention (Arthur, 1994). In 
further detail, he argues that technologies display increasing returns because of two 
mechanisms. The first is 'learning by using' which means the more they are adopted, the 
more experience is gained with them, and the more they are improved, and so the more 
they are adopted again. The second is network externalities: the first adopters of a 
technology choose according to their own needs and preferences and impose 
externalities on the following adopters by not exploring promising but expensive 
technologies, which could have brought higher returns to all later on (Arthur, 1989). 
Consequently, the combination of small random events and increasing returns may lead 
to the domination and lock-in of inferior or inefficient technologies (Vincensini, 2004). 
Originally, as noted above, the concept of path dependency developed as a criticism of 
the neo-classical point of view about technological change, and it appears that the main 
contention regarding this concept is the possibility of sub-optimal outcomes. Neo-
classical economists such as Leibowitz and Margolis (1995) acknowledge that 
technological change may be influenced by initial conditions and therefore difficult to 
predict, may be costly to change and that there may be multiple eqUilibria. However, 
they separate path dependency from inefficiency by challenging the link between the 
influence of initial conditions on the outcome and the possibility of a lock-in and the 
degree of efficiency (Vincensini, 2004). They distinguish between static and dynamic 
comparisons of a different solution, and "tailor their definition of efficiency so as to 
accommodate the fact that economic change may not reach the most efficient (static) 
solution but only the most effiCient solution conSidering switching costs" (Vincensini, 
2004, p. 3). Although they accept path dependency, they do not accept all its claims. 
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Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) illustrates three different types of path dependency, each 
having a different implication regarding market errors and lock-in: First-degree path 
dependency occurs if initial actions lead to a path that cannot be left without some costs 
and this path is efficient and agents are rational. Second-degree path dependency implies 
that decisions are based on imperfect information. In this situation, dependency on initial 
conditions leads to outcomes that are regrettable and costly to change, but they are not 
inefficient in any meaningful sense, given the assumed limitations on knowledge. These 
two types of path dependency are commonplace in mainstream economics but provide 
no support for the claims that remediable errors occur. Third-degree path dependency, 
which is the relevant one in' the innovation literature, critically challenges the neo-
classical paradigm of relentless rational behaviour leading to efficient and predictable 
outcomes. The argument of Liebowitz and Margolis has implications for path 
dependency in that they interpret path dependency as a market failure. They suggest that 
path dependency can be partially overcome by several mechanisms (communication 
between actors, planning and ~stitutional solutions), which increase the efficiency of the 
final result. However, they show this form of failure requires important restrictions on 
prices, institutions and foresight. 
4.2.2 Institutional Path Dependency 
As discussed above, the concept of path dependency emphasises that routines or paths in 
the past may be embodied within physical objects in the form of technology or products. 
The arguments of Arthur and David show effectively that rational decisions of a benefit 
maximizing individual can result in sub-optimal outcomes. However, according to 
Gertler (2004, p. 25), an important part of past events is also embodied in institutions 
that shape the attitudes, norms, expectations, and practices of individuals and finns 
through formal or informal means of regulation. Path dependency also has a strong 
social dimension. The new institutional economists suggest that 'institutions' humanly 
devise constraints that shape human interactions: they imply routinized behaviour and 
actions. They reduce uncertainties, coordinate the use of knowledge, mediate conflicts 
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and provide incentive systems by establishing a stable (not necessarily efficient) 
structure for human exchange. At the same time, institutions affect the perfonnance of 
the economy by their effect on the costs of exchange and production (North, 1990, p. 3-
6; Lundvall, 1992, p. 26). 
From this perspective, institutions have high start-up or fixed costs. There are also 
considerable learning costs and coordination costs that arise in the course of the mutual 
adaptation of fonnal and infonnal rules (Leipold quoted in Scherrer, 2004, p. 5). North 
argues that transaction costs in political and economic markets can result in inefficient 
property rights, and the interaction between institutions and organisations can produce a 
lock-in that accounts for the persistence of inefficiency (North, 1990). 
On the basis of above understanding of institutions, it shows that the concept of path 
dependency can be applied to address institutional change. However, some critical issues 
are raised regarding whether its relevance can be simply assumed or not. Vincensini 
(2001) points out three maID difficulties to the transposition of the idea of path 
dependency from technologies to institutions. Firstly, the technological and cognitive 
mechanisms of path dependency should be properly specified to become entirely 
relevant for institutions. Secondly, one of the main points of technological path 
dependency is the possibility that it might lead to an inefficient solution, but measuring 
the comparative efficiency of different institutions is far from straightforward and a very 
delicate task. Thirdly, the underlying vision of technological change is the idea of 
'institutional diversity' rather than that of 'institutional standardisation' in that "it is 
possible 10 conceive of a situation where several institutions continue to coexist' in the 
realm of institutional change (ibid, p. 4). 
4.2.3 Path dependency in organisational theory 
Path dependency has become a popular concept in most organisational research. It 
appears, however, as a metaphorical notion in many cases, indicating generally well-
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known phenomena like institutional inertia or resistance to change. There have been, of 
course, several attempts for more rigorous approaches in explaining technological 
development or institutional changes. In these fields, as mentioned above, some 
analytical concepts like 'increasing returns' or 'positive feedback' were developed to 
address the phenomena that once entered a path that cannot be easily quit or replaced. 
These concepts can be also useful in explaining organisational changes. Organisational 
change and structural inertia have an important agenda from organisational research for 
decades. More recently, as there has been growing interest in paths and the path 
dependency of organisational changes, organisational theory has developed beyond this 
general interest towards recognizing structural inertia in terms of the path dependency 
perspective. 
Firms in general and start-ups in particular, are not only very important economic agents 
in the market, but also key actors in innovation systems. In order to explain firm 
behaviour and the economic growth process, it is necessary to combine the technological 
and institutional path dependency with the organisational path dependency frame. This 
is because start-up firms are basically seeking continuous technological innovation, and 
in doing their business they are interacting with institutional settings. Thus, the sources 
of path dependency identified in the field of technological and institutional changes can 
provide useful insights in organisational studies such as scale of economy or increasing 
returns, learning effects, network externalities, coordination effects. However, further 
sophisticated approaches are needed to explain organisational path dependency. 
Organisational studies are usually divided into two approaches on the micro level and 
the macro level. Micro level approaches such as 'behavioural theories' (eyert and March, 
1963; Lindblom, 1965) or 'cognitive organisation theories' (Gioia and Sims, 1986, Barr, 
1998) mainly focus on the existing organisational routines, cognitive schemes, or 
decision-making processes in organisations which cause organisational inertia. These 
approaches emphasise the importance of the initial conditions which influence later 
behaviour, and also the continuous self-reinforcing mechanisms which lead to the 
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accumulation of a certain behavioural pattern. Initial events or specific conditions can 
gain momentum through self-reinforcing processes, and eventually generate persistence. 
On the other hand, macro-level approaches can be divided into broadly two streams: one 
is institutionalism, and the other is the evolutionary perspective. The fonner generally 
focuses on the process of 'institutionalisation' which represents the sedimentation of 
structure over a certain period of time (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; Lawrence et al., 
2001). These approaches try to explain 'institutional inertia' by adaptation in tenns of 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour. The other stream of macro-level approach is the so-called 
'population ecology theory' (Carroll and Harrison, 1994; Levinthal, 1997) based on an 
evolutionary perspective. This approach focuses on 'structural inertia' (Hannan et al., 
2004) which points out the stability of organisational arrangements opposed to 
environmental change. Structural inertia arises from the necessity of routinizing 
organisational activities in order to survive in competitive environments. As a result, 
organisational routines are reproduced and certain behavioural patterns are shaped over 
time. In this reproduction process, positive feedback and self-reinforcing mechanisms 
play important roles in causing inertia or persistence in organisational change. Structural 
inertia is seen as source for effective survival strategies by securing the reliability or the 
accountability of an organisation, but paradoxically it can also often be a serious threat 
to the survival of the organisation. This is because structural inertia may bring about 
failure to adapt in rapidly. changing environments. There is another stream of 
evolutionary based research. This approach focuses on the organisational learning 
process. Theoretical development of path dependency in evolutionary economics (e.g., 
Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter 1982) provided much insight to this 'co-evolutionary 
theory' (Rodrigues and Child, 2003; Volberda and Lewin, 2003). The learning ability of 
an organisation is affected by its previously accumulated experiences or knowledge. 
Thus the organisational learning process is likely to be a path dependent one. This is 
associated with regional innovation theories which emphasise 'learning' as the source of 
innovation. According to the evolutionary perspective, regional innovation is seen as 
path dependent process due to the path dependent characteristics of organisational 
learning process. 
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Organisational studies, as reviewed above, have developed the concept of path 
dependency on the basis of theoretical arguments developed in economics. According to 
traditional economics, all individuals are regarded as a rational actor who behaves 
following the principle of maximizing individual utility. From this neoclassical 
perspective, the market reaches an optimal equilibrium through rational behaviour of all 
actors. However, these naive and unrealistic assumptions have been criticized by later 
economics on the basis of 'bounded rationality' (Simon, 1986; Williamson, 1996) and 
'path dependency' (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989). Economic actor's behavioural choices 
can not be rational due to individual's cognitive limitation, emotional dimension and 
political processes in and between organizations. Moreover, individual actor's rational 
decisions may have irrational and unintended consequences at a collective level, and 
eventually entire markets can be locked into a sub-optimal equilibrium. These criticisms, 
as already discussed, have provoked controversial debates. Path dependency in 
organisation studies is, however, quite differently embedded from the sets of premises in 
economics. Although the classical model of path dependency provides very useful 
insights in organisational studies, its assumption of rational choice and its deterministic 
perspective have raised many objections in this field. More recently, theoretical 
approaches to organisational path dependency have developed into less deterministic 
and more realistic directions. The possibilities of 'unlocking' path dependency are being 
accepted, even if a 'lock-in' situation has already occurred. According to this 
perspective, both path dependency and path breaking are possible in the reproduction of 
an organisational path. This point of view forms the main basis to build the conceptual 
framework for this study. 
4.2.4 Path dependency in regional context 
The sources and mechanisms of technological path dependency and the lock-in process 
are relatively well understood, but the transposition of them into institutional changes is 
still a controversial issue even though various academic attempts have been done in the 
mean time. It is obvious that to apply these efforts to a regional innovation study must be 
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much more difficult and highly contested. The region is a very abstract and broad 
concept. In particular, there are many debates regarding how to understand regions in 
regional iImovation systems (ruSs). Most studies of ruSs commonly emphasise the 
importance of the role of institutions. Thus it can be very useful to approach regional 
path dependency on the basis of institutional path dependency. 
Paul Pierson tries to address what keeps things moving along the same path through 
specifying mechanisms of institutional reproduction. He argues that a specific path is 
promoted via various positive feedback mechanisms to moving along this path, and 
suggests a few mechanisms which could be operative in the reproduction of a given 
path: 'large set-up cost', 'learning effects', 'coordination effects' and 'adaptive 
expectations' (Pierson, 2000, p. 76-78). For Deeg, path dependency involves three 
phases; 
"the first is the critical juncture in which events trigger a move toward a 
particular path out of at least two possibilities; the second is the period in 
which positive feedback " mechanisms reinforce the movement along one path; 
finally, the path comes to an end when new events dislodge the long-lasting 
equilibrium" (Deeg, 2004, p. 5). 
Following these arguments, the distinction between 'change within the existing path' 
and 'change to a new path' seems to provide quite iInportant insight to understanding 
regional innovation and path dependency (Deeg, 2004, p. 7). In the process of shaping a 
regional trajectory, the perspective of institutional change and path dependency can be 
very useful. David and Arthur's notions of 'path dependency' are quite relevant to 
understanding the historical paths taken by specific regions. The foundation of their 
framework implies that history matters in the sense that once historical paths are chosen 
(even by coincidence), then they dominate future development. 
It can be expected that every region will have its own regional trajectory, and will be 
affected by path dependency, as institutions play an important role in the concept 
regional innovation. As Fuchs et al (2004, p. 225) argue, regional trajectories "consist of 
economic structures that have developed in relation to technologies and embedding 
institutions", so "existing regional structures, institutional thickness, existing relations 
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of cooperation as well as approved policy strategies are path dependent - which implies, 
that they can be hard to change". 
According to Deeg (2004, p. 8), regional changes depend on the logic of institutions in 
the system. He argues that "exogenous shock is not the only way a path gets disrupte(/', 
but endogenous sources of change such as actions undertaken by actors (or by events, 
processes) within the institutional logic, can also move actors off a current path. Actors 
"seek new institutional changes that will either restore the old path (possibly through 
non self-reinforcing mechanisms of institutional reproduction, e.g., power) or move to a 
new one (off-path)" and these kinds of endogenous sources of change are very important 
in explaining the extent of change (ibid, p. 9). He also raises an interesting claim that 
increasing returns (as a mechanism of institutional changes) to "social and political 
institutions must often be cultivated by actors, i.e., they do not happen automatically". 
"Actors deploy power or ideology (or both) to promote their favoured outcomes", but 
"we should also recognise that the pursuit of specific institutional changes by particular 
actors may not always result in their intended outcomes, but the unintended effects may 
nonetheless reinforce the move toward a new path" (ibid, p. 10). 
Since 1980s, a new paradigm has emerged in the arena of regional development policy 
which some refer to as the 'network or associational paradigm' (Amin et ai, 1995; 
Cooke, 1997; Morgan, 1997; Btorper, 1997). Regions in this new approach appear as 
very crucial units for knowledge generation and interactive learning. As a consequence, 
regions are increasingly regarded as important sources of innovation and economic 
growth. From the influence of this change, most of studies for the last two decades have 
focused on region-specific assets such as local tacit knowledge, the quality or thickness 
of regional institutions, formal and informal networks, norms or conventions of 
interactions, etc. Consequently regional innovation policy has also focused on the 
generation and diffusion of knowledge, building of learning capacity, facilitating co-
operations both at an individual and at a collective level. 
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The systems approach of innovation stresses the importance of knowledge diffusion and 
interactive learning within the region as a system (Morgan, 1997). In a regional context, 
innovation can be seen as a process embedded in a regional innovation system. As 
mentioned in previous chapter, a regional innovation system consists of various actors 
and their close, regular, strong networks that promote the innovativeness of the region. 
As Gertler (2004, p. 23) argues, it is widely understood that regions are highly uneven in 
their ability to support learning. It means innovation is also geographically uneven both 
within and between nations. "As this geography of innovative activity continues to 
evolve, there are strong tendencies for winners to keep winning and losers to keep losing 
in local economic opportunity". The prospects for overcoming this process depend on 
the capability of regions to change the direction of existing 'paths' over time. According 
to evolutionary economics, economic systems, as a consequence, have a tendency to 
change slowly, in path-dependent ways, whether at the national or regional level. 
Moreover, the direction of this change is strongly shaped by past experiences, decisions, 
and events of history (ibid). 
According to various empirical studies, particularly successful regions in terms of 
regional innovation systems have some similarity that the institutional context and 
regional networks are closely complementary to the dominant industrial clusters of the 
region. Regional economic development can be understood as an evolutionary process 
of collective learning, which is following path dependent courses. This process might 
lead to "lock-in situations that prevent regional institutions from adapting to changes in 
the environment and from learning new knowledge" (Fuchs et ai, 2004, p. 225). Fuchs et 
al differentiate three types of regional changes: breakthrough, incremental change and 
lock-in. While 'breakthrough' means revolutionary changes, 'incremental changes' 
mean evolutionary changes that do not set up new paths but try to lead previous paths 
into a new direction. Contrastingly, 'lock-ins' are characterised by institutional and 
technological structures which are inefficient but hard to be changed. However, it is very 
difficult not only to indicate the exact demarcation between these three types of changes, 
but also to interpret certain changes in some region as an example of breakthrough or 
incremental change or lock-in. 
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In economics, the concept of path dependency has been particularly used in empirical 
studies on the syndrome of 'lock-in'. Grabher (1993) classified 'lock-ins' into three 
types: functional lock-in, cognitive lock-in, and political lock-in. 'Functional lock-in' 
means that close cooperation within strongly-tied networks impede contacts with other 
regions. 'Cognitive lock-in' means that personal relations lead to shared common ideas, 
feelings and beliefs that prevent the adoption of new ideas. 'Political lock-in' means that 
new ways of thinking or policymaking are very hard to be expected where historical 
trajectories of economic development is maintained by cooperative relations between 
regional actors. 
Grabher (2004) argues that once an economic system is locked into a particular 
trajectory, the costs of shifting strategy from it can be heavier than the benefits of 
alternatives. This implies that it is very hard to escape regional path dependency and 
lock-in once a certain trajectory set up in a specific region. Regional trajectories can be 
led into an evolutionary dead end through the positive feedback dynamics of lock-in 
processes. He suggests that the 'lock-in syndrome' can be amplified by regional political 
intervention which kept the region effectively on its path, even when this path became a 
'dead-end' . 
In swnmary, path dependency approaches, as reviewed above, have been continuously 
developed and expanded to explain why path breaking and radical changes are not easy 
to be witnessed in various fields. In spite of a few of its weaknesses, it has quite strong 
explanatory power in understanding path dependent institutional and regional changes. 
This study focuses on the regional dimension of innovation system which is interlinked 
policy system. Policy can be' seen as one of the most powerful exogenous factors to 
tackle path dependency. As argued already, the role of institution is critical in shaping 
regional trajectory and it largely influences on the pattern or aspect of actor's interaction 
and learning. Policy intervention can bring about institutional changes, but there have 
been rare attempts to look at the changes under the consideration of the influence from 
public intervention. Basically this thesis accepts the possibility of path breaking or un-
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locking by policy intervention. However, it also recognises the possibility of recurrence 
from this deviation to path dependency due to the inertia in changes of actor's behaviour 
and institutions. The theoretical discussions and literature review above provide the 
basis for developing the conceptual framework of policy induced 'government 
dependency' in following chapter. 
4.3 Construction of a conceptual Framework: Policy-induced 
'Government Dependency' 
4.3.1 Re-thlnklng path dependency In 'space' and 'policy' 
Conceptualising 'government dependency' needs to be considered in association with 
notions of the 'region' and 'policy'. In this regard, it is necessary to integrate various 
insights of path dependency which have been developed to address technological 
changes with understanding of organisational, institutional or regional changes. The role 
of institutions, in particular, is central in the reproduction of a certain mode of policy 
intervention and also in the formation of regional development paths. 
As Cooke (2004, p. 46) argues, "regions with strong markets that could supply support 
services had a competitive advantage", and "regions with leading animateur firms were 
similarly privileged". On the other hand, "regions with innovative public innovation 
support systems were advantaged over those without any of these supports" but not over 
the other market oriented systems. Political and economic institutions evolve differently 
among different regions and countries. These differences relate to the institutional 
traditions of the respective region or country. In this vein, the outcome of policy 
intervention to correct path dependency can be also differently presented in regional and 
national context. At this point, the concept of path dependency takes a crucial role in 
generating regional innovative variations. Choices or decisions in the past may be 
embodied within material objects in the form oftechnology, finn assets and labour skills 
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(Walker, 2000). However, an equally important part of this past is also "embodied in 
institutions - social structures that shape the attitudes, norms, rules, expectations, and 
practices of individuals and firms through formal or informal means of regulation" 
(Gertler, 2004, p. 25). This institutional path dependency can also be a useful concept to 
analyse path dependency in regional innovation systems. One of the crucial questions in 
analysing policy-induced 'government dependency' is what role does the policy 
intervention play in regional innovation? 
Every region has its own regional trajectory which has been shaped by complex 
institutional contexts. This regional trajectory is likely to be path dependent due to 
institutional path dependency. Thus, policy intervention can be seen to be aiming at the 
creation of new development paths. According to the system failure perspective, policy 
intervention should orient itself to the interdependencies among relevant actors in the 
system. As Staber (2004, p. ·120-121), "the idea is to encourage the formation and 
development of networks of actors in the institutional setting who are loosely embedded 
in a dense, yet open and dynamic web of economic and social relations". Many policy 
practitioners have tried to clone the successful story of 'Silicon Valley' over the last 
decades, but the outcome of these attempts turned out to be not so successful. Some 
studies point to region or country specific institutional contexts caused such a wide 
range of policy outcomes (Rosenberg, 2002; Gertler, 2003; Sturgeon, 2003). These view 
points are quite relevant indication in terms of institutional path dependency and 
regional lock-in. Besides these regional specific institutions, policy mechanisms that 
operate in the process of innovation need to be explored as well. Policy intentions, 
especially for facilitating regional innovation, are usually concentrated on the change of 
regional paths to new, innovative ones. Unlike traditional R&D policies, it is very 
important to encourage interaction for learning and knowledge distribution in innovation 
policies. Collaboration such as partnerships between university and industry or strategic 
alliances between firms is propelled by a grant or subsidy regime. 
The aim of regional innovation policy mainly focuses on transforming regions into 
'learning regions' (Morgan, 1997). In other words, it aims to introduce changes in the 
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innovative behaviour of companies and regions, taken as a whole, through the processes 
of learning and of the creation and accumulation of knowledge. As Nauwelaers et al 
(2002) note, most policy measures to promote innovation aims to change actor's 
behaviour in principle. Policy can affect the innovative activities of actors (particularly 
firms) directly via providing fmancial incentives such as grants or subsidies. The effect 
of this policy intervention works on individual actor's choices or decisions based on the 
costlbenefit or risk/reward calculations. Not surprisingly, intervention influences actor's 
motivations, expectations, attitudes or behaviour and consequently can affect actor's 
innovative activities such as firm creation, funding, investment. 
At the same time, policy intervention can influence the shape of regional trajectories 
through institutional changes. Institutional change induced by policy int~rvention 
combines with inherited cultural and institutional structures, and consequently constrains 
future innovation. But policy mechanisms are not as straightforward as one might hope. 
Possible government failures or unintended policy impacts may reduce the effectiveness 
of policy interventions. Government supportive policies, particularly direct fmancial 
supports such as grant or subsidy can generate a strong dependent tendency on them. 
This tendency may also be connected to the matter of moral hazard, grantlsubsidy-
seeking behaviour or loss of entrepreneurship. Then it may produce a sort of crowding-
out effect to policy effectiveness. The mechanism of this phenomenon is quite similar to 
the mechanism of institutional path dependency. For rational actors, especially profit 
maximising entrepreneurs who have to do their business under very harsh and uncertain 
market environment, they want to avoid uncertainties or risks as far as possible. 
Government fmancial support can reduce the risks for new start-ups in the process of 
business growth. Considering the situation of new firm formation, start-up entrepreneur 
can be faced with huge risks due to uncertainty and the lack of resources. Hence, firms 
are likely to depend on the financial support provided by governments particularly at the 
initial stage. Once this reliance is locked into the memory of firms, it might be quite hard 
to change or replace this path due to its benefits or convenience. 
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Based on insights of David (1994) and Arthur (1994), the concept of path dependency is 
broadened in this study by focusing on how human cognition and learning processes can 
be affected by policy intervention. Policy supports, particularly those providing fmancial 
incentives can make certain types of behavioural rules for fIrms. In other words, policy 
measures influence incentive structures and consequently affect individual actor's 
perception, motivation, attitude, or expectation through a reflective learning process. In 
the case of start-ups, the role of founders can be crucial for the survival of their fInns 
and their business performances. Their vision, values, belief or specifIc business style 
can be directly reflected on the fIrm behaviour. As Heffernan (2003) argues, the pattern 
of response (a set of rules) can be referred to as routines or behavioural rules. Once the 
set of rules is developed, it is reinforced by a variety of mechanisms of learning and 
incentive structures. Thus, once firms get benefIts from policy aids, it can be connected 
to a reliance on the external incentives through the fIrm's costibenefIt or risk/reward 
calculation, and it tends to persist at least for a certain period of time. It can be described 
as a conditioned response pattern formed by an interactive learning process. 
Environmental uncertainty and human's 'bounded rationality' can be crucial factors in 
transforming the recursive responses to external incentives into a sub-optimal level of 
policy consequences. Basically, if the actor's particular response seems to correct 
problems that arise in their 'business, it becomes a routine. Due to environmental 
uncertainty and the limits of human cognitive ability to anticipate every possible 
contingency, to perceive all potential choices inexpensively, to gauge the responses of 
others accurately, it may be rational to adopt a set of rules already settled in an 
organisational routine. According to Heffernan, individual actors will follow rules 
without thinking about them in this situation, rather than trying to determine the optimal 
response to each situation they encounter. The effects of this can be magnifIed and self-
reinforcing, and consequently becomes a mechanism. It also "acts as an incentive 
structure to reward rules-following behaviour" (Heffernan, 2003, p. 47). 
In this process, policy intervention can influence actor's responding mechanism as 
mentioned above. Thus we can expect if benefits from policy measures seem to be 
helpful to solve their problems, then firms may tend to seek this assistance continuously. 
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As a consequence, it creates a certain reliance based on set of rules that become a 
routinized pattern of behaviour. As Heffernan (ibid, p. 48) argues, "rules-following 
behaviour persists not just because it is expensive to change behaviour, but because 
people may not know how to go about changing the system or even think about changing 
the system". These behavioural rules put some rigidity into system. Thus, following the 
rules may provide a clearly suboptimal response to the problems. This phenomenon is 
similar in some sense to the choice of imitation by ftrms rather than the introduction of 
new paths. Copying practices assumed to be successful or emulating the most commonly 
used practices may raise the possibility of potentially greater value. However, imitation 
may lead to unintended failures because of uncertainty. Imitation may reduce some of 
the costs of trial-and-error, or buffer some possible risks at the early stage, but may also 
lead to the adoption of ineffective practices, and a lack of variety which is crucial for 
evolutionary innovation (Staber, 2004). Thus, government policy for facilitating 
innovation through tackling the matter of system failure may paradoxically produce a 
different type of dependency, and consequently constrain innovation rather than enable 
further innovation. This perspective can contribute to an explanation of why the process 
of regional change is overwhelmingly incremental through continuous marginal 
adjustment rather than being achieved by breakthroughs to previous paths. 
The response to the policy intervention depends on the individual actor's perception and 
capability. As Heffernan (2003, p. 49) said, "Bounded rationality does not imply people 
all suffer from the same type of myopia". These differences may provide a method of 
breaking out of inefficient path dependency. Individual differences in firm's 
'entrepreneurial alertness' (ibid, p. 45) can prevent the possibility of lock-in since it 
leads people to alter perceptions and change behaviour. Many empirical researches on 
path dependency that focus on technological and institutional changes, have tried to 
explain why inefficient or suboptimal choices can persist in the future. As mentioned 
already, recent studies try to apply this perspective to address regional innovation or to 
identify the factors that lead to regional lock-in. As Aoyama (2003) argues, regional 
institutions couple with path· dependency and shape 'regional legacy' as a way of 
sustaining regional distinctiveness. Even under the same national economic system, 
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regional legacy fonns different perceptions of risks and incentives among entrepreneurs 
in regions. 
In summary, policy intervention can playa critical role both in breaking the dependency 
on an existing path and in generating a different path of dependency at individual actor's 
level and regional or systemic level. Indeed there can be a dynamic process of 
accumulation in policy regime before path dependency (or consequent lock-in 
phenomenon) or path breaking (or consequent new path creation) occurs. When there is 
a positive accumulation, policy intervention can become successfully entrenched. 
Accordingly, at what point this accumulation flips into path dependency or lock-in is 
one of key issues in determining the impact of policy intervention. As argued above, 
once actors experience some benefits from policy measures, it can be logically assumed 
they are faced with a critical juncture as to whether follow a dependent way or 
breakthrough this dependency. In other words, the actor's choice can be influenced by 
various factors such as individual (organisational) innovative capacity, regional legacy 
conditioned by institutional settings, and the type of policy intervention. Policy support 
can reduce risks or uncertainties in actor's entrepreneurial activities, but this initial effect 
(benefit) can also result in an unexpected 'dependency' on government policy. This 
phenomenon can be understoo'd as the result of reflective learning, and not surprisingly, 
it can reduce the intended effect of policy intervention. Thus government dependency 
can be seen as a prevalent phenomenon rather than an exceptional one; however, its 
extent differs in each case. 
4.3.2 Modification of ciasslcal path dependency approach 
This study focuses on exploring the reproduction of start-up firm's 'government 
dependency' and its influence on regional innovation capacity. The notion of 
'dependency' here means, on the one hand, start-up firm's 'reliance' on assistant 
policies which is found in the entrepreneur's mind and firm behaviour. On the other 
hand, it contains 'persistence' in the start-up firm's business history. Path dependency 
theory plays a central role not only in conceptualising the construct of 'government 
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dependency', but also deploying complex theoretical discussion for underpinning this 
attempt. 
The start-up entrepreneurs, subject of this research, can be seen as risk-takers, in that 
they give up their jobs in stable employment markets and create their own 'risky' 
businesses. University faculties or researchers in PRIs are regarded as typical potential 
entrepreneurs for high-tech. start-ups. PRI researchers, for example, transform 
themselves into self employment entrepreneurs from wage-earners in government 
funded research organisations. In Korea, the emergence of start-up businesses had 
already started after the early 1990s, but it expanded from 1997 when the Korean 
economy fell into the IMF crisis. In the case of Daedeok, it has similar history to the 
national trend. The number of start-ups that spun-off from PRIs began to increase from 
1997 (Daedeok Valley MasterPlan, 2001). Actually the 'venture boom' in Korea can be 
seen largely encouraged by the government policy initiatives for promoting start-up 
entrepreneurship since particularly 1997 (Baek and Ra, 2001; Shin, 2003). This can be 
supported by the statistics which show rapid increases in the number of new business 
start-ups when the legislative basis for special supports for 'certified ventures' by the 
government first prepared. The statistics show another notable phenomenon of sharp 
decreases in the number of these newly emerged finns since 2001 when the government 
reinforced the screening criteria for venture certification (Kim and Lee, 2003). 
This new firm formation has two different dimensions in respect to a new economic 
development path. Firstly, from an individual perspective, the potential entrepreneurs 
were faced with a very critical· 'career choice' (Kanniainen et ai, 2005) when deciding to 
create their new and risky businesses, rather than to stay in the labour market as 
employees. Secondly, in regard to Korean policy regimes, the previous 'chaebol-
oriented' policy was partially replaced by a new 'venture-oriented' policy. After 1997, 
the government came to see venture firms as the main actors to substitute the chaebols, 
which were regarded as the source of the economic crisis. These dimensions of 'new 
path creation' (Garud and Kanwe, 2001) were intertwined with in that the individual 
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entrepreneurs' start-up decision as a new path creation was also largely influenced by 
the new path of policy intervention to stimulate potential entrepreneurship. 
Path dependency has been used to explain why actors may fail to respond to c~ges in 
their environment. The classical path dependency theory is seen as a linear and 
irreversible perspective which is hard to turn back once a path has been adopted due to 
positive feedback or self-reinforcement mechanism. This approach shows "the 
persistence of diffusion processes under relatively restrictive conditions, that is, 
unabated self-reinforcement without external intervention" (Ebbinghaus, 2005, p. 25). 
As a consequence, the end of this path dependent process is likely to result in lock-in. It 
points to the saying 'history matters' and it appears as a deterministic process. In this 
perspective, the possibility of path breaking can exist but it is not very common. Only in 
exceptional cases such as war, crisis or exogenous shocks, does path breaking or new 
path creation can take place. However, this excessively rigid and deterministic approach 
often lacks a full explanatory power. Major changes do often occur in the real world. 
Even once settled paths can be changed. Path breaking or new path creation needs to be 
understood as normal phenomenon rather than exceptional one. Moreover, the 
deterministic approach does °not offer explanations for institutional changes at the 
macro-level. As Ebbinghaus argues, "it can explain neither the emergence nor the 
change of institutions" (ibid, 2005, p. 25). In case of institutional changes, self-
reinforcing processes are seen as social mechanisms, and may be increasingly eroded in 
the long-term process of institutionalization. Institutional change, of course, may emerge 
suddenly due to a certain contingent or chance events, but it is more likely to occur in 
long-term social mechanisms. Institutional inertia needs to be understood in terms of 
such social phenomenon. 
The modified path dependency approach suggested in this study represents a more 
flexible and less deterministic perspective. Path breaking or new path creation can occur 
at anytime and everywhere, not only by individual efforts of 'mindful deviation' (Garud 
and Karnoe, 200 1), but also by intentional policy interventions. In this regard, attempts 
for path breaking or new path formation may even be seen as ubiquitous phenomena. 
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Ho e er, thi tudy suggests the problem is not so simple, instead it might be quite 
compl . A path can result in dependency and eventually lock-in, but at the same time, it 
can be replac d by a new path. 
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Figur 6. Br aking and creating organizational paths: Alternative route in face of 
path d pendency (Source: Sydow et ai, 2005, p . 32) 
ydm: I al (2005) uggested a modified perspective of path dependency approach in 
th ir r nt organi ational study (See Figure 6). It shows that organisational paths can be 
n Iy r at d and locked into path dependency, but simultaneously those new paths can 
b un-locking path dependency. Reflexive actors with sufficient 
re end wm nt may engage in breaking existing paths, even if a lock-in has 
alrea y curr d (ibid, p. 19). 
rding t in titutional economists, institutions can lower uncertainties which can be 
fa d b ntr pr n ur in the process of start-up. In this study, institutions are defined as 
' th rul ofth gam ' in a broader sense (North, 1991). Policy interventions definitely 
influ n in tituti nal changes. Supportive policy, in particular, can have effects on 
indi idual act r' incentive structures, and consequently cause changes in llislher 
p r pti n of bu iness risks and the motivation to start-up. At the same time, 
to policy measures can influence changes in policy itself. It means that 
hang d or modified by the reflective reactions of actors, and this results in 
h ng . The relation between the individual actor's mind and the 
in tituti nal change can be described as a feedback relationship in ' policy learning' 
pr 
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This more flexible and less detenninistic path dependency approach appears to be useful 
to conceptualise the construct of' government dependency'. Basically, it is assumed that 
path breaking can occur as a result of policy intervention, even when lock-in has taken 
place. As a result of path breaking, a new path can be created and at the same time, a 
previous path may be dissolved (a previous path can of course co-exist with a new path 
for a certain period oftime). In other words, policy intervention is assumed as an enabler 
to unlocking path dependency. Path breaking or a new path creation can take place at 
any time in the process of innovation. However, at the same time, a newly created path 
by policy intervention can also lead to path dependency again due to various factors. 
Policy is influenced by political considerations and it may be often far from rationality, 
and policy makers themselves are regarded to have 'bounded rationality'. Even though 
policy makers conceive a structural and radical reform and intervene directly with 
regulatory measures, institutions are not likely to be changed as rapidly as they expected 
due to institutional inertia. On the other hand, firms do not always follow the 'rational 
choice' model in responding to policy intervention. Sometimes actors' choices which 
look quite irrational for other people can be perceived for themselves as very normal and 
rational decisions due to mainly bounded or limited rationality (Simon, 1986; 
Williamson, 1996) such as limited cognitive ability. Thus, the effect of policy may often 
lead to unexpected consequences. On the basis of these considerations, a circulating type 
of path dependency approach can be illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figllr 7. irculating type of path dependency model (Source: Author) 
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t r l"ued 
in lock-in. Then governments can be tempted to intervene again. At 
n th ugh a new path is successfully created, it seems to be also not 
ibility of path dependency. In other words, path dependency and lock-
ain within a newly chosen path . If then, from the circulating path 
a h which this study proposes, policy makers may be required to 
ans of corrected policy schemes to sort out path dependency. As 
ction of in titutional path dependency, policy changes are also 
urr d in path dependent ways. Therefore, corrected policy measures tend 
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to be staying in the level of incremental changes rather than drastic reform. Second 
intervention is of course different from previous intervention, but this process can be 
illustrated as a kind of repetitive circulation loop as follows: 
'path dependency (a) - policy intervention (b) - path breaking and a new 
path creation (c) - another path dependency (a') - another intervention (b') -
another path breaking and a new path creation (c') ......... ' 
Strictly saying, this process is not exactly 'circulating' in that path dependency (a) is not 
the same to path dependency (a'). Similarly, policy intervention (b) is also different from 
intervention (h'). However, in a broader sense, it can be seen a circulating pattern 
because the process of (a)-(h)-(c) forms a cycle which is repeated in another cycle of 
(a')-(b')-( c'). 
4.3.3 Mechanism of 'government dependency' 
As stated already, this study seeks to develop the conceptual framework of 'government 
dependency' to explain why' government intervention does not necessarily result in 
increase of regional innovation capacity. The construct of' government dependency' can 
be approached at both micro (individual entrepreneur or fIrm) and macro (systemic or 
regional) levels and these need to be integrated. 'Government dependency' is, in a 
broader sense, dermed as the unintended consequence of policy intervention which can 
be induced by a certain type of support policies. More specifically, it represents a sort of 
dependency culture on government financial assistance which is likely to be persistent in 
start-up fum's entrepreneurial behaviour. 
Generally speaking, the term 'dependency' represents two aspects: one is reliance, and 
the other is persistence. Reliance is often used to indicate more psychological 
dependency. For example, this reliance can be found in the cases of children's 
dependency on their parents, welfare recipient's dependency on welfare payments, or a 
drug addict's dependency on drugs. The reason why people become dependent in these 
cases must be varied in each case, and many studies in these fields have suggested 
116 
different mechanisms for this reliance. In case of welfare related studies in particular, the 
concept of dependency has been examined in association with the concept of 'self-
reliance' (Ringen, 2006). In this field, dependency can be situated at the opposite to self-
reliance or self-exploitation. In the extreme, it can degrade the effectiveness of welfare 
policies by preventing people from being self-reliant. On the other hand, persistence is 
usually used to indicate durability or continuance. There may be many reasons for 
persistence in different cases. It might come as the result of the above mentioned 
psychological reliance, or as the consequence of inertia. In this sense, it can be presented 
that psychological reliance is likely to be connected to behavioural persistence as if 
nicotine dependency can cause the persistence in smoking. 
Government dependency is rooted in both reliance and persistence. These two 
intertwined concepts are crucial to developing the framework from general path 
dependency theories. However, it seems to be still quite abstract. A more precise 
analytical frame is necessary to move onto empirical study. In the above suggested 
'circulating' type of path dependency approach, 'starting up' is once regarded as a new 
path created by policy intervention (of course, several factors influenced the emergence 
of start-ups). Within this newly created path, another path of 'government dependency' 
can be shaped to gain momentum over time. Institutional economics and NIE (neo-
institutional economics) in particular, argues that institutions are changed over time and 
consequently in a path dependent way. From this epistemological point of view, it can 
be assumed that policy is likely to be changed in a path dependent way. Then, 
consequent changes in individual actor's mind (such as perception or motivation) by 
policy intervention are also likely to be path dependent. Once an entrepreneur thinks a 
certain policy measure is beneficial, this can be continuously reproduced in hislher mind 
and it must influence hislher business behaviour. This assumption can be also extended 
to a surmise that only really beneficial behavioural paths adopted in start-up stage can 
lead to the latter expansion and mature stages. Moreover, entrepreneurs can not foresee 
the exact consequence of their behavioural choices due to environmental uncertainties 
and cognitive limitations. In this situation, start-up founders can willingly take risks in 
the process of new firm formation when policy support is provided in that it can lower 
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the level of possible risks. It means that supportive policy measures work on their risk 
perceptions and on the motivations of start-ups. According to the path dependency 
perspective, this initial event or change makes a path formation and is likely to persist in 
later stages. At this point, on the basis of above argument, another significant 
assumption is possible that previously acquired and accumulated experiences of start-up 
entrepreneurs as researchers in PRIs are likely to persist in their entrepreneurial 
behaviours after start-up. Considering the characteristics of public R&D in Korea, most 
of PRIs in DST are, not surprisingly, accustomed to R&D subsidizing and grant regime 
for large-scale of national R&D projects. Researchers in PRIs have been generally 
recognised as representative 'risk-avoiders' in Korea. Contrastingly, start-up 
entrepreneurs are regarded as typical 'risk-takers' by establishing and running their own 
enterprises. This raises the question for both theoretical and empirical studies about how 
'risk-averse researchers' could be transformed into 'risk-taking entrepreneurs'. In 
addition, how supportive policy intervention impacts on entrepreneurs' business 
behaviour through the changes in their perceptional patterns, and how these policy-
induced changes have been reProduced in 'Daedeok' need to be explored. This study, in 
particular, focuses on exploring how entrepreneurs who once adopted the policy induced 
'mindful deviation' (Garud and Kam.ee, 2001) of start-up from existing career path 
become dependent on another path shaped by the very policy intervention and 
consequently locked into it. 
The above discussion can be summarised that reliance means start-up firms' 
psychological reliance on policy supports, and it is approached by probing their changes 
in risk perception in the process of start-up, at the same time, persistence means start-up 
firms' behavioural persistence in benefit-seeking from policy supports, and it is 
approached by probing their self-reinforcing expectation in business history. Through 
this analytical frame, it can be suggested that one of the main themes which is worth 
addressing in the field study is the perception of entrepreneurial risks. 
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Figure 8 shows the mechanism of government dependency. As discussed before, 
previously acquired (and accumulated) experiences and supportive policy interventions 
can influence the adoption of entrepreneur's behavioural path at an initial stage. 
Figure Mechanism of government dependency 
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Self-reinforcing 
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In this process, the changes in entrepreneur's cognitive pattems play an important role 
(Rizzello and Turvani, 2000). If an entrepreneur believes that the path is beneficial for 
hislher business, then it can become persistent and reproduced in his/her entrepreneurial 
activities. This frame can be seen as a kind of 'self-reinforcing' mechanism in the 
individual entrepreneur's expectation, which is one typical source of path dependency. 
Government policy brings about institutional changes through influences on rules of the 
game and incentive structures in the market place. From the perspective of 
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organisational theories, individuals or organisations are assumed to act on the basis of 
their own self-interest within a wider range of positive feedback mechanisms. 
Considering the characteristics of start-up flrms such as their size and age, the 
importance of the start-up founder in its entrepreneurial activities is undoubtedly beyond 
simple individuals in other type of organisations. Start-up entrepreneur's values or 
decision makings are more often reflected directly in the direction of flrm behaviours. 
The accumulation of a certain direction of flrm behaviour can form behavioural patterns 
and eventually become embedded into organisational routines. Start-up founders are 
likely to initially receive policy support for intentional beneflts or with just vague 
expectation. At this time, several conditions such as previous experiences and social 
circumstances influence their initial reactions. If they think policy support is beneflcial 
to their business growth, it can lead to their behavioural or structural reaction patterns 
through a self-reinforcing feedback mechanism. Behavioural patterns of seeking beneflt 
from policy support are built up, and consequently linked to structural inertia in the 
organisational level. In this process, changes in start-up entrepreneur's risk perception 
playa critical role for the formation of a path and the reproduction of path dependency. 
Policy support can be a sort of safety measure for a risky start-up business. As stated 
above, this self-reinforcement becomes an important source of 'reliance' on policy 
support and 'persistence' in business history. Government dependency can gain 
momentum as it is accumulated in organisational routines. This momentum can make 
the path resistant to changes over time. 
Considering the above conceptual framework, a path of change in many cases can not be 
seen as a single, linear and deterministic trajectory, like in the classical models. In every 
phase of path dependency, a different dimensional path can exist, and in some cases, 
multiple paths can co-exist at the same time. Moreover, a path dependent mechanism 
does not occur always in the same way, and path breaking can also take place in this 
process at any time and anywhere. From the broader sense, a start-up decision related to 
an occupational choice can also be seen as a new path, as potential entrepreneurs deviate 
from their existing career path of 'wage-employment' and enter into a novel path of 
'self-employment'. However, this path itself is not main focus of this study, although it 
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becomes a significant analytical starting point. To look at government dependency 
phenomenon through a path dependency perspective, 'start-up firm's reliance on policy 
support' is seen as the focus in this study. It can be described as 'a path within a new 
path', but those two paths are based on different dimensions. More specifically, the path 
of policy reliance is found in the newly entered start-up path. It can be also represented 
from a policy dimension. Policy intervention to promote a new path creation can be 
effective for that expected path formation, but simultaneously it can contribute to 
another unexpected path formation within a newly established path. The path of 'start-up 
firm's reliance on policy support', in this regard, can be seen as an unexpected 
consequence induced by policy intervention intended to create a new path of start-up 
entrepreneurship. Ifpolicy makers accept this unexpected path as a problem to be solved, 
then they must be trying to intervene again with new policy schemes or instruments. 
This attempt may create other new paths, but it also may bring about other unexpected 
paths due to the many policy constraints faced by policy makers. This multi-dimensional 
approach might be too complex, but it needs to be regarded as an inevitable challenge in 
this study to make the path more identifiable one. In line with this, this study constructed 
a 'circulating' type of path dependency approach to develop a relevant analytical lens. 
When it comes to occupational choice, start-up decision making seems to be a critical 
juncture, and it can be clearly identified. Many entrepreneurship studies focus on this 
visible and relatively easily measurable path and critical juncture. In real world contexts, 
however, it is often nearly impossible to precisely predict a critical juncture. This study 
takes one step further towards more qualitative and fluid phenomenon. The tenn of 
'critical junctures' from path dependency perspective is "characterised by the adoption 
of a particular institutional arrangement from among two or more alternatives" (Sydow 
et al., 2005, p. 8-9). As Mohoney (2000) argues, the reason why these junctures are 
'critical' is that once a certain option has been adopted, it becomes progressively 
difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available. Once 
the potential entrepreneur has made the decision to fonn a new firm, it looks difficult to 
return to previous working place in PRis as a researcher. Many entrepreneurs in 
Daedeok did not return to PRIs although most of them were entitled to do so within 
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three years of suspension period of their duty. There, of course, may be some exceptions, 
but a critical juncture in this case can be easily detected. However, in the case of a path 
of policy reliance, the existence of critical juncture seems to be quite flexible and even 
elusive in some cases. Some firms may try to deviate from the path of policy support 
reliance at an early stage of start-up, but some can maintain their dependent behavioural 
patterns stemming from this reliance over a relatively long period of time. Furthermore, 
the points (or timing) of these critical junctures depend on firm specific conditions, 
capabilities or situational factors. At the same time, to what extent it is critical depends 
also on various factors. This matter is associated with the issue of 'irreversibility' of the 
path dependency process. 
In this study, the start-up can be seen as path breaking decision making. In Korea, the 
start-up boom particularly from 1998 can be seen to be partly influenced by the 
exogenous economic crisis and policy intervention. Some entrepreneurs willingly take 
the risks from this path breaking decision, but not everybody dares to do it. Policy 
makers want to facilitate or trigger this mindful deviation through supportive policy 
measures. Policy support for start-up promotion in Korea seemed to work well at least 
for a short period of time, and statistics have showed positive policy effects in the 
increase of start-up numbers. However, after the cooling down of the 'venture fever', 
there was skepticism and even consequent criticism about the existing type of 
government policy for venture firms. In this period, the term of 'green house ventures' 
began to be often used to describe the firms which rely too much on government support 
rather than exploit their own self reliance. 
To sum up this argument, deterministic nature of classical path dependency model is not 
accepted in this study. Instead, path breaking, unlocking paths, or new path creation are 
regarded as ubiquitous phenomena. Unlocking the paths can occur by intentioI}al policy 
intervention. Then policy initiatives can produce beneficial effects in the process of 
innovation. However, the new path as a result of this intervention can be developed into 
a path dependent trajectory. This may cause continuous interventions. As a matter off act, 
the framework in this study is developed to apply it to empirical work. Policy 
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intervention is usually in use as a way of systematically promoting localized learning 
process to secure regional innovativeness in practice (Asheim et ai, 2003). In this respect, 
the application of govenunent dependency framework to the field is expected to 
generate practical empirical data in identifying how govenunent dependency has been 
reproduced. According to the framework of govenunent dependency, reliance and 
persistence are the main elements that can be addressed through the investigation of risk 
perception change and self-reinforcing expectation. 
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5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
As stated above, this study attempts to use the conceptual framework of government 
dependency to understand the role of high technology businesses in the period of 
economic readjustment in Korea. In this regard, the central unit of analysis in this study 
is high-tech start-up firms. In Korean context, dramatic structural changes have occurred 
since the fmancial crisis in 1997. The economic transition has not only caused severe 
economic disruption but also made numerous impacts on Korean society. One of notable 
changes since 1997 was that high-tech start-ups began to emerge as a main actor in 
Korean economy. Daedeok is expected to be a relevant study area in that there is a large-
scaled science park and considerable number of spin-offs from it and there have been 
quite long efforts to promote innovative activities such as R&D and start-ups. 
As stated in the introduction, this thesis addresses four sub questions for empirical work 
on the basis of two primary research questions; 
1. What makes potential high-tech entrepreneurs become start-up founders? 
2. How has policy support influenced changes in the perception of risk during the 
process of start-up? 
3. What sort of entrepreneurial responses have been induced by this change in risk 
perception? 
4. How have these responses been reproduced as a form of behavioural persistence 
in their business history? 
In collecting relevant data from the field, this study employs qualitative interview as its 
main data source. Secondary sources are also used in analysing the study area and policy 
contexts in terms of path dependency. Among the four questions above, first two 
questions are examined to address the emergence of a path of policy reliance and the rest 
of two questions are to address the persistence of dependent business behaviour. This 
provides the understanding of policy learning mechanism that interplays between 
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institutional building in systemic level and behavioural changes in actor level. In these 
considerations, how to position the researcher and how to prepare the research settings 
are very critical methodological issues. This chapter, first of all, discusses these issues to 
be tackled and also research methods employed under the consideration of them. In last 
section of this chapter, the descriptive information of Daedeok as a study area is outlined 
in terms of RIS perspective. 
5.2 Methodological issues 
There are many issues that need to be considered when conducting interviews as part of 
a data collecting exercise. Many of these have been well examined elsewhere and this 
section attempts to discuss a few fundamental issues for appropriate research settings in 
line with the nature of this particular study. 
5.2.1 Posltlonallty In Situating the researcher and the research 
This study was largely motivated by the researcher's personal observation during a 
period of working in the field as a practitioner. Thus, the researcher had been involved in 
the phenomenon observed in this study. This position of the researcher seems to be a 
good starting point of the study. However, it simultaneously raises two methodological 
issues associated with the researcher's ontological and epistemological point of view, 
and also ethical issues in conducting qualitative interviews. This study is basically 
looking at the interrelations between space, policy and business. The researcher is also 
situated between theory, research, and practice. Considering these elements and contexts, 
positioning of the researcher is crucial in determining the position of this research. 
Positioning between theory, research, and practice 
The researcher has fifteen years of working experience in practicing policies in the field, 
and the present thesis was motivated by these experiences. This study attempts empirical 
investigations through interviews in the field, but the researcher was involved in this 
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field through policy practice. The discussion of the relationship between theory and 
research and practice has always been problematic and thorny issue. As Einstein's 
statement that "it is the theory that decides what can be observed" implies (Heisenberg, 
1989), theory is what gives direction to an empirical investigation. Theories can be used 
not only to explain or predict phenomena but also to generate hypotheses that can be 
tested by research. As Nress and Saglie (2000, p. 738) say, "[f]or any field of planning 
re earch there is a necessity of striking a balance between empirical and theoretical 
contribution over time. Empirical research may challenge the theoretical lenses used 
for looking at the world, while too strong emphasis on empirical investigations may lead 
to naive empiricism." In this vein, it can be said that the results of research may provide 
evidence that supports the theory, which, in turn strengthens the theory. 
In the context of social SCIence, researches are usually not conducted in laboratory 
settings where researchers can control the variables that they want to study unlike 
experimental researches in natural science. Thus, it seems to be skeptical that theories in 
social science can be easily tested in the real field to see whether or not they work 
(Stinchcombe, 1987). However, in spite of this limitation, theory and research serve 
undoubtedly as the foundation for the field of practices. In return, the results of research 
conducted in academia impact on the development and revision of theories in that field. 
It means that theory and practice are also closely interrelated. In this respect, it is very 
important to situate research in its particular institutional, social, and political contexts 
(Parton, 2000, p . 449). 
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Figure 9. Positioning of the thesis between practice, theory, and research (Source: Author) 
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To sum up, those relationships can be illustrated by the double headed arrows linking 
three circles with the theory, research and practice circles (see Figure 9). On the basis of 
this illustration, it can be said that theory plays a crucial role for research and the 
relationship between theory and practice is mutually dependent. At the same time, 
"practice has been heavily and consistently influenced by other fields of policy and 
practice" (Thompson, 2000, p. 127). However, there are barriers to the fusion of theory 
and practice. They seem to come from different climate or culture that envelops them. 
Usually practitioners are more interested in pragmatic matters and focusing more on 
output or perfonnance. For the practitioners, the language used in planning theories can 
be unnecessarily obscure, so it may not be easy to fmd academic output useful or 
digestible (Thompson, 2000). As Sandercock argues in her commentary on Thompson's 
article, it might be vain efforts to stake a claim to a single theoretical solution. Theory, in 
itself, is not enough and sometimes too abstract, general and usually context-less 
(Sandercock, 2000, p. 136). 
As stated already, the research interest of this thesis starts from the problematic 
recognition about the close interrelation between theory and practice. With respect to the 
study area (Daedeok), there have been several efforts in both academic and practical 
purposes to explain the phenomenon of R&D resources agglomeration in it (Oh, 1995; 
2003; Oh and Kang, 1997; Lee, 2001; Seol et ai, 2002). Daedeok has been understood 
through various theoretical approaches such as science parks, technopolis, clusters, 
regional innovation systems. Some of them understand that Daedeok is a successful and 
well functioning cluster or exemplary regional innovation system. Nevertheless, what 
the researcher felt as a practitioner was quite different from these research results. 
Moreover the policy recommendations from these researches were often too abstract, 
ambiguous and superficial to reflect well the many problematic phenomena in the field 
of practice. Academic researchers have neglected to address more practical and 
substantial issues in Daedeok. On the other hand, practitioners have also not realised the 
importance of interface with more theoretical spheres. Deep theoretical discussions 
could provide this empirical' study with an academic basis. At the same time, the 
researcher's working experience as a practitioner in the field could also provide solid 
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basis for doing this theoretic~l work. The researcher will return to the job in practice 
after the completion of this study. Thus, the learning from it could contribute to the 
integration of planning theory and practice, and also create a climate in which the 
interaction of theory and practice is encouraged in both the academic and practical 
sectors (Thompson, 2000). 
Positioning between locality, policy, and business 
This study is looking at three interrelated factors: locality, policy, and business. As 
stated already, it aims at exploring the reproduction of policy induced government 
dependency through the investigation of start-up finn's risk perception and business 
behaviour. Thus, this study seems to be situating closer in the middle of the relation 
between policy and business rather than between locality and policy or locality and 
business. However, locality in this study has the importance not only as the space where 
innovation takes place but also as the field for empirical investigation. The unit of 
analysis in this study is start-up firms, but it is approached under the consideration of 
regional context and policy regimes. Start-up finns are seen as an important actor in 
regional innovation systems, and also as an important target group for innovation policy. 
At the same time, this study stresses the importance of the regional dimension of 
innovation. 'Region' in this study is basically understood as a container in which 
innovation takes place. Studies of 'learning region' have focused on the dynamics of 
individual regions. This study, however, does not directly focus on regional 
differentiation or variation, but rather focuses on the feature of the relationship between 
regional innovation behaviour and regional development within a region. Thus this 
thesis does not use a method of comparative study. 
Innovation processes are seen as systemic or interactive ones rather than linear. Policy 
intervention in the process of innovation is required to address the problems of market 
failures and system deficits as well. Theoretically, path dependency perspective can be a 
powerful tool to understand the nature of innovation process, and it becomes the main 
theory to encompass all these complex frameworks in this study. Start-up finn's 
128 
response to the policy intervention (support policy in particular) is analysed through the 
theoretical lens of path dependency, and also the empirical method of qualitative 
interview. As a result of these complex layers for observation, this study has inevitably 
multi-dimensional nature such as actor, systemic or regional, and policy dimension. 
This study which is looking at start-up ftnn's business behaviour has two intertwined 
issues to be addressed in relation to path dependency theory: spatial issues and policy 
issues. Spatial issues are important to understand innovation in regional context. 
According to RIS perspective, fum behaviour tends to be accumulated over time in 
regional context. In this regard, start-up fum's dependency on government policy 
support which is the main interest in this study can be also assumed to be reproduced in 
regional context. However, a region as the construct developed particularly in European 
context might be tricky more or less in applying it to Korean context in that there is still 
no clear distinction between local and regional levels in Korea. On the other hand, this 
study is, of course, not focusing on policy itself. Thus, it is far from policy evaluation 
study. Nevertheless, policy issues need to be also deeply considered because 'policy 
matters' a lot in the reproduction of government dependency. Policy has continuously 
changing nature rather than ftxed one. Policy feedback is likely to occur always and in 
every process. It means policy itself is changing all the time, but it seems to be changed 
in path dependent way. Moreover, policy can produce expected outcomes, but 
simultaneously bring about unexpected impacts as well. 
In summary, the positionality in this research setting can be seen producing the 
limitation but the potentiality of this thesis. This issue seems to be not the matter of right 
or wrong, but instead the matter of fundamental viewpoints or values in research. 
Considering the researcher's position between academia and empiria, it might be 
impossible to completely eliminate the values in this thesis. It would be the potential 
weakness of this study, but simultaneously it would be the potential source of 
contribution in ftlling the gap between empirical knowledge and theoretical development. 
At the same time, the nature of this study which is anchoring in three different 
dimensional factors like locality, policy, and business may produce excessive 
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complexity. However, it seem:s to be inevitable in considering the nature of this study 
and it needs to be addressed by appropriate methodological research design. 
5.2.2 Connectivity of studying firms to locality 
The central unit of analysis in this study is start-up firms. In economics, firms have been 
understood as a key actor in the capitalist market economy. Start-ups in particular have 
drawn much attention from scholars and policy makers in that entrepreneurship plays a 
critical role in economic and regional development. Many entrepreneurship studies have 
focused on certain distinguished characteristics of individual entrepreneurs from non-
entrepreneurs. On the other hand, organisational studies have emphasised the importance 
of organisational learning capacity for innovation. In this study, start-up entrepreneurs 
were interviewed to explore the changes in perception and behaviour of firms in 
response to policy support. Thus, connection between individual entrepreneurs and start-
up firms may cast problematic questions in this study whether the unit of analysis is 
entrepreneur or firm. Considering the critical influence of start-up founders in small and 
newly established firms, start-up firm's behaviour is likely to be heavily dependent on 
founder's value, belief or business style. Those individual factors are often reflected 
directly in the start-up firm's business performances. As start-up firm's certain 
behaviour accumulates over time, it formulates behavioural patterns of firms and 
eventually it is likely to be embedded in organisational routine. In this vein, it could be 
no problem at all to look at start-up firm's behaviour through studying individual start-
up founders. 
As argued above, the unit of analysis in this study is the firm rather than individual 
entrepreneur. However, it still needs to be further argued that how to understand the firm. 
Basically, firms' behaviour and decision makings strongly depend on the information 
they receive from their envirorunent. The start-up firm assumed in this study is an 
economic actor who has bounded rationality. It implies that start-up firm has not full 
information and only has limited information-gathering and cognitive computation 
abilities. In this vein, the information coming from the envirorunent should fit into 
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already existing cognitive frames or patterns which firms hold. This 'cognitive 
representation' (Anderson, 1980; Fornahl, 2003) can make actors choose one possible 
alternative that consequently lead them to a certain action and behaviour. A~ Fornahl 
(ibid, p. 41) argues, change of this cognitive representation can take place by individual 
and collective learning processes. The start-up firm can be recognised as an individual 
actor or a collective actor according to the nature of study. This research is based on 
systems approach. In a system of regional innovation, start-up firms are regarded as a 
key actor who interacts for learning not only with other actors within the system but also 
with external environment. According to neo-classical economics, flrms are assumed to 
behave towards an optimal reaction to environmental changes on the basis of their 
capability of optimising behaviour. However, in the evolutionary economics, firms are 
recognised as actors who exist, behave and evolve in different ways. In other words, 
flrms are not homogeneous, rather they exist in diverse forms in evolutionary processes 
and they possess distinctive learning capacities. Therefore, the firm as a collective actor 
can be different from the simple sum of individual firms. Furthermore, this recognition 
of firms is linked to the assumption that firm behaviour is likely to change in path 
dependent ways. Once certain behavioural patterns are embedded into organisational 
routine, it provides a sort of inertia for those patterns. As organisational routine builds 
up, firms may have competitive advantages in a relatively stable environment. However, 
this may result in lock-in situation in rapidly changing environment. These premises on 
the firm would be the basis in establishing conceptual framework below. 
Another issue associated with studying firms in this study is the connection, between 
firm behaviour and locality. It has been a central interest for regional planners and 
economic geographers for several decades (Harrison et ai, 1996; 10hannisson et ai, 
2002; Nijkamp, 2003; Tully and Berkeley, 2004). In the meantime, several notable 
approaches have been tried in this field such as location theories (North, 1955; Krugman, 
1993), regional input-output studies (Jensen et ai, 1988; Batey et ai, 1993), 
agglomeration and clustering theories (Malmberg et ai, 2000; Malmberg and Maskell, 
2002), territorial innovation theories (Moulaert and Sekia, 2003). Many scholars have 
focused on not only structural factors of regions like industrial structure, business 
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cultures, cooperative networks, or innovative milieu, but also individual factors of finns 
like business strategies, competitive behaviour. This study is, as argued above, starting 
from studying start-up firms, but it is moving from studying individual start-up 
entrepreneur to fIrm as a collective actor. At the same time, it is moving further from 
fIrm to region. This study is using qualitative data collected from interviews of start-up 
founders. Methodologically, it makes sense because a key focus in this study is laid on 
probing the change in entrepreneur's risk perception and its persistence in business 
behaviour. Data on such qualitative factors may be nearly impossible to fmd in 
secondary sources and difficult to evoke even in surveys. In this sense, interviews can be 
quite useful for studying fIrm strategy and dynamics as behavioural phenomena 
(Schoenberger, 1991). However, as argued above, the researcher needs to make several 
assumptions about the matter of 'representativeness' in moving from interviews with 
fIrm representatives to inferences about regional dynamics (Markusen, 1994, p. 478). 
This matter is closely related not only to the selection of case area, but also to the 
sampling of target fIrms for interviews. In other words, this matter is the question 
whether the specifIc start-up fIrms selected as interview targets can represent the study 
area (or region). There exist ~arious types of fIrms in a region such as large fIrms or 
SMEs besides high-tech start-ups. In this study, the founders of spin-off start-ups from 
PRIs in Daedeok Science Town are mainly selected as interviewees. Then, can they 
really represent Daedeok? This question is also linked with the matter that how Daedeok 
is understood in this study. Basically, Daedeok is regarded as a regional innovation 
system which is deeply rooted in DST. Thus, the above asked question can be answered 
in terms of representativeness in choosing a study area and interviewees. 
5.2.3 Dealing with 'time' and 'space' 
The issue of time and space seems to be methodologically one of the most critical 
factors in this study. This issue has been the most fundamental elements in a number of 
disciplines in that all things occur or exist in relation to space and time (Peuquet, 2002). 
It is related to the matter of time range and space scope in research. These two factors 
are often very closely interconnected to each other, and this entanglement adds to the 
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difficulty of analysing these concepts (ibid, p. 12). Generally speaking, history reflects 
time and geography represents space. Economic geographers often try to combine these 
two. In particular, the studies aiming to connect path dependency to regional 
development are interested in regional inheritance and endowment differentiating one 
region from another (Clark et ai, 2002). As Cooke and Morgan (1998) argue, the 
persistence of industrial district or innovative milieu based on local relations or assets 
not easily reproduced elsewhere. 
The term 'space' in this study is understood to contain several associated concepts such 
as area, place, territory, region, regional innovation system, etc. As argued already, a 
region is basically understood as the vehicle of innovation, and it is increasingly 
becoming the relevant unit of observation in innovation studies. At the same time, policy 
is seen as intentional intervention to facilitate innovation. Thus, policy itself also needs 
to be understood in a regional context. This study is basically looking at the changes in 
actor's perceptions and behaviour, but simultaneously interested in the changes in region 
and policy as well in a broader sense. 
Time and space can be described by the boundaries between its entities or attributes. 
"Spatial boundaries form when adjacent iocations differ; temporal boundaries form 
when adjacent states of the modelled system differ, i.e. when change occurs." (Langran, 
1992, p. 29). In this regard, it is necessary to look at 'government dependency' through 
the angle of 'spatial boundary' in regional context, and within the 'temporal boundary' 
on time line. The concentration of science and technology policy on DST over the last 
three decades endowed 'Daejeon' city with a clearly advantageous status in accepting 
benefits from innovation policy or venture policy. As discussed previously in chapters of 
conceptual framework of government dependency and institutional arrangements for 
venture policy, it can be inferred that the more policy measures are concentrated on a 
certain region and the more institutional environment is firmly established, the more 
economic actors like start-up firms in regional innovation systems try to embed 
themselves in it. This study focuses on high-tech start-ups in general, inventor-founded 
start-ups in particular. Many previous studies point out that the most conspicuous 
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characteristic of the start-ups in Daedeok is the fact that there are many spin-offs from 
PRIs, and they have a strong 'technology-orientation' rather than 'market-orientation' 
(Kang, 1998; Lee, 2001; Seol et ai, 2002). Most of studies have focused on these spin-
offed start-ups' quantity and quality. According to previous survey data (DSSC, 2001; 
DSSC, 2003; DSSC, 2004; DSSC, 2005), the proportion of them is over 60% of total 
number of start-ups in DaejeoI1 city. But, this quantity may be increased a bit more when 
the firms which recruited external CEOs are included. In their quality, 12 out of 14 IPO 
firms in Daejeon are spin-offs from PRIs in DST. It implicitly indicates that they have 
played a significant role as leading companies in Daejeon. This characteristic can be 
seen as a sort of path dependency in that the past experience of CEOs as researchers or 
engineers in PRIs has influenced on business styles even after their career change to 
start-up entrepreneurs. PRI researchers in DST are seen as typical scientists or inventors, 
and there have been policy measures to support them to create their own business in 
Korea. In this regard, Daedeok would be a relevant study area to observe high-tech start-
ups and to explore how policy-induced government dependency has been reproduced in 
their business behaviour. In this study, Daejeon, a local authority encompassing DST is 
seen as an administrative region which has the clear spatial or geographical boundary. 
'Daedeok' in this study is dealt with as a regional innovation system which is rooted on 
the one hand in Daejeon geographically, and on the other hand, in DST systemically. 
Thus, it is assumed that its system boundary is beyond the administratively fixed 
geographical boundaries of Daejeon Metropolitan City or the legally defmed area of 
DST. 
In exploring the reproduction of government dependency in Daedeok, a long term 
perspective seems to be necessary in that path dependency approach itself is based on 
long term perspective. The time scope of this study is basically focused on arpund ten 
years after the outbreak ofIMF crisis in 1997. This time setting comes from two points: 
firstly, this ten year period. has very significant meanings in terms of economic 
readjustment, and secondly, it triggered many institutional changes including the 
emergence of high-tech start-ups in Korean economy. Considering the research aim and 
objectives, analysing this period can be quite relevant. However, from the path 
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dependency perspective, this period can not be free from the past in tenns of institutional 
continuity or inertia. Daedeok could be constructed by the intervention of Korean 
government in the early 1970s. Furthennore, there have been continuous R&D supports 
for Daedeok over the last three decades. In this regard, as Figure 10 shows, this study 
looks at the ten year period on the extended time line from 1973 when DST was born. 
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1995 / starting Local Autonomy System 
1993 / Oa«ieon International EXPO 
1992 / completion of OST 
1973/ DST(Daedeok Science Town) 
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2004 / Daedeok R&D zone designation 
Stieg" yd Techuology Polley. 
- Agglomeration of R&D resources 
- PubUc-sector R&D promotion 
- R&D subsidization -- - -- - - ---- - - - - -, 
Igdusttia. f211~l: SMEs P21l£l: 
- Big corporation 
-
-~ vah.xlaldedirdBry r-
- Export drive - Corr1JCIitive advantage 
- Labor intensive - Technology intensive 
I 
I 
Venmril Polit~ 
-support~ 
- IT companies 
-KOSDAQ 
I 
Inpoyatlou Po.k~ 
- Knowledgetransfer 
-Co11atxntioo 
- Clustering , 
- NetWorkinll 
Fieure 10. Major events and policies in Daedeok (Source: Author) 
This seems to be inevitable in that the history of DST as an origin of Daedeok Valley 
goes back to that time. But, the main interest is laid on the ten year period from 1997 to 
the present in relation to the venture policy. There have been many significant events 
and policy changes during this period of time. Venture policy which was initiated 
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mainly after 1997 is the target policy in this study, but it needs to be reviewed in the 
perspective of other background policies such as science and technology policy, 
industrial policy, and innovation policy. The changes in these background policies 
seemed to function as a legacy in policy regime in shaping venture policy. 
5.2.4 Translation issues 
In this type of research which is using not mother tongue (Korean) but foreign language 
(English), translation issues can be crucial in conducting research. Although this study 
was not designed to interview English-speaking respondents, there still exist several 
possible translation issues. In this vein, those issues in relation with language or 
translation are raised with respect to mainly written communication with the readers of 
this PhD thesis rather than verbal communication with interviewees. 
In this section, translation is defmed as the transfer of meaning from a source language 
such as Korean to a target language such as English (Esposito, 2001, p. 570). As a 
matter of fact, translation issues may be raised at nearly every stage of this research. 
Much literature written in Korean was reviewed and many Korean statistics or policy 
documents were analysed. Some quotations from these Korean texts were interpreted in 
English by the researcher and put in this thesis. References for the sources of them were 
also transcribed into English. These attempts might cause the limitation in not only the 
expressions for cited data but also the accessibility to data sources. This study tries to 
use literature or data about Korean contexts written in English as far as possible. It, 
however, can cause another problem in that it is utilizing the translation by somebody 
else in secondary sources which must be done in different contexts from this research. 
Although this study tries to use Korean literature or data written in English already 
published in journals or books, this matter of translation seems to be still tricky in this 
study. Accessibility to the data sources written in Korean but put in references in English 
can be also problematic. In many studies which are dealing Korean contexts but written 
in English, Korean references are put in English. Contrastingly, English references are 
put in English even in the studies written in Korean. It may reflect a sort of English 
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oriented language hegemony in conducting academic researches particularly in Korea. 
This thesis adopts 'paralleling reference' which means putting Korean reference together 
with translated version of English reference in case of Korean written literature or data. 
Another critical language issue is arisen from the way of conducting interview and 
analysing data. This study conducted interview and transcribed interview data in Korean 
but this thesis is written in English. Whereas some expressions used in secondary 
Korean sources written in English are seen to be already generalized to some extent 
through publications, empirical data in this study is mostly containing terms or 
expressions which need to be .interpreted differently from the previous literature. Some 
of them can be, of course, refer to similar usages from previous studies, but it is not 
appropriate to borrow them in same manner in this study. A few expressions from 
interviewees seem to imply a quite specific Korean context which can not be easily 
understood by foreign readers. It demonstrates the matter of cultural differences rather 
than reflecting just the matter of language. In this case, attempts for direct translation of 
these expressions in English' may often not work properly in describing them. As 
Esposito (ibid) notes, the researcher as the translator needs to conceptualise the meaning 
of the statement from the raw data in informant's language (Korean) for understanding 
and reconstructing the meaning of it in a new cultural (English) context. In case of 
qualitative studies particularly interview based researches, translation needs to include 
connotations and contextual meaning (ibid, p. 571). In line with this, translation was 
done in this study as accurate and natural as possible to reflect their original meanings 
exactly in terms of Korean context rather than just sticking on literal translation. In some 
cases, however, original expressions in Korean were also used within brackets together 
with translated English expressions to give better understanding to Korean readers. 
5.2.5 Ethical Issues 
As Mason (2002, p. 79) notes, the use of qualitative interview as a data collecting 
method raises a number of general ethical issues, and there will also be specific ethical 
concerns connected to the particular research project. Ethical issue in this study is also 
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not so different from her statement. In this study, there are some ethical issues to be 
taken into consideration in that individual interview method which involves personal 
opinions is to be used. Moreover, this study is dealing with problems of policy 
intervention and I, as a researcher, am a civil servant who might be in charge of policy 
making again for most of interviewees when I return to my country. Thus, the ethical 
issues are mainly related to two matters: one is about research methods and the other is 
about researcher's position. These two matters seem to be closely interrelated in that 
interviewees may be influenced by researcher's job as a civic official of Daejeon where 
they are doing business at the moment. In this sense, the researcher is seen standing in 
the middle between 'insider' and 'outsider' in conducting the interview. This equivocal 
position may cause ethical or methodological problem. Considering this potential 
problem, the researcher tried to be as neutral as possible not only in conducting 
interview but also in treating all collected data through whole process of research. 
General ethical issues 
General ethical issues in interview based researches mainly arise from obtaining the 
consent from interviewees and dealing with the information from them in terms of 
confidentiality. The consent, if necessary, needs to be gained from informants before 
interview on the basis of the statement how interviewer will guarantee confidentiality 
regarding all gathered information. The judgement of this depends on the nature of 
researches. The interview in this study was designed to gather personalised opinions 
which may contain informant's value or belief. Moreover, interviewees' statements may 
reflect their pros and cons about government policies. Thus, it can be important for the 
researcher to gain the consent beforehand. The consent could be obtained through email 
or telephone. Some of them sent their consent by email in advance, but some of them 
recruited by 'snowballing' in Korea gave the consent through telephone contacts. Most 
of interviewees were not interested in the detail of interview such as interview questions 
or interview time. However, it was clearly emphasised in gaining the consent that 
collected interview data would be used only for academic purposes and all interviewee's 
name would be treated anonymously by allocating serial numbers. It was agreed to use 
just company names on the interview list which will be put in an appendix of this thesis. 
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Before every interview began, the purpose of interview and the way of using it in this 
thesis were briefly introduced again to respondents, although it was already infonned to 
them in the process of gaining consent. At the same time, recording the interview was 
agreed by each interviewee in advance. Most of interviewed entrepreneurs did not object 
to being recorded, but some of them showed some reluctance about that in the beginning. 
However, once they had checked again that their responses would not be opened to the 
public. they then agreed with recording. In the course of interviewing, some 
interviewees showed a bit conscious attitude about the fact that their saying was being 
recorded when they were going to say some sensitive matters. In this case, they could be 
relaxed again by reconfinnation of the previously mentioned anonymity and 
confidentiality in treating interview data. In the process of data analysis, aU interviewees 
were treated in just serial numbers for citation. Interviewees' company names are 
arranged on the interview list according to their alphabetical orders and each serial 
numbers are not matched with this order. In this regard, no personal data is idt:ntifiable 
within the results of this study adhering to the 1998 Data Protection Act. 
Specific ethical issues in this study 
As noted before, the researcher has long working experience as a civil servant in the 
field of providing business support for start-up companies in Daedeok. Therefore the 
researcher has already known some of infonnants even though it is not very close 
relationship. As seen in later section (5.3.2), it did not influence sampling or the 
selection of interviewees in this study. Nevertheless, it might be difficult to completely 
exclude the researcher's bias from this background. At the same time, interviewees 
might also have a certain bias or even prejudice toward the researcher. This 
acquaintance and the researcher's position as a civil servant can be expected to affect the 
proceeding of interview in any way. For example, contacting some interviewees whom 
the researcher has already known was relatively easy and interviewing them was done in 
a favourable atmosphere. Given the power relationship between public and private 
sector in Korea, however, this might be a disadvantage as well in that the researcher's 
position as a city official can influence the interviewee's answers. Basically this possible 
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problem was partly tackled by preparing interview questions and conducting the 
interview according to cautiously planned interview guide. In addition, it was also 
addressed by cross-checking start-up flrm's interview data in the process of data analysis 
with other actor's interview data such as venture capitalists or government officers. 
5.3 Fieldwork and research methods 
5.3.1 Utilization of secondary sources 
This study used a wide range of secondary data such as policy documents, government 
statistics, web data bases, previous surveys, and so on. Secondary sources were mainly 
used for interview design and institutional analysis of the fleld (Daedeok and Korea). 
Firstly, various statistics and policy documents from the central and local governments 
were reviewed together with previous studies to provide descriptive information of study 
area and policy context. At the same time, this data was also carefully examined for 
institutional analysis about Daedeok and venture policy through path dependency 
perspective. Policy documents from the central government ministries such as MOST 
(Ministry of Science and Technology) or 5MBA (Small and Medium Business 
Administration) could be collected in the form of publication or online document from 
the websites and local government documents could be obtained during the period of 
fieldwork in Korea. This data was mainly used to understand the change of policies and 
the characteristics of studied area. 
Secondly, in interview design, government statistics issued by mainly 5MBA were used 
to obtain the necessary information for sampling and selection. 5MBA website and its 
portal site 'Venture net' contain various online policy documents and annual statistics of 
certified venture flrms. Daejeon Metropolitan City (DMC) has also managed a quite well 
updated database on start-ups in Daedeok. DSSC (Daejeon Small & Medium Business 
Support Centre) has updated this database annually since 2000. This database covers 
nearly all types of start-ups in Daedeok and it contains quite detailed information on 
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venture firms. It was very helpful for the researcher to use these official websites or 
databases here in conducting this empirical study about Korea in the UK. Secondary 
online data could considerably complement the limitation of offline data accessibility in 
this research. 
In addition, previous survey data was also used to find more detailed information of the 
start-up firms in Daedeok. There have been several surveys on start-ups in Daedeok for 
the last a few years (DSSC, 2001; DSSC, 2003; DSSC, 2004; DSSC, 2005). Most of 
them were mainly conducted by DMC or its subsidiary organisations. DMC has exerted 
to transform DST into more innovative cluster since the mid 1990s. In particular, after 
the official declaration of Daedeok Valley in 2001, DMC has launched survey works 
almost every year although their purposes, methods and scope were slightly different. In 
this study, these secondary data were used for mainly fieldwork design. A recent survey 
(DHIPF, 2004) was used as a .main secondary survey data. This data can be relevant to 
be used in this study in that, firstly, it is quite recent one, secondary, its target companies 
cover various types of start-ups including certified venture firms, thirdly, its sample size 
is big enough. This study also referred a recent national survey on venture firms as well 
which is titled 'Fact-finding survey on venture firms in Korea' (SMBA, 2004). At the 
same time, a few similar large-scale surveys on SMEs and venture firms recently 
conducted by DSSC were also used to review the major changes in venture finns. 
Utilization of these previous surveys provided very useful and reliable data for picking 
up interview firms. However, the results of these previous survey researches were used 
very carefully and limitedly not only because it targeted various types of technology-
oriented small firms including certified venture firms, but also because their pwposes 
and employed methods were slightly different each other. 
5.3.2 Interview design 
Qualitative research in general uses a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand 
phenomena in context-specific settings. While quantitative approaches seek causal 
determination, prediction, and generalisation of findings, qualitative approaches usually 
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seek illumination, understanding, and extrapolation to similar situations (Hoepfl, 1997). 
However, these two research paradigms are not always in conflict with each other in 
teons of methodological appropriateness, but instead those can be effectively combined 
in the same research project (Patton, 1990). As already noted, the objectives of this study 
are, ftrstly, to construct a conceptual framework of 'government dependency', and 
secondly, to apply it to the study area to explore how policy intervention induced start-
up fum's government dependency and how it has been reproduced. According to these 
research objectives, two primary questions were raised as follows: 
• How and why has the reliance of start-up ftrms been produced in the process of 
starting their business? 
• How have start-up finns responded to support measures of government in getting on 
their business and why they came to respond in that way? 
To address these questions, this study adopted qualitative approach as a main method. 
Quantitative approach has been commonly employed in many previous innovation 
researches. For example, some indicators were selected to quantify possible variables 
such as the portion of public R&D expenditure, start-up's public fund dependency, the 
ratio of public fund in venture capitals, the portion of patent citation which produced 
through public collaboration programmes, etc. However, these quantitative variables 
seem to have limitations to fully represent various qualitative factors of the research 
problem. Furtheonore, it might be nearly impossible to explore changes influenced by 
policy intervention such as start-up venture's motivation, attitude, expectation or 
behaviour by single quantitative methods. This study was done on the basis of mainly 
qualitative paradigm, but it uses a range of other types of data as well such as statistics, 
secondary survey data, and policy documents. It worked well to reinforce qualitative 
data in understanding the phenomenon at the fteld. 
For conducting this empirical work through interview, six sub questions were produced 
from three primary questions (see the introduction of this chapter). As stated in above 
chapter, the major concepts of the fieldwork are 'risk perception' and 'self-reinforcing 
expectation'. Considering the .objective of this study and the abstract characteristics of 
these two constructs involving the examination of feelings or tacit perceptions, 
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qualitative interview can be naturally proposed as a way of eliciting rich data (Arksey 
and Knight, 1999). Basically; main interviewees in this study are start-up founders. 
However, start-up finn's innovative activities (e.g., finn fonnation, fmancing, 
investment, marketing, cooperation with other actors, etc) are influenced by a range of 
factors from several actors. Thus, besides the founder of start-up finns, venture 
capitalists and government officers were also interviewed for the purpose of cross-
checking. 
In this study, semi-structured interview was adopted for probing respondents' subjective 
meanings of varied risk perceptions in their business history. It means that a list of issues 
and questions to be covered is prepared in advance, but it does not deal with all of them 
in each interview. Interview questions are structured to some extent, but their order may 
change depending on how the respondent answers (Gray, 2004). Thus, the planning and 
conducting this type of qualitative interview must be very difficult and creative work. It 
is necessary to establish the structure and the flow of interview in this planning stage. 
Then data analysis could be also well carried out. The process of data collection and 
interpretation needs to be understood as an interwoven procedure rather than the linear 
process like the fashion of 'first collecting and later interpreting' (Flick, 2002, p. 176). 
Interviewing is seen as a kind of social interaction between interviewer and interviewees. 
The interviewer may face varied challenges in real interviewing. Thus, a possible OOt 
step in initial designing stage of interview is to address the questions of 'what kind of 
data and how and from whom it can be generated'. In interview design, one of the most 
important things is that every interview questions and preparing steps should be focused 
on research questions. In other words, interview design can start from the deep thinking 
about what the researcher want to ultimately know through this interview. Then it needs 
to set out detailed necessary steps: such as the type and the order of questions, the depth 
and the width of questions, the way of asking questions and how to express it (Mason, 
2002). 
143 
With regard to the selection of interview population, it is important to recognise how 
start-ups develop. Many previous studies use 'organisational stage model' or 'life cycle 
model' to analyse the development process of start-ups. It has been the dominant 
framework in both theoretical and practical literature. This model recognises the growth 
and development of new finns as linear, sequential and identifiable stag~s. Many 
scholars adopting this model tried to articulate various stages or life cycles of start-ups 
(Galbraith, 1982; Block and MacMillan, 1985; Bhave, 1994; Kazanjian, 1998; Kaulio, 
2003). But in the meantime this perspective has been criticized in that the process of 
start-up development should be recognized as a more complex and dynamic one 
(Lichtenstein. 2000; McKelvey, 2002; McKelvey, 2004). This criticism from the 
complexity theory seems to be very persuasive considering the complexity and 
dynamism of start-up process in the field of real practice. However, this study followed 
a conventional 'stage model' in terms of practical and methodological consideration. It 
was because this study used this model just for grouping the start-up firms in Daedeok 
for the selection of interviewees. However, this study does not basically regard the 
development process of start-ups as a linear, static and easily predictable one. This study 
classified the stages of start-up development into three stages: 'initial stage', 'growing 
stage' and 'mature stage'. Initial stage includes the phase of inception, start-up and early 
stage of development. Growing stage includes the phase of business expansion in 
finance and production. Mature stage means the phase of stability including for example 
IPO stage. This distinction can not be clearly accepted in various situations in real 
practice. In Daedeok and Korea, it seems to be accepted that 'growing stage' of start-ups 
usually covers the periods between around 3-4 years and 9-10 years of their business 
careers. According to surveys ,conducted by DMC from 2001 to 2005, average business 
careers of start-ups in Daedeok are between 4 years and 9 years (over 60%). More 
specifically, it is around 40% between 4 years and 6 years, and around 20% between 7 
years and 9 years. It reflects many venture firms were established from mainly the end 
of 1990s. Considering the fact that 'venture-certification' started from 1997, start-ups 
who were established between 1997 and 2001 (who have business careers of between 
nine years and four years) would be targeted for interview in this study. On the other 
hand, previous surveys show that the majority sector of industry in Daedeok start-ups is 
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IT (Infonnation Technology) sector including manufacturing and information services. 
Its proportion is around 50% of total start-ups in Daedeok. The second big proportion is 
BT (Bio Technology) including precise chemistry - around 30%. This study targets on 
start-up firms in mainly IT sector. It is widely agreed by venture capitalists that the 
period from initial stage to growing stage in the case of BT sector is relatively longer 
than that in IT sector. Thus it could be not relevant to include start-up finns in BT sector 
with IT sector firms. 
On the basis of above discussion, first of all, this study picks up start-up finns on the 
growing stage as interviewees. This is because venture finns on the initial stage 
(between from the beginning to 3-4 years) may be more likely to have a natural reliance 
on government support. However, it is hard to distinguish this natural reliance from real 
'government dependency'. Secondly, as noted above, interviewees would be basically 
confined into CEOs of spin-offed venture firms from DST considering the 
characteristics of Daedeok. At the same time, these firms are divided into 3 groups in 
relation to the 'venture certification'. The first group ('never' venture group) is the firms 
who have never been certified by the government as venture firms. The second group 
( 'once ' venture group) includes the finns who have certified as ventures once but are not 
now certified. The third group ( 'still' venture group) contains the finns who 
continuously maintain venture certification up to now. Among these three groups, 
second and third groups are targeted for interview in this study. It is because the first 
group (never venture group) does not have its accumulated statistics. In cases of once 
venture group (OVO) and still venture group (SVO), some interesting questions are 
raised: why some venture firms did not renew their venture certifications, and why some 
of them keep their certification up to now. Unpacking these questions must be very 
useful to identify how and why venture finns have tried to embed themselves into the 
institution of 'venture certification'. This certification in venture policy looks a selection 
of target firms for policy support by the government. In this respect, the response to the 
venture certification might be a key in approaching to the behavioural change as the 
response to policy supports. It is assumed that there might be meaningful variation in 
behavioural changes between these two groups. On the other hand, a few successful 
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(IPO finns can be regarded as successful finns) and failed (bankrupted) finns were 
interviewed as well. These two additional groups (IVCs: IPO Venture Comp~nies and 
FVCs: Failed Venture Companies) provide useful checking points with the above two 
main groups. 
These two groups are selected randomly among target population which is filtered 
according to three steps as follows: 
- Spin-off start-ups from PRIs in DST 
- Start-ups in IT sector 
- Start-ups in growing stage (from 4 to 10 years of business career) 
From this filtering, 20 start-ups were selected respectively as one group. Interviewees 
were the firm representatives who are founders and at the same time CEOs of those 
finns. In addition, statistics of certified venture firms issued by 5MBA on monthly basis 
since 1998 were also used for the selection of population. The number of certified 
venture finns in 2001 when venture boom reached at the peak in Korea is 503 firms. 
Among them, it is only 181 firms to maintain venture certification up to now (as of the 
end of October in 2005). These firms can be categorized as SVG, and then the rest of 
once certified venture firms (322 firms) in 2001 can be firstly classified as OVG. In the 
case of OVG, some finns had already disappeared due to bankruptcy or M&A or 
moving into other regions. Thus these firms need to be excluded from sampling. For the 
relevant sampling, this study used another database which is being updated annually by 
DSSC on the basis of survey works. By the above mentioned three additional sampling 
criteria (sector, business career and spin-offs), fmally 28 firms of OVG and 39 firms of 
SVG are left as follows. 
[Summary of population and sampling] 
1. Population 
- 2001 certified venture finns: 503 
- 2005 certified venture firms: 395 
2. Sampling criteria 
• First sampling: Venture certification 
- OVG: 322 firms, SVG: 181 finns 
• Second sampling: Sector/ Business career/ Spin-off 
- OVG: 28 firms, SVG: 39 firms 
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• 
Thi tudy wa de igned to recruit 10 finns respectively as interviewees from each group, 
and additionally 5 IPa finns which are registered in KOSDAQ market and 5 recently 
bankrupted firm . As a result of this sampling, totally 30 start-up entrepreneurs from 
sel cted firm were planned to be interviewed in this study. In addition, for the cross-
checking, 5 venture capitalists and 5 government officials were also planned as 
interviewee . Table 13 show the interview design and the number of interviewees. 
Tabl 13. Interviewees - Groups, Population, Sampling and Numbers 
Population Sampling Target No. of Actual o.of roup Interviewees Interviewee 
OVG 322 28 10 9 
tart-up SVG 181 39 10 10 
founder IVCs 9 5 5 
FVCs (Many) - 5 5 
V ntur capitalist (A few) - 5 5 
0 rnm nt officials (A few) - 2-4 3 
TOTAL 37-39 37 
Sourc : Author 
5.3.3 Conducting interview and analysing data 
The int rview were carried out in a two month period between February and April 2006. 
mail c ntact was used to approach interviewees in Korea from UK. Most of their email 
addr e were collected from the data in 'Venture Net' of 5MBA website. This annual 
date c ntains quite detailed infonnation about certified venture finns. A few changed 
addr fi r interviewees could be renewed from the website of their companies. In the 
ca e of non-entrepreneurs, such as venture capitalists and government officials, it was 
not ea y t obtain email addresses from UK. Thus, recruiting through 'snowballing ' 
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needed to be used. Staff in Daejeon city hall provided the necessary telephone numbers 
of selected contacts, and they also introduced relevant phone numbers and email 
addresses for potential interviewees. Many potential interviewees showed a positive 
reaction. Most of them agreed to be interviewed. There were, however, a few who were 
not available during the fieldwork period. Detailed interview dates and times could not 
be firmly fixed with all interviewees in advance. This was particularly true for start-up 
entrepreneurs who had busy schedules. Thus, approaching interviewees had to depend 
largely on time in the field. In the end, the number of potential interviewees agreed to 
participate was more than the target number in each group. The list of interviewees 
contained exact addresses, contacting telephone numbers, and brief information about 
the fIrms collected on the basis of the statistics on 5MBA website. 
After arriving in Daejeon, Korea, interviews were started with CEOs of previously 
arranged target firms. Most of interviews were recorded by MP3 player under the 
respondent's agreement. Three interviews could not be successfully recorded due to 
some problems: one of them was terribly recorded because it was conducted in open 
spaced office environment, and the rest two of them were not recorded because 
interviewees seemed to be reluctant about recording. Note taking was done for all 
interviews including three unrecorded ones. In note taking, it was also focused on 
catching a certain notable interview atmosphere or non verbal expressions such as body 
language. Most of interviews often lasted longer than expected due to respondent's 
active and even enthusiastic attitude. Usually one or two interviews could be carried out 
per day and most of them were done in quite silent and non-intervened environment 
such as interviewee's office or meeting room. Interview questions were asked according 
to basically prepared interview guide, but in many cases, contingent and situational 
questions were often added, and some questions were not asked in case interviewees 
already replied to previous question. In the courses of interviewing, some interviewees 
who told a lot were allowed to keep talking as they could, but some who tend to reply 
just shortly to the questions were often encouraged by asking contingent sub-questions 
or providing more information. Contacting details for potential interviewees could be 
obtained from the interviewees who were already interviewed. They often recommended 
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a few start-up founders worth interviewing. It was very helpful for recruiting 
interviewees particularly in case of failed companies in that relevant interviewees could 
not be recruited in the UK. Interview was conducted as planned, and consequently field 
work in Korea could be completed within two months. Number of interviewed people 
was totally 37: start-up entrepreneurs are 29, venture capitalists are 5, and government 
officials are 3. One interview 10 once venture group was missing because it could not be 
arranged before the date for already booked returning flight to the UK due to his busy 
schedule. 
Collected interview data is analysed to address how policy matters in the formation of 
start-up firm's 'government dependency' and its reproduction. Methods of analysis are 
following the ways of typical qualitative data generation and interpretation. Most of 
recorded interviews could be transcribed into word processor files within at least a few 
days after those interviews were conducted. It was quite useful to improve the way of 
interviewing. Listening to interview records during fieldwork provided some lessons for 
later interviews. A few interviews were transcribed in the UK where this work could be 
done more easily by using specialized transcription software named 'F4 for Windows' 
which was downloaded from a website (http://www.audiotranskription.de/english/).This 
German freeware could save time and effort considerably. Transcription was done to 
contain all recorded data as complete as possible. 
Transcribed text data was sorted into each interviewee groups: entrepreneurs, venture 
capitalists, government officials. Among these groups, entrepreneurs were divided again 
into four sub groups: once venture group (OVG), still venture group (SVG), IPO 
companies (IVCs), failed companies (FVCs). To organise this sorted data, it was sliced 
into several indexed data. Particularly, two entrepreneur groups of OVG and SVG were 
divided into 14 indexing categories each. Other groups were also categorised into 
several necessary slices. This ~dexing was carefully done according to the direction of 
already developed interview design for analytical purpose. Reading qualitative data in 
interpretive sense was very helpful to build relevant explanations and arguments (Mason, 
2002, p. 148). The degree of indexing depends basically on the direction of analysis. 
149 
Too shallow indexing can cause difficulties to grasp meaningful points in qualitative 
data reading, but too detailed indexing may also bring about risks to loose broad 
analytical frame. Here in this analysis, it was focused on making each indexing category 
represent enough meaningful data in tenns of analytical view point. Creating the right 
indexing categories from data set was not easy because the data set itself in this study is 
very large. This problem could be solved only by the cross checking between continuous 
interpretative data reading and going back to research questions and intellectual puzzle 
(Mason, 2002). This becomes the basis of interpretative explanation and raising 
argument. 
As stated earlier, one of the research objectives is to explore the reproduction of 
government dependency in Daedeok by understanding reliance and persistence. 
Methodologically, empirical investigation about these two elements was conducted on 
the basis of the examination of institutional settings in Daedeok. Secondary data was 
used not only to prepare the qualitative interview in Daedeok, but also to produce the 
description and analytical explanation about Daedeok and Korean context (See 
following Section 6.4 and Chapter 7). The consideration of institutional settings of 
Daedeok-RIS (Chapter 7) focuses on addressing what institutional legacy of policy 
intervention have contributed to the reproduction of government dependency in Daedeok 
and Korea. Interview data analysis was conducted to address two main analytical 
elements ('reliance' and 'persistence') that have qualitative features. 
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6 LEGACY OF POLICY INTERVENTION AND 
INSTITUTIONAL PATH DEPENDENCY IN 'DAEDEOK 
-RIS' 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses Daedeok-RIS through a lens of a path dependency perspective to 
understand institutional settings that influence actor's business behaviour or strategy. 
The notion of path dependency is "useful to understand why economic actors who face a 
fondamental change in the overall incentive structure behave in a way that would 
appear irrational to the external observer" (Meyer-Stamer, 1998, p. 1495). Policy 
intervention affects this overall incentive structure particularly with its inevitable nature 
of selectivity. In this vein, an analytical review of the legacy of spatial and 
entrepreneurial selectivity in policy would be helpful to understand fmdings from the 
empirical field work in the next chapters. Daedeok can be seen, in some sense, the 
production of technopole policies to build a national innovation system. Establishing 
public research institutes and the continuous subsidising of their R&D activities have 
been concentrated on DST. This R&D orientation of Daedeok seems to have contributed 
to the formation of a regional growth trajectory. It can be seen as a comparative regional 
advantage, but at the same time, it may also be the possibility of regional lock-in. On the 
other hand, selectivity of firms as main actors in innovation systems is strongly found in 
overall Korean industrial policies. As seen in the case of chaebols, selection has been 
done by the government to choose promising firms worth concentrating national 
resources. Selected firms could get exceptional benefits and protection. The mode of this 
policy intervention is found in policy support for newly emerged economic actor 
'venture' firms. Venture certification looks a typical selection mechanism to choose 
start-up firms for policy support. This selectivity makes firms respond not only to a 
market signal but also to a policy signal. In Korea, the selection and support mechanism 
in policy has been common and a long lasting mode of intervention. In this situation, 
firms may think that selection by the government can be very helpful for their survival in 
the market. Institutional reproduction of this selection and support mechanism in policy 
151 
regime can generate the expectation of benefit from policy exploitation and it can also 
influence firm's risk bearing strategy. In first section, policy intervention for supporting 
high-tech start-ups in Korea is reviewed. In second section, 'spatial selectivity' in policy 
and its regional legacy is discussed. Third section examines 'selectivity' in business 
support and its entrepreneurial legacy. This analytical chapter provides the basic 
understanding of policy intervention and institutional settings in Daedeok-RIS. It is 
expected to be a helpful basis in examining reliance and persistence through the 
qualitative interview analysis. 
6.2 Policy intervention for supporting start-up ventures 
6.2.1 Role of government for start-up promotion 
The role and function of the government was absolutely crucial in shaping and 
promoting overall start-up sector in Korea. The history of policy initiatives for nurturing 
high-tech start-ups in Korea can go back to the attempt for facilitating venture capital 
company establislunent in the mid-1980s. The first venture capital company was 
established in 1974 in the name of 'Korea Technology and Advanced Company' 
(KT AC), but its mission was focused on commercialising the R&D results from the 
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). In 1981, 'the Korea 
Technology and Development Company (KTDC) was established by the government. 
Two more venture capital companies were consecutively established by financial 
institutions: 'the Korea Development and Investment Company' (KDIC) in 1982, and 
'the Korea Technology and Finance Company' (KTFC) in 1984. These firms 
constructed the basis of venture capital growth in Korea under the umbrella of 
government protection and promotion (Seong, 2004, p. 161). At the same time, the 
government prepared statutory and institutional frameworks such as the '1986 Support 
for Small and Medium Enterprise Establishment Act' which defined the legal status of 
and benefits bestowed upon 'Startup Investment Companies' and the '1986 Financial 
Assistance to New Technology Business Act' which provided the legal framework for 
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another type of venture capital company, 'New Technology Financing Companies', 
which operated under the supervision of MOFE (Ministry of Finance and Economy), 
rather than 5MBA. 
In the United States, venture capital has developed in response to the market demand for 
high-risklhigh-return investments. However, in Korea, after these laws were enacted, the 
government granted various forms of preferential treatment and relieved the regulations 
applicable to venture capital companies. In the discourses about government intervention, 
this was justified from a market failure perspective. It was argued that growth in the 
start-up sector could not be done without the existence of a mature and well-operating 
risk investment market and stock market. Equity investment by venture capitals or angel 
investors was a vital source for start-up firm's fundraising, but it could be risky due to 
several features of the start-up sector, such as information asymmetry betwee~ start-up 
founders and investors. Moreover, it is difficult if there is no 'exit market' such as initial 
public offerings (IPOs) through a stock market. In this regard, government promotion or 
protection to some extent may be inevitable when the market is not mature enough or 
underdeveloped. Ko and Shin (2000, p. 470-471) argue that "the nature of venture 
capital is the appropriate allocation of the high risks that accompany projects with 
potentials for high returns among stakeholders, combined with heavy monitoring to 
reduce risks" , but the Korean scheme grants "direct and indirect subsidies to a selected 
group of venture capital companies as indicated by law". 
These institutional efforts made the availability of venture capital easier by lowering the 
minimum criteria for initial capital investment. Moreover, the government encouraged 
VCs to establish a 'venture investment fund' with other investors and directly invested a 
considerable portion of the total capital fundraising. Most of venture capital in Korea 
operated two kinds of fund; their own funds and outside funds. Considering the big 
proportion of outside funds in VCs' fundraising (the proportion ofVCs' own funds was 
usually 10% or even under), the possibility of a serious moral dilemma could exist in 
making investment decision for uncertain and risky businesses from their own funds or 
outside funds (YCs could be tempted to invest money for riskier projects from outside 
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funds not from their own funds). Although the scale of venture capital fundraising 
expanded remarkably since the mid 1990s, the dependency on external financial 
resource particularly public funds from the government still took the dominant position 
in the Korean venture capital industry. In this situation, early venture capitals in Korea 
were mainly a vehicle for implementing government-sponsored loan programs for start-
up businesses, and there were difficulties in attracting outside funds or increasing VCs' 
own capital. onsidering the risk of start-up investment, this structural feature of the 
Korean venture capital market looks problematic. 
Since the end of 1999 through the year 2000, the venture capital market began to freeze 
because of the shockwave of the bursting of the venture bubbles, the experience of 
several incidents of fraud and associated market fluctuations. This phenomenon was 
partly influenced by the global economic downturn started by the stumbling US 'New 
Economy in 2000 that even affected the Silicon Valley economy. However further 
fundamental reasons included market immaturity and institutional loopholes which were 
caused by the gap between the rapid growth of external factors and actual maturity of 
institutional infrastructure. Venture firms as well as venture capitals have relied too 
much on the government for funding (See Table 14 and 15). 
Table J 4. Investors in Investment Funds by periods (% of total commitments) 
Period Venture Government Pension Institutional Corporations Foreign Individuals Capital Funds Investors Investors 
Before 29 11 6 3 30 18 3 1995 
1996-1998 17 14.3 - 26.2 33.6 0.3 8.6 
1999 15.2 15.3 - 13.6 33.3 1.4 21.2 
2000 15.9 18.1 1.8 9.3 32.8 4.4 17.7 
2001 20.2 32.2 4.6 5.3 27.6 1.1 9.0 
Source: KVCA Korean Venture Ca ital Association ( p ) 
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Table 15. Investmentfunds with and without government participation 
Number (%) Million Won (%) 
With Government 
1996-1998 
15 (57.7) 94,900 (55.5) 
Purely Private 11 (42.3) 75,950 (44.5) 
With Government 
1999 
16 (21.6) 207,700 (45.6) 
Purely Private 58 (78.4) 247,668 (54.4) 
With Government 77 (41.2) 738,370 (52.2) 
2000 
Purely Private 110 (58.8) 675,625 (47 .8) 
With Government 68 (76.4) 660,020 (90.3) 
2001 
Purely Private 21 (23.6) 70 ,980 (9.7) 
Source: KVCA (Korean Venture CapItal ASSOCIatIon) 
The government provided a wide range of direct and indirect benefits for both venture 
firms and venture capitals. ' Certified ' venture finns and ' registered ' start-up investment 
companies could enjoy explicit advantages and benefits such as tax abatement, grant or 
subsidy, cheap physical space supply, and so on. Venture firms can borrow money from 
commercial banks at a low interest rate and favourable conditions for redemption (but 
the detailed conditions differ in different cases and regions) . The financial resources for 
these benefits come from the government budget. Both VCs and investors in VC funds 
are exempted from capital gains tax and securities transaction tax . In addition, investors 
in VC funds can deduct 30% 'of their investment from their taxable income (Kim and 
Lee, 2002). 
In the history of government intervention in venture capital development in Korea, 
venture capitalists could not predict whether they could consistently receive special 
treatment from the government because of volatile political envirorunent. Moreover, too 
much power in the hands of a few government officials had been a breeding ground to 
foster ' rent-seeking' behaviour or the chain of corruption. In the end, venture capitalists 
may have to assess non-economic factors in measuring the possibility of success of their 
venture capital projects. This set of political interventions was quite different from a 
venture capital driven system in United States (Ko and Shin, 2000, p. 474). 
155 
Throughout 1999 and 2000, the issues of a venture crisis or a venture bubble began to be 
raised seriously. Many start-ups were on the verge of bankruptcy and some of them 
began to collapse. Consequently, the investment of venture capitals withered. The 
government expanded the expenditure of public funds to revive dying venture ftrms. A 
representative example was the so-called 'Primary CBO' (Primary Collateralized Bond 
Obligation; hereafter 'P-CBO'). Originally this was a financing scheme through issuing 
high-credit CBOs with the basic asset formed by pooling newly issued low-credit 
corporation bonds. In this process, CBOs are treated as corporate bonds on the ground 
that they are issued through 'SPC' (Special Purpose Company) and the credit guarantee 
is provided by the 'Korean Credit Guarantee Fund' (KCGF) which charges a 1.5% fee 
for this service and screens the companies wishing to participate in this program (Shirai, 
2001; MOFE website). In the second half of 2000, the corporate bond market in Korea 
was virtually paralyzed and the financial intennediary function did not work well. This 
market failure could have brought about a chain of insolvencies in the corporate and 
fmancial sectors. As investors became more sensitive to credit risk, firms with low 
credit rating faced difficulties in issuing corporate bonds. Furthermore, those bonds that 
were issued in 1998 during the venture boom period were maturing in 2001. The bond 
issuers have found it very difficult to rollover their bonds. 
The government (MOFE) has argued that although the P-CBO might cause difficulties 
of financial propriety for firms that issue corporate bonds, it was inevitable to introduce 
the P-CBO in order to revive many promising venture firms dying because of credit 
crisis. However this policy measure has been criticized because it caused a serious 
vicious circle of public fund expenditure. In 2001, the Government issued the P-CBO 
with a value of 2.2 thousand billion Korean Won on the security of 808 venture ftrms' 
CBs (convertible bonds) and the KCGF provided credit guarantees for this P-CBO. But 
in 2004 the KCGF had to pay back about 700 billion Korean Won because it could not 
be recovered from the venture firms (MOFE, Joong-ang daily news dated 16/08/2005). 
As a consequence, the government had to consider how to avoid the default of the 
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KCGF. This phenomenon could be interpreted as a kind of path dependency caused by 
the large 'sunk-cost' which makes it difficult to escape from the existing path. 
In summary, start-ups in Korea have been grown by the strong initiative and supportive 
policy of the government. Particularly, 'venture finn certification' by the legislation of 
'1997 Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture Businesses' provided an 
overall framework for the government's venture promotion policy in the last decade. 
The government also enacted various other legal and institutional backup measures such 
as the low-interest loan program, venture capital promotion and participation in public 
venture fund establishment, provision of credit guarantee and P-CBO, KOSDAQ market 
opening. By being certified, the venture firms enjoyed not only these explicit benefits 
but also other implicit benefits. The government which took office shortly after the 
breakout of the crisis tried to push the refonn in four major areas: the corporate sector, 
the banking and fmancial markets, the labour market, and the public sector. Venture 
promotion policy was considered as a way of breakthrough for the government to 
overcome the crisis and to accomplish the four major sector reforms in a short period of 
time. Consequently, the Korean economy bounced back to a surprisingly positive 10.7% 
growth of GDP in 1999, from its worst ever perfonnance of -6.7% in 1998 (Abn, 2001, 
p. 452). However, by the end of 2000, Korea's economy began to show 'refonn fatigue' 
syndrome following the hasty complacency about the faster-than-expected economic 
recovery in 1999. Critics attributed this phenomenon to the government slowing down 
its efforts to eradicate bad debts within the corporate and financial sectors (ibid, p. 453). 
On the other hand, some people questioned whether the leading role of government in 
this refonn and restructuring process could possibly cause other unexpected side effects 
in the near future. In other words, even though the government is pushing forward the 
reform in the public sector, the results can be called into question in that the government 
could be the subject of reform but simultaneously could be the object of it. 
6.2.2 Institutional arrangements for 'venture policy' 
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In Korea, the beginning of venture-business support policy goes back to the Plan for 
Vitalizing Venture Businesses in March, 1997 and the Act on Special Measures for the 
Promotion of Venture Businesses in August, 1997. 5MBA, established in December 
1996, had a determination to promote venture fIrms and prepared the Draft of Five Year 
Planfor Fostering Venture Businesses in February, 1998. 
Brief history of venture business support policy in Korea 
Before 1997: The birth of venture firms 
- 1986 Act on Support for Small and Medium Enterprise Establishment was enacted 
- 1986 Act on Financial Assistance to New Technology Business was enacted 
- 1995 KOV A (Korea Venture Association) was established 
- 1996 5MBA (Small and Medium Business Administration) was established 
- 1996 KOSDAQ market was opened 
Between 1997 and 2000: Venture boom and recession period 
- 1997 'Stock Option System' was introduced 
- 1997 Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture Businesses was enacted 
- 1997 'Venture Certification System' was began 
- 1998 Special Committee for SMEs was launched 
- 1998 'Tax benefit programme for venture firms' was prepared 
- 1998 'Measure for vitalizing KOSDAQ market' was launched 
- 1998 'Master Plan for fostering Venture Firms' was presented 
- 1998 'In-lab start-up system' was introduced 
- 1999 'Supporting measures for the start-up investmentfunds' was prepared 
- 2000 'Designation of Venture Promotion Zone' was began 
- 2000 Entered to venture business stagnation (from April 2000) 
- 2000 Venture crisis was deepen (from October 2000) 
After 2001: Recession and revival period 
- 2002 Strengthening of the criteria for the Venture CertifIcation 
- 2003 'Measures for enhancing the transparency of venture capitals' was prepared 
- 2003 Strengthening the criteria for exclusion from KOSDAQ market 
Source: Revised from Seol et al (2002, p. 63) and 
Measure for the revitalizing venture firms (Korean government, 2004) 
The above summary shows how the venture-business support policy commenced and 
changed from the beginning. According to the Master Plan for Fostering Venture Firms 
(1998), the government planned to foster twenty thousand venture fIrms in the five years 
from 1998, and to create 400,000 jobs through the fostering of these venture businesses; 
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half of the targeted number of venture firms created from new business start-ups, and the 
other half created by the transfonnation of existing fIrms to venture fInns. To achieve 
this ambitious quantitative target, the government designed a 'total service package' for 
the fostering of venture firms that consisted of fmancial support, technology 
development, tax incentives, the provision of physical space and information, and other 
assistant measures. More detailed policy measures can be summarized as follows; 
Start-up 
- Introduce venture firm certiflcation system 
- Support firm formation of university students 
- Provide information and incubating service 
Financing 
- Provide favored start-up loan program (low interest, extended pay-back term) 
- Support venture capital establishment 
- Allow venture investment from pension funds 
- Introduce angel investment system 
- Open KOSDAQ market 
Physical business space 
- Provide business incubation centres 
- Venture building designation (provide benefits) 
- Support 'venture park' development (low-interest loan) 
Technology 
- Introduce 'technology-secured credit guarantee' system 
- Operate 'R&D support program' for venture firms 
- Establish 'technology-support centre' 
Labour (Human resources) 
- Allow temporary retirement of professors/researchers to start their business 
- Introduce and activate 'stock-option' system 
- Expand 'exceptional military service benefit system' to venture firms 
Tax 
- Income tax deduction for venture investment 
- Provide tax reduction and exemption incentives for venture business 
The venture-business support policy started from focusing on stimulating new firm 
fonnation and gradually changed to backing the growth of prominent firms. In the 
beginning, for the government, the first step was to select the target firms. The 
government's venture certification system is a quite exceptional and unique institution in 
Korea. To provide fmancial support for ftnns must be always controversial in that it 
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allocates limited national resources not to all but to a few selected ones. In this respect, 
the venture certification system can be interpreted as a selection mechanism for the 
strongest firms who are worthy of benefits from the government. At the same time, it 
had the indirect effect that the government gave signals of trustworthiness to other 
players in the market. This system was fully operational in less than four years, creating 
over 10,000 venture finns. However, since 2000, it began to be criticized because of the 
reported wrongdoings of several certified venture finns. The increased number of 
certified venture finns began -to undermine the belief in the system's ability to select 
competent finns. As neo-institutional economists assert, "when the institutional 
environment is firmly established, organizations try to embed themselves in it, since such 
a maneuver dubs them as legitimate members in the given fielfl' (Jung, 2004, p. 124). 
Once a finn has been selected as a venture finn by the government, this recognition in a 
'preliminary match' is likely to be misunderstood by other players who see it as a 
successful finn in the main game. It is possibly connected to the belief that if certified 
venture finns are in trouble or at a crisis, then the government will bail them out. This 
concern became reality after 2001 when many certified ventures were on the fringe of 
bankruptcy due to the busting of the 'venture bubble'. The government injected a huge 
amount of public funds to save dying ventures. 
The effect of venture certification has not been studied much in Korea, but it is widely 
agreed in previous researches that market failures can exist in start-up sector and 
consequently governments need to intervene to correct them (Lee et ai, 2003). Market 
failures in start-up sector can take place mainly because of high uncertainty and risk, 
infonnation asymmetry or information gap, intangible asset of start-ups, etc. Particularly 
the existence of infonnation asymmetry between entrepreneurs and external investors 
can be connected to the matter of 'moral hazard' or 'adverse selection'. Market failures 
can be found in venture capital industry as well due to mainly so-to-speak 'short-
termism' of venture capitalists. It means that most of venture capitalists tend to be 
interested in finns which can provide profit for them in short period of time. These 
factors make it difficult for ~ew start-ups to finance from banks and even venture 
capitals. As market failure perspective has been traditionally accepted by policy makers 
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as the justification of public intervention in the field of science and technology policy, it 
can be also powerful to justify why government should intervene in start-up sector. But 
as discussed before, recent system failure approach is providing a different justification 
of policy intervention. It is focusing on encouraging start-ups to interact with other 
actors for learning. Venture policy in Korea seems to cover both market failures and 
system failures in start-up sector. 
Venture certification has been a starting point for policy intervention in Korea. However, 
it is questionable whether this role of certification should be undertaken by the 
government. In United States, this certification is generally conducted by mainly venture 
capitals in the market. According to the venture survey in 2004, the portion of certified 
venture firms by the first criterion (venture capital investment) was just 7% in national 
total and around 4% in DMC. On the contrary, the proportion of the third criterion 
(technology evaluation) was 73.5% in total and around 72% in DMC. Considering that 
over 90% of certified venture finns attracted investments from venture capitals (Lee et 
ai, 2003, p. 84), these statistics show the considerable gap between 'market certification' 
and 'government certification' that existed in the Korean start-up sector. 
This type of policy initiative' can contribute to institutional settings, and institutions 
influence the economic activities of finns (Dobbin and Dowd, 1997). Yet, "the effect of 
economic institutions is not always in its regulatory power, rather, in many cases, 
institutional measures are designed to affect a firm's behaviour in an indirect and subtle 
way" (Jung, 2004, p. 124). In this respect, venture firms could get an institutional 
guarantee heightening their reputation in the market by the certification. This argument 
can be helpful to explain why finns were trying to secure venture certification. 
According to Baum and Oliver (1991), the survival rate of organisations is higher if they 
are closely linked to the institutional environment. This perspective from a neo-
institutionalism can be partly helpful to explain why the survival rate of venture finns in 
Korea is much higher than start-ups in Silicon Valley. 
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After the selection of target ftrms for support, the next step was the provision of mainly 
ftnancial aid. Financial and administrative support that accompanied venture 
certiftcation could be very helpful for new start-ups who might be struggling to survive 
under the highly uncertain situation of their early stages. Potential investors might be 
encouraged by the positive impression of venture certiftcation if they do not have 
enough capabilities to judge the ftrm's value accurately. Moreover, venture capitalists 
who received the government .ftnancing or fund managers of public funds might fmd it 
difficult not to be influenced by institutional recognition. The government wanted to 
make start-up fmancing easy, but could not ftnd the solution within the banks as it did in 
the past when they supported the chaebols. Considering the characteristics of high-risk 
and high-return in venture business, the supply of risk ftnancing can not be undertaken 
effectively by a conventional bank loan. The government tried to take advantage of 
venture capitalists as an intermediary function connecting venture ftrms to investors. In 
the United States, well-developed systems of venture capitals and angel networks take a 
crucial role in providing risk money. The distinct features of high-risk and high-return 
involves with a well-developed equity market like NASDAQ. Venture capitals can reap 
high returns from the invested ftrm's IPO and thus they are willing to bear high risks. 
The virtuous food chains among 'start-ups', 'venture capitals' and 'equity market' have 
been formed and operated by competitive market mechanisms in US. This 
interdependent network is called the core of 'start-up eco-system' (Moore, 1996). 
In Korea, however, the government played an active role in formation and development 
of the venture capital industry. First of all, as noted before, signiftcant legislation for 
securing the legal basis of the support was already in place. KOSDAQ market as an 
equity market for venture business was also installed by the government. To some extent, 
these institutional settings seemed to construct an external framework for a 'US type 
start-up eeo-system'. But such a highly motivated institutional experiment must be very 
difficult to implement in the short term following the long tradition of a bank-loan 
centred system. The signiftcant role of the government was likely to influence the high-
risk and high-return mechanism of the venture capital industry. In the end, "venture 
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capital in Korea has become identified with limited-risk and limited-return investment' 
(Ko and Shin, 2000, p. 459). 
In summary, the Korean government took a leading role in setting up an institutional 
framework for the growth of venture business. Start-up venture fIrms had to embed 
themselves in this institutional setting. They attempted to get venture certifIcations with 
the expectation of taking more benefIts from the government. Venture capitals were also 
similarly influenced by the institutional setting. As discussed before, institutions tend to 
change following a path dependent way. Institutional inertia due to path dependency can 
be found in the change to 'venture policy' in Korea. Comparing it to the previous 
industrial policy, the new mode of government support for the ventures had a very close 
resemblance to the one for the chaebols because of the common 'selection and support 
mechanism' underlying both approaches. In this regard, it seems to be possible to 
suggest that the path of 'government dependency' might have been prevalent in nearly 
all of the Korean systems. 
Then why, despite its inefficiencies, was this path persisted with? It might be partly 
explained by the historical and cultural factors in Korea. The Korean government has 
always undertaken heavy burdens from the beginning to develop the country. In this 
process, the government particularly which had a weak political legitimacy needed to 
show some visible economic performance to the people. The successful experience of 
rapid growth in the early stage of economic development was embedded into all Korean 
people. It created a path and this path had a strong inertia to a changed environment. 
6.2.3 Implementation structure 
Venture support programmes contributed to the rapid growth of high tech start-up and 
venture capital market. However, there have also been problems and side effects in the 
process of government intervention. Policy programmes in the meantime were mainly 
oriented to the quantitative expansion of start ups through 'direct' government 
intervention. The government tried to build up the 'risk fInance' market for stimulating 
163 
venture investment which is crucial for the growth of high-tech start-ups. These artificial 
and direct interventions caused some unanticipated phenomena in a relatively short 
period of time. It might be argued that selection mechanism by the government of 
'venture certification system' impeded the operation of market mechanisms, and 
consequently brought about the distortion of resource distribution in the market. 
Moreover, the concentration of benefit and protection for selected venture firms might 
interfere with natural entry to and exclusion from the market. The ability of government 
to control or manage complicated market mechanisms properly has always been 
questioned (Datta-Chaudhuri, 1990; Grand, 1991; Hefetz and Warner, 2004). 
On the other hand, most of the venture policy was initiated by the central government. 
Even though 5MBA, which is a sub-ministry level of administration, undertook central 
functions for venture policy, several ministries got involved in preparing and 
implementing various support programmes. Sometimes they were overlapped or 
mismatched due to the lack of integration among different ministries. However, unlike 
this overlapping and competitive involvement of ministries in central government, local 
authorities played a relatively limited role. The reason for this was partly due to most of 
the policy measures being constrained by the institutional or legal settings, and partly 
because local authorities could not undertake major roles due to their limited disposable 
budget. The weak role of local authorities made policy programmes in different regions 
very similar. Most of the local authorities in Korea could not afford to develop 
independent policy programmes which require a huge budget investment. Local 
authorities prepared detailed implementation plans to fit central government's 
institutional framework, taking cognisance of their own situation or capabilities. In many 
cases, policy programmes required local authorities to invest a certain portion of their 
budget as a way of 'matched funding'. For local authorities, participation in these 
matched funding programmes prepared by the central government could be a big burden 
on their finances. As a consequence, most of the local programmes focused on providing 
'non-budget' services, or adding some more benefits for venture firms. Considering the 
competitive efforts of local authorities to make their cities or provinces more business-
164 
favourable and innovative regions, similar local policy programmes were not a strange 
phenomenon at all. 
As noted before, there were two special regions in tenns of innovation in Korea: one 
was the capital region including Seoul city, and the other was the Daedeok region 
including Daejeon city. Seoul and its surrounding area (mainly Gyung-gi Province) 
showed an extraordinary concentration of nearly all the national resources and service 
functions. According to the large scale survey of venture finns conducted by 5MBA, 
KOVA and KVRI (Korea Venture Research Institute), as of March in 2004, over 70 
percent of certified venture finns were concentrated on Seoul Metropolitan City and 
Gyung-gi Province. Daejeon city and its surrounding area (mainly South and North 
Chung-chong Provinces) showed a high concentration of R&D oriented venture finns 
(23% - this percentage includes Gang-won Province but its portion is very minor). This 
was influenced by the existence of DST in Daejeon city. However, the total percentage 
of venture finns in Daejeon city and its surrounding regions was still not as big 
compared with the capital region - being respectively 5.5% and 7.2% in 2003, 2004. 
Except for these two extraordinary cases, most of the other regions showed similarly 
minor percentages. The agglomeration of innovative resources in Daejeon was unusual 
in Korea considering the situation that most of the national resources were concentrated 
in the Capital, Seoul. This exceptional case was undoubtedly enabled by the policy 
decision to build DST as a national R&D hub. 
6.2.4 Support programmes for venture firms 
As mentioned before, venture policy is closely related to other policies such as industrial 
policy, S&T policy, innovation policy. In practice, policy measures are also actualized 
through various fonns of programmes. In this study, the main focus is on those policy 
programmes particularly providing financial incentives or benefits for start-up venture 
finns. It is because the 'select and support' mechanism (particularly fmancial support) 
gives a good indication of how start-up firms try to be certified as venture finns to take 
advantage of benefits from selection. As many previous surveys (DSSC, 2001; DSSC, 
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2003; DSSC, 2004; DSSC, 2005) indicate the majority of the start-ups in Daedeok were 
very keen to utilize financial support from the government. Financial support 
progranunes can be broadly classified into following five categories: 
- Subsidy or grant (for R&D, cooperation or collaboration, etc.) 
- Favourable policy loan (credit guarantee, lowered interest rate, etc.) 
- Venture investment (public funds, venture capital, stock market, etc.) 
- Indirect fmancial support (providing cheap business spaces, tax benefit, etc.) 
• Subsidy or grant provision 
Government ministries provided subsidy or grant for start-ups to support their R&D 
activities or to encourage cooperation with universities or research institutes. MOST 
usually provided the R&D budget for public research institutes through KSEF. Unlike 
R&D subsidies in the past, most of the public R&D programmes imposed conditions 
that applications score more highly in the screening process if those applications 
contained a scheme of collaboration between research institutes or universities and 
industries. In this regard, spin-off and certified venture finns in Daedeok could take 
advantage of R&D subsidy or grant through the cooperation with public research 
institutes in DST. In some cases, public research institutes suggested a kind of sub-
contract for joint R&D with venture firms spun out from them. This cooperation 
provided a few merits for both the research institutes and the venture finns in that 
research institutes could secure more R&D budget from the government and could solve 
the problem of the lack of a capable R&D workforce; on the other hand, venture firms 
could save on their own R&D spending and utilize the high-priced R&D facilities in 
public research institutes. Most of the government ministries such as MOCIE (Ministry 
of Commerce, Industry and Energy), MIC (Ministry of Information and 
Communication) had their own programmes to encourage the cooperation between 
industry, university and research institutions. Certified venture firms were in an 
advantageous position to take· part in and win these programmes. Once a venture frrm 
won a government programme, then it could gain the advantage of meeting not only its 
R&D needs but also its ordinary running expenditure such as personnel expenses. 
Government grant regimes imposing conditions requiring collaboration could be 
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evaluated positively at least in tenns of quantitative perfonnances. It contributed to the 
induced behavioural changes of the actors not to act independently but to cooperate with 
others. However, previous studies were quite rare indication how these outputs have 
been actually utilized by venture finns. If the induced collaboration was just superficial 
cooperation for getting grant or subsidy from the government, then any benefits could be 
partially eroded by this grant-chasing behaviour. 
• Policy loan and credit guarantee 
The government provided very favourable 'policy loan' programmes for venture finns. 
Relatively lower interest rate and longer pay-back tenn than general loan were given to 
them. The central government established a special fund for SMEs through a scheme of 
matched funding with local authorities. This fund was usually lent to conimercial banks 
via the annual budget of local authorities including the above favourable conditions. In 
this process, most of the local authorities provided this lower interest rate through their 
own budget. Certified venture fInns could usually lend money from this government 
fund through most of commer:cial banks on the most favoured condition. For example, 
Daejeon city has suggested an additional 5% lower interest rate for certified venture 
finns. If the current interest rate for loans from commercial banks was around 10%, then 
the interest rate of the government fund for SMEs was suggested between 7-8% to local 
authorities, and then local authorities compensated the gap of interest rate between the 
suggested rate by the government and the interest rate which local authority suggested to 
commercial banks. As a result; venture finns in Daejeon city could lend money at rate of 
interest between 2% and 3%. This policy loan programme was particularly helpful for 
venture fInns in the period of high interest rates. However, this scheme might not be 
attractive for venture firms because most of the start-ups did not have sufficient financial 
security as required to be provided by the banks. Thus, the government prepared a credit 
guarantee programme. A few credit guarantee funds or foundations were established on 
the initiative of the central government. They provided credit guarantees for venture 
firms through credit screening and technology evaluation. There were three kinds of 
credit guarantee agencies in Daejeon such as the branch of KCGF (Korea Credit 
Guarantee Fund), KTCGF (Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund), and DCGF 
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(Daejeon Credit Guarantee Foundation). The credit guarantee system could make the 
policy loan programme very practical, but if the credit guarantee agencies did not have 
sophisticated evaluation abilities, public money could be wasted repaying the debt of 
bankrupted finns. KTCGF, in particular, evaluates venture fInn's technology and issues 
a guarantee letter if it was judged as an 'excellent' technology. This guarantee letter 
could be regarded as the same as fmancial security. On the other hand, start-up fIrms 
could apply to KTCGF to undertake technology evaluation to obtain 'venture 
certification'. However it was questionable how the staff of KTCGF can properly 
evaluate the level of technology of spin-off start-ups from DST. It could be considered 
as nonsense if start-up CEOs had to apply for technology evaluation just for getting a 
venture certification or a guarantee letter, even though they had much higher level of 
technology than the staff of KTCGF who was in charge of the technology evaluation. 
The technology of venture firms could be correctly and naturally evaluated in the market. 
In this regard, it was controversial if this type of administrative technology evaluation by 
the government established organizations could properly reflect the real market value of 
technology (Lee et ai, 2003; Jung, 2004). 
• Fund-raising for venture investment 
As mentioned before, the venture capital industry could grow rapidly because of the 
government's policy efforts. However, most of the venture capital companies were 
located in Seoul and their investment was also concentrated on venture fIrms in Seoul 
and the area around the capital. A recent venture survey (2004, 5MBA et a1) showed the 
percentage of venture firms who attracted investment from venture capitalists was higher 
in Seoul and the capital area than other regions. This means that venture firms in non-
capital regions have largely been excluded from venture capital investment. This 
phenomenon might be partly because venture firms who were worth investing in were 
concentrated on the capital area, or partly because venture capitalists did not put in 
sufficient effort to find promising venture finns in non-capital regions. The first 
generation of venture firms who led the 'venture boom' were mostly 'dot-com' 
companies. They were concentrated on 'Teheran Road' in Seoul. However, most of the 
venture firms in Daedeok had a manufacturing base which required relatively large 
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initial investment for setting up facilities. This characteristic might be less attractive for 
venture capitalists than 'dot-com' or software companies in Seoul. During the venture 
boom period, venture firms in Daedeok could not attract much attention from venture 
capitalists. Only one branch of a venture capital companies was located in Daejeon until 
'venture bubble' started to burst around 2001. The venture bubble could be seen as a 
result of 'blind investment' by venture capitalists or angel investors to 'dot-com' venture 
companies. Daejeon city created 'public venture investment funds' to encourage venture 
investment for start-ups. 
The ftrst 'Daedeok Valley Venture Fund' was created in 1999 on the scale of 10 billion 
Korean Won (approximately 5 million GBP). Since then, five more venture funds were 
created, so far on a similar scale of the first fund respectively. Venture capitalists, as an 
operating party, invested around 10-20% of the total size of the fund. Usually 5MBA 
invested 30% and Daejeon city invested 10-20% respectively. The purpose of these 
funds was obviously focused on stimulating investment of venture capital in Daedeok 
Valley. However, venture capitalists who had opened their branches in Daedeok for 
managing Daedeok Valley Venture Funds left Daedeok after the 'venture crisis' from 
around the end of 2000. In this respect, a question needs to be asked: why venture firms 
in Daedeok could not attract much attention from venture capitalists even though they 
have relatively quite high levels of technology? 
To answer this question, it is possible to assume that start-ups in Daedeok, in particular 
spin-offs from DST might be more dependent on their previous path. Most of spin-off 
start-up CEOs in Daedeok had working experience in public research institutes as 
researchers or engineers. They were relatively familiar with R&D subsidies from the 
government due to their long experience of S&T policy. According to the survey report 
(2003, DSSC), over 70% of start-up CEOs in Daedeok had working experience as 
researchers (63%) or engineers (10%). On the other hand, around a half of start-up 
CEOs (46%) in above survey replied that they relied on government support such as 
subsidy or grant to secure their R&D budget. From the case of Silicon Valley, it has 
been widely accepted that market-oriented start-ups can be more successful than 
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technology-oriented start-ups. Venture capitalists are usually more interested in a clear 
exit strategy from their investment than complicated technology itself. On the other hand, 
it could be assumed that venture capitalists in Korea did not have enough ability to 
evaluate the future market value of high technology. Considering the rapid growth of the 
venture capital industry and its high reliance on government funding, this weakness of 
venture capitals might be natural to some extent. 
• Other indirect financial support 
Certified venture firms could rent very cheap physical space for business such as BI 
(Business Incubator), Post-TBI (post-Technology Business Incubator), VIB (Venture 
Integrated Building), VBC (Venture Business Complex). These premises were usually 
established in universities or research institutes by government funding. In the case of BI, 
small units were provided for venture firms at the start-up stage for a really cheap rent. 
Construction costs of BI were funded by the government. Universities or research 
institutes provided their land for the construction of BI and manage the units. As of the 
end of 2004, there were 22 BI centres which have a total of 376 incubating units, 13 
Post-TBIs and VIBs which provided 148 business spaces, 6 VBCs in which 81 venture 
firms were housed (Daejeon city, 2005). These various types of cheap physical 
accommodation were suitable for the growing stage of start-ups: starting from business 
incubator at the initial stage, moving to a large space for Post-TBI or VIB, and then 
settling down in VBC or other industrial complexes if they needed to build their own 
facilities or factories. This programme was very helpful for rapidly growing start-ups 
who have to move accommodation often because they did not have to invest large 
amount of money renting high-priced business space. Another indirect financial support 
was tax benefit for venture firms. Various tax reductions or exemptions were provided 
for certified venture firms as prescribed by the statute. Thus, tax benefits were usually 
applied to venture firms on siniilar conditions. 
This section provided descriptive information on the venture policy in Korea as a central 
context. In summary, the venture promotion, initiated from 1997, has had a wide range 
of impact on social, economic and regional changes. 'Venture policy' has its 
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institutional background of 'selection and concentration' like most of other policies in 
Korea even though it consists of various support programmes. Indeed, the role of the 
Korean government was central in promoting high-tech start-ups. Providing the 
concentration of policy support for those selected targets seems to be an efficient and 
effective way especially in transition economy like Korea. This type of active 
intervention for 'venture promotion' has been, however, a controversial issue in terms of 
its performance and side-effect. This study does not, of course, attempt to enter into this 
issue further, but it provides an implication for this study in exploring how the policy 
intervention has influenced the business behaviour of start-up firms. As discussed above, 
'selection and concentration' can be seen as the core mechanism of venture policy and it 
seems to have been persistent in most of industrial, regional, science and technology 
policies. Most of venture programmes focus on providing financial assistances for 
selected start-ups. This direct and incentive-based support can largely influence firm's 
risk perception and risk spreading strategy. In this respect, institutional set-ups induced 
by policy intervention have animpact on actor's business behaviour and strategy. 
6.3 Selection of the firms and entrepreneurial legacy 
6.3.1 Industrial policy in catching-up model 
Science, technology and industrial policies in Korea have largely been shaped by the 
'catch-up model' as an overall economic development strategy. The state took a pivotal 
role in this model. The Korean government was successful in the early stage of 
economic development by effectively adopting a development strategy based on 
government initiative (Lucas,. 1993). Most of the policy measures by the goyernment 
were, arguably, appropriate and timely, and the interaction between the government and 
the market was well-coordinated (Evans, 1995). However, the policy evaluation seems 
not so simple and easy because over the past five decades policy aims and measures 
have been variously changed in the turbulent periods of rapid economic growth. As Shin 
and Chang (2003, p. 42) say, it is well known that "the Korean 'miracle' was achieved 
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on the basis of extensive industrial policy measures." Since the early 1960s, the Korean 
government has practiced industrial policy aimed at developing, guiding, and supporting 
industrial development. It basically focused on shaping Korea's economic structure. In 
doing so, the government needed to intervene in the market for correcting 'market 
failures'. This seemed an inevitable choice for the Korean government under the 
condition that national resources available to be mobilised were limited, the private 
sector was poorly developed, and people were distressed due to the poverty and political 
uncertainty after the Korean War. 
This section briefly examines how policies have changed in different policy 
environments. Economic policy depends on constantly changing factors such as the 
nature of market failures facing the economy, the scope and effectiveness of policy 
instruments available to government (Leipziger and Petri, 1993, p. 1). Korea's industrial 
policy has served its economic growth well in many ways, but it has created a few 
problems as well. Three maill areas are linked to these problems: the chaebol, the 
financial system, and past successes (Szamosszegi and Prestowitz, 1997). Among these 
intertwined problems, in particular, the third problem 'past successes' gives a 
meaningful implication. It seems to be an irony that successful past experience causes 
problem in future. As stated already, the 'visible hand' (Chandler, 1977) of the 
government intervention have molded Korea's industrial bases and generated rapid 
economic growth. Despite this success, however, there has been a growing consensus in 
Korea that the legacies of the industrial policy paradoxically make the breakthrough of 
its inertia difficult. In Korea, market failure has been used as a representative logic of 
justification not only for industrial policy but also science and technology policy. It is 
impossible to look at industrial policy in Korea without saying 'chaebol policy' and 
'financial sector policy'. 
The chaebols can be regarded as a natural 'byproduct' of the industrial policy practiced 
during the period from the 1950s to 1970s. They are large in scale, broadly diversified, 
and vertically integrated business conglomerates that dominate Korea's economic 
landscape. According to Bang and Kim (2003), the relationship between the chaebols 
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and the state has been transfonned from the so-called 'honeymoon period' in the early 
stage to 'conflict period' in the later stage. During the honeymoon period (1961-1979), 
the government picked a few companies and provided various special favors (benefits 
and protections) for these selected players. Chaebols could expand their external scale in 
the process of unbalanced economic growth, and consequently get a monopolistic 
advantage by this governmental policy. In times of economic crisis like the 'oil shock', 
chaebols showed a strong reliance on government policy intervention rather than 
seeking their own flexible solutions (ibid, p. 11). After the first and second oil shocks, 
the Korean economy was seriously challenged. It meant that 'sensitivity dependence' 
and 'vulnerability dependence' in the Korean economy became to deepen structurally 
(Lee, 1993, p. 211). The government could control chaebols effectively by various 
policy measures through banks, e.g. credit management system. However, during the 
period of conflict period (1980-1997), the government's view of chaebols began to 
change as it revealed the chaebol's problems such as their collusion with banks, unfair 
intra-group transactions and excessive diversification. Following the collapse of the 
totalitarian regimes, from the early 1980s, there was a massive demand for 
democratization in Korea. The rapid growth of chaebols and their increasing political 
influence made the vertical symbiosis between the state and the chaebols difficult to 
continue. The government tried to regulate chaebols through economic refonn to relieve 
their dominant influence on the overall Korean economy. The so-called 'real name 
system in money transaction' was a representative measure for economic refonn 
focusing on chaebols-regulation. 
Since the economic crisis in 1997, according to Bang and Kim (2003), the Korean 
economy entered into 'competition period' (1998-Present) between the state and 
chaebols. Far reaching refonn programs after the crisis, particularly corporate sector 
refonns strengthened government intervention in the market. The government promoted 
'Big-deal policy' was a coerced restructuring program for chaebol regulation. One 
aspect of this policy was linked to 'venture policy' to foster start-ups. High-tech start-up 
venture finns were regarded as a promising substitute for chaebols and as a new engine 
for continuous economic gro~. The government had been interested in SMEs since the 
173 
early 1980s expecting their high flexibility to complement the chaebols's rigid 
adaptation capability. However, SMEs could not develop as a main player in the Korean 
economy due to the influential shadow of chaebols. However, the unprecedented crisis 
situation changed the role of venture policy. Thus, venture support policy needs to be 
examined through the combined perspective of the conventional industrial policy and 
science & technology policy, particularly in relation to the understanding of Daedeok. 
At the same time, it is also required to be reviewed from the viewpoint of innovation 
policy given the greater emphasis placed on its role by the current government. 
6.3.2 Selected actor 'chaebor and its legacy 
In the background to Korea's spectacular economic performance over the past three 
decades, there was the government's policy initiative. Through the period of rapid 
growth, it undertook several roles simultaneously: as an owner, a fmancer, a trader, a 
cheerleader, and a strategic planner (Szamosszegi and Prestowitz, 1997, p. 90). As 
discussed above, the heart of a typical industrial policy was a strategic market-
conforming intervention on the basis of a cooperative trust relationship between the state 
and enterprises. The state selected a certain industrial sector strategically and allowed 
entry to the market for only selected firms who fit with its criteria. At the same time, the 
state not only provided them with several benefits and protections, but also monitored 
their performances (Johnson, 1982). In the case of Korea, industrial policy had strong 
characteristics to support not overall industrial sectors but individual firms like a few 
chaebols. The government used the performance of firms in export markets as a 
selection criterion in extending financial and other support in 1960s (Lim, 2001, p. 6). It 
provided selected exporters. with various benefits such as tax reduction, tariff 
exemptions, etc. At the same time, excellent export performers were given national 
recognitions such as medals, awards, or certificates to encourage them. 
In this economic development drive, as stated above, the Korean government has 
deliberately introduced limited competition by lowering entry barriers over time and by 
monitoring market failures by major chaebols in order to maximize efficiency of limited 
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resources (Pyo, 2000). For undertaking this role, it adopted active policy measures such 
as credit guarantee for foreign debts to share the investment risks of private sector by the 
formation of a risk partnership with the chaebols. This type of drastic measure could be 
operated in effect through the controlling power of the government on banking and 
financial sector. The government could compensate for the capital market imperfections, 
and remove the constraints that had made it difficult for fInns to challenge profItable but 
risky projects surpassing their own capabilities. Government-backed debt fInancing, 
however, used to create moral hazard problems. Moreover, this type of active 
government intervention vested government officials with a strong power of discretion, 
and consequently induced fInns to coerce officials in order to be successful in this 
selection mechanism. Nevertheless, what the Korean government did is seen quite 
'right' in the take-off stage in that market failure mainly due to the capital market 
imperfection could be effectively addressed. In 1970s, the Korean economy began to 
push Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) drive. This sector is quite capital intensive 
sector to which the scale of economy can be applied. The government focused on 
selecting a target group of large conglomerates and providing them extremely generous 
fInancial support. As a consequence, massive resources were channelled into the 
chaebols to sustain huge-scaled investment projects. During this period, the size of the 
body to the extent of undertaking excessive investment and consequently competing 
with big foreign competitors became an important selection criterion from the 
government's point of view. This strategy seemed to be inevitable considering the 
situation of the Korean economy pursuing catching up formidable foreign forerunners 
within short period of time. The chaebols could gain their gigantic size in this process, 
and it was making the myth of a 'too big to fail' for them. They were gradually 
becoming the 'Goliath' in the Korean economy through 1970s and 1980s. As a result, it 
became increasingly difficult for the government to control them like before. This 
indicates that increased systemic risks were growing in overall Korean economic system. 
In 1980s, fundamental claims about the desirability and effectiveness of government 
intervention used to be suggested by scholars and technocrats. Behind these claims, 
there was the recognition of mcreased domestic and foreign pressure for liberalisation 
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and democratisation (ibid, p. 15). The necessity of more market-oriented economic 
system was raised on the basis of the concern that the government intervention had cast 
menacing shadows over the country's economic landscape. Scepticism about the model 
which produced past success began to be emerged. Amid a rapidly chang~g global 
economic environment, the previously adopted 'factor-input oriented' and 'export-led' 
growth strategy on the basis of government intervention appeared to be no longer 
feasible for sustainable development. Rapidly rising labour costs and fierce global 
competition forced Korea's policy makers to consider a new strategy for the future. 
Given the situation, the government began to pay more attention to, on the one hand, the 
openness, deregulation, liberalisation in the market, and on the other hand, the global 
technology competitiveness. When it comes to the former attempt, however, it seemed to 
be ambivalent in that the inertia from previous path of intervention such as protection or 
promotion could not be easily harmonised with the newly imposed policy challenges 
like deregulation. Before the economic crisis in 1997, the government-led controlling or 
monitoring schemes were remarkably reduced, but a transition to a more market oriented 
system had produced several dysfunctional problems. Institutional settings and socio-
cultural norms are not likely to be changed within short period of time, although the 
planners intend to drive rapid reforms. In this regard, it can be said there was a sort of 
mismatch between interventio~ mode and socio-economic changes. 
As mentioned already, major industrial sectors in Korean economy were changed from 
the light industry to the heavy chemical industry in the process of rapid industrialisation. 
Its manufacturing competitiveness in those sectors was mainly coming from low costs 
for factor-input like labour forces. The comparative advantage based on low labour cost, 
technology imitation, and foreign debt could make Korea's catching-up model in effect. 
However, simply increasing factor-input became no longer feasible under the P"ansition 
of global economy toward more knowledge-based one. The Korean government has 
taken an active role in financing R&D since the early 1970s, but most of R&D projects 
by public subsidising have not well connected to technology transfer or technology 
commercialisation. As the private sector grew fast, the locus of R&D function began to 
be shifted from the government to private firms. This forced fundamental changes in 
176 
Korea's science and technology policy. Changes in science and technology policy were 
closely associated with changes in industrial policy. In 1990s, the Korean government 
began to target the high-tech industries to improve its technological capabilities in line 
with those of the G-Seven countries (the Group of Seven industrialised countries). 
Particularly, infonnation and communications industry was adopted as one of fastest-
growth sectors, and huge investment began to be concentrated on it. This change in 
envirorunent and policy can be seen as the basis of 'IT venture boom' in the late of 
1990s. 
This industrial and entrepreneurial legacy faced serious criticism by the outbreak of IMF 
crisis in 1997 (Hong, 1998; Ahn, 2001; Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2001; Crotty and 
Lee, 2002). Since 1998, the Korean government has promoted the policy of a full-scale 
venture-business support package. At that time, after the outbreak of the IMF crisis, 
chaebols were regarded as the first target to be refonned, and due to serious credit 
restrictions, SMEs suffered from the occurrence of bankruptcy, and the financial sectors 
were not operated at all. The government needed to find an escape hatch from this 
unprecedented crisis. As IMF (2003) described, the economic crisis in 1997 can be 
basically seen as a twin-crisis: a combination of domestic banking crisis and foreign 
exchange crisis. Under the IMF mandated bail-out schemes, Korean industries had 
undergone a massive restructuring. In the process of this extensive refonn, high-tech 
start-up ventures emerged as a new growth engine, an alternative actor replacing 
chaebols, and the catalyst of job creation. As noted in previous chapter, the government 
first of all prepared the institutional basis through the enactment of the special law in 
1997. According to this law, v~ture certification system was firstly introduced to select 
promising start-ups worth supporting. For certified start-ups as 'venture finns' by the 
government, various supports mainly financial assistances were provided. The creation 
of this venture policy is similar to conventional industrial policy in that the state 
strategically selects target firms and establishes criteria to support and provides fmancial 
benefits for them. It appears the risk partnership between the government and business 
which have been formed from the past is still operated in venture policy. According to 
path dependency perspective, a previously chosen path is more likely to be persistent 
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when it has successful history in the past. In Korean context, government policy 
intervention in the way of promotion and protection has successful memory in' terms of 
particularly effectiveness and efficiency. Then, it can be assumed this successful mode 
of policy intervention in the past may persist in the future even in newly emerging sector 
and a new field of policy. As Lim (ibid, p. 21) argued, 'old habits die hard' and old 
legacies can remain in the future, particularly in case they were successful in the past. 
This issue would be further argued in following section. 
6.3.3 Revival of 'select and support' mechanism in venture policy 
Venture firms emerged into the Korean economy as a new growth engine in the process 
of overcoming the economic crisis. Their rapid growth and several successful stories 
encouraged not only young entrepreneurs to dream of becoming a millionaire~ but also 
enabled policy makers to escape from the inefficiency of the chaebol-dominated 
economic structure. However, when the Korean economy was boiling over into 'venture 
boom', ironically venture fll1lls began to reveal similar growth paths to those chaebols 
followed in the past. Financial impropriety and corruption began to be prevalent in the 
overall venture business sectors including the venture capital industry, KOSDAQ market, 
supporting agencies, government officials and politicians. The government established a 
few 'credit guarantee funds' to secure loans made to the venture firms by the banks. 
Venture capitals could establish 'outer funds' by the investment from the government. 
These are quite similar to the credit allocation for chaebols through the scheme of 
'policy banking' in the past. As fundraising became easy, some 'certified' vent),lre firms 
by the government did not know what to do with the excessive money attracted from 
investors, and some of them even invested the money in other venture firms expecting 
capital gains. This reminds the past that the chaebols tried to increase their controlling 
power over the financial sector since the government divested itself of the banking 
sector in the early 1980s. They began to move to acquire shares of major banks or to 
gain ownership of new sources of capital. Most of chaebols were keen to have insurance 
companies for receiving funds from them in the way of shareholdings or loans. It is 
ironical that this type of transaction and investment of chaebols is similarly found in 
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newly emerged start-up sector. Some IPO venture fIrms who made large amounts of 
money through the stock market tried to expand and diversify their business domain 
under the pretext of strengthening their 'core competence'. This also resembles 
chaebol's extreme diversification in some sense. 
Path dependency perspective provides useful insights to understand the irony that why 
and how venture firms as the 'anti-chaebols' became paradoxically locked into a path 
which chaebols have trodden. The cause of this phenomenon might be variously argued 
according to different points of view, but there are two main probabilities which could 
be suggested in this study: government intervention and weakness of basic economic 
structure. Policy intervention in Korea has undoubtedly contributed to the makeup of the 
institutional setting, and these changes influence the economic activities of fIrms. As 
argued by neo-institutional economists, when the institutional environment is firmly 
established, organizations try to embed themselves in it. Thus, it can be assumed that if 
institutional changes are path dependent, then firm's entrepreneurial activities would 
also be path dependent. 
The purpose of policy intervention in Korea has been considerably changed and 
diversified up to recent years, but the mode of intervention has followed typical path 
dependent ways, particularly in the field of industrial policy. Two central patterns of 
intervention are found in both conventional chaebol-oriented industrial policy and recent 
venture-oriented policy. The fIrst one is a 'selecting' mechanism and the other is a 
'supporting' mechanism. As seen in supporting the chaebols, the state selected some 
promising target companies according to a certain criteria like the performance of export, 
and then concentrated various resources and financial aids on them mainly through 
fInancial organizations like banks. One of the most powerful policy tools for shaping the 
process of economic development is controlling the flow of money, or more broadly, the 
flow of credit through financial system. It is because this tool can have a vital impact not 
only on economic activities but also structural development of economy. Government 
policy, in the meantime, tried to not only enrich the chaebols, but also create the 
environment to encourage them risk-taking. The government was a risk partner in 
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supporting these strategic enterprises. It shared risks mainly by financial tools such as by 
guaranteeing foreign debt, by providing debt relief for companies in distress, and by 
setting lowered interest rates for launching big projects than market-determined rates. 
This type of implicit guarantee could encourage a few selected enterprises to venture 
into new industries, to dare to invest huge money in building production facilities in 
excess of their capacity levels.' In this process, however, the average debt-to equity ratio 
of these companies began to be sharply increased. This problem became eventually one 
of the main reasons oflMF crisis in 1997. 
The combination of this 'select and support' mechanism is found in venture policy, and 
its impact seems to be also quite similar to chaebol policy in some sense. 'Venture 
certification system' by the government has played a sort of selection scheme to pick up 
promising high-tech start-ups. As the chaebols showed strong reliance on government 
support and protection for a long time, certified venture firms showed similar strong 
reliance on governmental financial supports and protection. In particular, through the 
government selection mechanism,· there is a belief that if certified venture firms face a 
crisis, the government will bail them out. This concern came true in reality from 2001 
since many certified ventures were on the fringe of bankruptcy due to the bursting of the 
'venture bubble'. The government injected a huge amount of public funds to save dying 
ventures as seen in the case of 'primary CBO'. This looks quite similar resemblance 
found in a few cases of bailout by the government for chaebols at bankruptcy crisis. On 
the other hand, support mechanism of the government for selected venture firms has 
been used in the way of mainly direct financial support such as grant provision, credit 
guarantee and tax relief. When it comes to this type of support, it is not so strange at all 
comparing with policy schemes previously adopted for the chaebols. 
As noted before, venture policy was initiated in the beginning as a relief programme at a 
time of crisis to create jobs and to replace traditional actor' chaebols'. This circumstance 
at that time seems to be linked to the above mentioned paradoxical phenomenon. It 
implicitly indicates that venture policy in Korea was launched with a framework of 
industrial policy rather than innovation policy. In this argument, innovation policy is, of 
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course, understood through a systems approach. Start-up policy can be said to have two 
aspects: one is to foster new firm formation, and the other is to promote interactive 
learning in business. Unlike a linear model approach that emphasize the input factor 
increase, innovation system approach focuses on encouraging firms to cooperate with 
other actors for the acquisition· and utilization of knowledge. According to system failure 
perspective, this pwpose of intervention is seen as an attempt to correct 'system deficit 
or imperfection' such as path dependency and lock-in. The lack of networking, 
interaction, or collaboration has been suggested as a source of path dependency that can 
lead system to fail. In Korea, there have been, of course, policies for encouraging 
cooperation between firms and other actors, but those policy measures have not been 
closely combined with start-up policy (more specifically venture policy) at least until 
new presidential term of Roh, Moo-Hyun government started in 2003. When the venture 
policy was born in 1997, the ex-president Kim, Dae-]oong put venture promotion on the 
top place of policy agenda to primarily create more jobs. According to this policy aim, 
new firm formation in numbers as many as possible was more emphasised than its 
dynamic entrepreneurship in .the market. In this regard, the period of venture boom 
between 1998 and 2000 can be seen as a consequence of this active policy intervention. 
In the wake of political power shift, however, regional innovation and balanced regional 
development began to be more emphasised than venture promotion. It brought 
considerable policy changes in the field of venture businesses. However, venture policy 
has still maintained its basic skeleton to some extent, and the combination of 'select and 
support' mechanism in terms of policy tool is also still in operation. 
6.4 Selection of the space and regional legacy 
6.4.1 Spatial selectivity In unbalanced regional development in Korea 
As mentioned above, an 'imbalanced development strategy' was one of the main factors 
which made rapid economic growth possible in Korea. During the 1960s through 80s, 
the Korean government exercised a 'growth pole' concept (Perroux, 1970; Parr, 1973; 
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Parr, 1999) of regional development. This strategy calls for the rapid growth of the 
national economy focusing on export oriented mass production on the basis of cheap 
labour forces. It was expected that the economic wealth produced and the employment 
created in the growth pole would permeate into other sectors and regions. The 
government prepared some main legal frameworks to support this policy such as 
National Physical Development Planning Law in 1963 and the Export Industry Estates 
Development Law in 1964. On the basis of these institutional instruments, the 
government constructed industrial complexes for large export-led firms in selected and 
favoured regions (Park, 1998). In this regard, regional development policy in Korea has 
been traditionally developed in association with the strategy in industrial policy. The 
Korean government developed several large industrial complexes to establish national 
production systems especially in the south-eastern part of the country. The location 
decision of this spatial industrial agglomeration was influenced by several economic and 
political factors such as locational advantages, decentralisation, and other political 
considerations. Chaebols also contributed to the growth of industrial cities by 
establishing large branch plants. As a result of this spatial industrial policy, major 
industrial cities or production clusters were created in Korea. However, these industrial 
complexes in some regions were just simple agglomerations with only limited local 
inter-firm linkages or significant intra-regional production networks (Park, 2001, p. 32). 
According to the Keynesian theory of 'cumulative regional growth' (Chisholm, 1999), 
once a leading manufacturing company is induced into a growth pole region, it is 
expected to create a successive chain of subcontracting firms supplying components and 
materials. Then there would be growing numbers of employment in that manufacturing 
sector. Consequently this would be connected to the popUlation growth and lead into 
increase in the revenues of local authorities, enabling the local governments to invest 
more in infrastructure development. This chain of effects in the leading region would 
spread out to the surrounding regions through the forward and backward inter-regional 
linkage before attaining an equilibrium growth. This model has legitimised the 
government intervention in regional development to achieve the goal of grqwth pole 
driven economic development. However the negative aspects of this model have been 
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raised such as the increasing government role, the growing bureaucracy, the deepening 
regional dependency on national subsidies for provision of public services. 
Reflecting these negative issues, many scholars and policy makers have paid much 
attention to the new possibility of endogenous development models (Markusen, 1995; 
Park and Lee, 1997; Park, 1998). This newly emerged model is a more dynamic and 
evolutionary one. It places more emphasis on the technological development and 
regional innovation than the traditional approach. According to this new approach, a 
'competitive advantage' in a region is more important than a comparative advantage. 
This point of view is found particularly in regional innovation system theory (Braczyk, 
Cooke and Heidenreich, 1998; Cooke and Morgan, 1998) or cluster theory (Potter, 1998). 
The economics of agglomeration in a specific location is important in terms of a 
geographical perspective, but simple agglomeration is not enough to create a synergistic 
effect in a region. As Krugman (1994, 1998) says, regional competitiveness comes from 
high productivity created by geographical and functional clusters of interrelated 
industries and their production factors. A regional innovation system requires 
coordination with various actors, including firms, universities, venture capitalists and 
local governments, etc. 
In fact, Korea has suffered from serious problems of regional imbalance and disparity. In 
the process of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, most of national functions or 
resources have been overwhelmingly concentrated in Seoul and its surrounding capital 
region. There have been a few policy efforts for decentralisation to sort out much 
inefficiency from this problem. However, the capital region have increasingly ,absorbed 
more resources like a 'black hole' on the basis of its ready made favourable factors such 
as advanced infrastructure, easy access to financial and other services, the availability of 
high skilled human resources. As the government has made an effort to improve 
knowledge-based high-tech industries, the capital region's advantages became more 
powerful to attract firms in that field. In 2003, the new presidential term began as the 
president Roh, Moo-Hyun administration was launched. The government put 'balanced 
national development' and 'regional innovation' on the top of policy agenda. It 
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emphasised the importance of innovation-driven economy, and suggested the building of 
regional innovation capacity to pursue it. In this regard, regional innovation policy needs 
to be approached basically by the connection of regional development policy and 
innovation policy. 
6.4.2 Selected 'techno-pole' Daedeok and its legacy 
Spatial selectivity in Korea is also applied to the government intervention in science and 
technology policies. The Korean government tried to promote national R&D capability 
through mainly public research institutes and R&D subsidising. As reviewed in section 
6.4, DST has always been at the centre of these policy initiatives in Korea. In the mean 
time, DST has often been studied through a lens of techno-pole or technopolis (Oh, 
1995; Oh and Kang, 1997; Luger et ai, 1998; Oh, 2002). The term 'techno-pole' has its 
origin in French, meaning planned centres for the promotion of high-technology industry. 
It has been frequently used in the literature since the end of the 1970s. Castells and Hall 
(1994) distinguished three types oftechnopole: industrial complexes of high-tech firms; 
technology parks; and science cities, and they classified DST as a case of science city or 
technopolis which is the Japanese version of techno-pole. However, it is not easy to 
defme a techno-pole with a single concept founded upon one theoretical model. In 
relation to the above mentioned term 'growth pole', techno-pole can be interpreted as 
the growth pole driven by high technology industries. The techno-pole as a pole of 
technological development represents a specific form of polarisation process. It is "more 
a spatial concentration of technology transfer than a policy instrument for regional 
development" (Benko, 2000, p. 166). In this sense, DST was not designed as an 
industrial based techno-pole but instead a R&D based one. As witnessed in cases of 
many countries, the attraction of companies or the promotion of technology transfer is 
an essential part of successful techno-poles. But Daedeok showed a lack of industrial 
basis and production systems. Furthermore, DST was initiated by the central government 
rather than local authorities. Thus it has not much contributed to the regional economic 
development since its initial stage. The government has located many public research 
institutes, universities, and other supporting organisations in DST. It has also provided 
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huge R&D subsidies for them. However, these organisations have been 'poorly 
connected' (Cooke, 2001, p. 23) to each other, and consequently there has been quite 
weak interactive innovation in Daedeok. 
In order to understand the R&D oriented techno-pole policy, it is necessary to look at the 
changes in science and technology policy of Korea in a broader sense. Under the catch-
up model, Korea could borrow technologies from advanced foreign countries and utilize 
them effectively. This meant that Korea as a late-industrialising country could enjoy 
'late-comer's advantages' during the early stage of economic development. However, as 
the scale of the economy grew and economic structures moved towards more 
technology-intensive industries, these advantages could not be applied any longer to the 
Korean economy (Sub, 2000). Thus, the development of indigenous technological 
capacity became important for continuous economic growth. By this legacy of the catch-
up model, the R&D sector in Korea has been operated by mainly governmental R&D 
programmes which have been mostly mission-oriented rather than diffusion-oriented. 
While developed countries have placed emphasis on the importance of knowledge 
diffusion to foster innovation, the Korean innovation system has been focusing more on 
knowledge generation. From the viewpoint of innovation system, the close interaction 
and overlapped interface between public research institutes (PRIs), universities and 
private firms are generally regarded as ideal conditions for generating innovation. In 
Korea, however, it has been considered that PRis are largely dependent on the 
governmental financial support and the knowledge diffusion from PRis to industry is 
very small. At the same time, this legacy of government dominant R&D caused the 
weakness of universities' research capabilities in Korea. For example, over 60% of 
national R&D programmes in 1998 were commissioned to PRIs as main contractors, 
whereas universities received only 9% even though university researchers participated 
widely in most of these programmes (ibid, p. 43). This means that, unlike universities in 
other innovative clusters like 'Silicon Valley, universities in Korea have focused more on 
the function of general education. 
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In line with this stage of economic development, the Korean government has 
successively changed the orientation of its science and technology policy. In the early 
stage, most of policy measures focused on building the infrastructure for technological 
development. A few institutions were established such as KIST (1966), MOST (1967), 
KAIST (1971); KIST (Korea Institute of Science and Technology) has played the role of 
technological functionary in responding to industrial demands for rapid economic 
growth; MOST (Ministry of Science and Technology) has been the main designer of 
Korea's overall S&T policy; KAIST implemented the concept of the research-oriented 
university into the Korean higher education system. National R&D Programmes, first 
introduced by MOST in 1982, were clearly aiming to develop technology in order to 
enhance industrial competitiveness. The implementation of these programmes is closely 
related to the role of the PRIs. The rationale of these programmes and public research 
were originally intended to complement research areas that would not be pursued by the 
industry alone. Up to the early 1980s, a substantial part of the PRI budget had .relied on 
'contract research' from industry, but the needs of the private sector decreased as 
corporations began to increase in-house research to strengthen internal technological 
capabilities. Consequently, the government tried to restructure PRIs and defmed their 
role as "leading cooperative research among industry, academia and research institutes, 
conducting creative generic technology and long-term complex big projects with the 
emphasis on basic and applied research areas, and being fully responsible for 
developingpublic/we/fare technologies" (MOST, 1997 cited in Sub, 2000, p. 41). 
At the early stage of economic development, the role of R&D subsidy and public sector 
R&D was dominant in Korea. However, as the world economy entered into a 
'knowledge based economy' and globalisation, the Korean economy faced serious 
challenges. Public sector R&D could not satisfy the technology demand from private 
finns as the industrial structure is gradually transfonned from light industries to heavy 
and chemical industries during 1970's. Firms began to consider the need for building 
their own technological capability, and as a result, to expand in-house R&D activities. 
The private sector R&D which was motivated by various tax incentives by the 
government had been oriented toward the application and adaptation of technologies or 
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engineering know-how. From the mid 1980s, most of the Chaebols started to invest in 
in-house R&D to cope with severe competition in international markets particularly in 
the field of high value-added industry like semi-conductors. It meant that Korean firms 
felt the need to develop their own technological capabilities. As a result, the overall 
portion of private R&D began to dominate public sector R&D in Korea, but only a few 
chaebols could make large-scale R&D investment in this period. This dominance of 
chaebols caused the lack of domestic knowledge diffusion in the Korean economy. 
Conventional S&T policy, particularly knowledge generation-oriented policy does not 
satisfy the needs for innovation in terms of knowledge diffusion. The Korean 
government has developed and implemented various policy measures in order to 
promote technological innovation not only in the private sector but also by public sector 
R&D. These measures to support R&D activities include mainly the provision of 
incentives such as tax reduction or R&D subsidy, but they are linked with human 
resources development and procurement systems. Actually, it is very hard to make an 
objective assessment of the effectiveness of these policy measures because, among other 
reasons, evidence is incomplete (Sub, 2000, p. 36). It means that a more in-d~pth and 
comprehensive study is necessary to discuss the appropriate scale of the government's 
R&D support. Previous studies show that governmental R&D support measures are not 
only marginally helpful in promoting private enterprises' innovation activities, but also 
have some critical problems (Song and Shin, 1998; KIT A White Paper, 1998). Sub (ibid, 
p. 37) refers particularly to the KITA's White Paper and suggests that government's 
R&D support measures are associated with the following problems; 
"1) mismatches between the objectives of the government's support measures 
and industrial needs; 2) the lack of complementarity and substitutability 
between financial measures and tax-incentive measures; 3) the difficulty of 
securing credit-loans for SMEs; 4) the limitations of mobilising funds through 
market capital; 5) high interest rates for bank loans; 6) underdevelopment of 
the venture capital system,' 7) and other factors such as various banking 
regulations and practices, various ministries' overlapping policy measures". 
These problems have also been connected to the under-utilisation of public R&D results. 
A study conducted by STEPI (Oh, 1997) indicates that there has been a big gap in 
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understanding the necessity of technology diffusion between PRIs, universities and finns. 
According to this survey research, researchers in PRIs or university professors have 
thought that private finns are not interested in diffusion, and on the contrary, finns have 
thought that the results from PRIs or universities are not very helpful to solve their 
technological problems. 
Despite these problems found in public sector R&D suggested in these previous studies, 
it is very hard to simply conclude that governmental policy measures were wrongly 
designed or implemented. It is also difficult to assess its performance objectively and 
quantitatively. However, it seems to be clear on the basis of above discussion that public 
sector R&D has contributed to knowledge generation in the early stage of economic 
development, but did not contribute much to knowledge diffusion. Although the 
government tried to implement several programmes aimed at helping SMEs or the 
involvement of universities, the role of SMEs and universities were consistently not 
sufficient (Hwang et ai, 2003; Min et ai, 2003). It follows that the Korean government 
had to set up a separate programme for promoting innovation through knowledge 
diffusion. As noted earlier, innovation does not take place in a vacuum. The linear model 
of innovation has been replaced by an interactive or systemic model. The rationale of 
system failure alongside the perspective of market failure created much attention with 
researchers as another justification for government policy intervention in the process of 
innovation. It emphasises the importance of interactive learning and networking among 
various actors. As a result, the government policy measures became more focused on 
promoting knowledge diffusion, stimulating learning mechanism, improving system 
linkages. In Korea, since the inauguration of President Roh Moo-Hyun in the end of 
2002, as the successor of President Kim Dae-Jung, innovation has been a supreme 
national task, particularly in terms of balanced national development. In this respect, 
venture-business support policy needs to be understood as an extension of industrial, 
science and technology, and innovation policies. 
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6.4.3 Venture policy In the regional context of Daedeok 
As stated in above section, Oaedeok has the long tradition of public R&D subsidising for 
OST. According to the Oaedeok Valley Master Plan (2001), it was estimated that around 
60% of start-up entrepreneurs in Oaedeok spun-off from PRIs in DST. In this regard, 
venture policy in Oaedeok needs to be understood in the close relationship with 'DST' 
in a context of S&T policy. As noted before, the government has concentrated national 
R&D resources on DST for the last 30 years, and consequently spin-off start-ups from 
OST began to naturally emerge from the early 1990s. The government concentrated 
various policy measures on venture fIrms from the end of 1997. However, this venture 
policy did not appear to have close link to the nascent development of high-tech start-
ups naturally emerging in Daedeok. It was instead emphasised as a relief programme to 
create jobs and to replace chaebols in a situation of fmancial crisis. As a result, on the 
initial stage of venture policy, start-ups in Daedeok could not attract increased attention 
from venture capitals, the govenunent, and the people. This circumstance at that time 
seems to represent a paradoxical phenomenon that the mechanism of venture policy 
resembles the typical mechanism of conventional chaebol-oriented industrial policy. It 
implicitly indicates that venture policy in Korea was launched with a framework of 
industrial policy not innovation policy. There, of course, have been policies for 
encouraging cooperation between industry and academy (or research), but those policy 
measures have not been closely combined with venture policy. This reproduction of 
intervention mode in policies has contributed in some ways to the formation of the 
regional context in Daedeok. 
The regional context is likely to reflect the changes in a wide range of regional history, 
culture, institutions over a long period of time. As stated before, the development of 
DMC as an administrative region encompassing Daedeok geographically has been 
pulled by mainly exogenous factors like political or strategic decision makings by the 
central government. Over the . last three decades, several significant location decisions 
were made to set up some important national organisations or institutions in Oaejeon or 
move them to Daejeon. Furthermore, Daejeon could be a host city for international 
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exposition in 1993. Considerable infrastructure improvement in Daejeon was followed 
by these strategic decisions by the central government. In this manner, the influence of 
exogenous factors took a central role in the process of the development of Daejeon. 
However, this endowment has been mainly focused on the improvement of urban 
envirorunental factors like transportation or housing, rather than entrepreneurial factors. 
As a result of this regional development trajectory, Daejeon came to have a lack of 
industrial basis and business climate. Considering these regional "inheritance and 
endowments" (Clark et ai, 2003), DST seems to be weakly embedded in its surrounding 
region (Daejeon). 
In summary, Daedeok-RIS appears to have the characteristics of strong R&D oriented 
milieu and weakly embedded to the region. In addition, the 'central government 
dependent' regional development trajectory of Daejeon has influenced the evolution of 
Daedeok-RIS to have the above mentioned characteristics. Recently there was another 
important decision by the government to designate Daejeon as the 'Specialized R&D 
Zone' (its name was changed into 'INNOPOLIS' later). 'The Special Law for fostering 
the Daedeok R&D Specialised Zone' was proclaimed in January 2005. This project 
represents a sort of symbolic transformation of the Korean economy into more 
'innovation-driven' economic growth from the traditional 'factor-input oriented' model 
(MOST and DMC, 2004). However, in the process of enactment, this law caused big 
debates mainly raised by other local authorities regarding its criteria and the scope of 
designation. DMC strongly insisted a logic of 'choice and concentration' as a 
legitimization why DMC needs to be designated as a 'specialised R&D zone'. When it 
comes to the difference of specialised R&D zone from DST, the government puts more 
emphasis on the function of technology commercialization and enhancing the global 
position of Daedeok. However, apart from its different aims and expanded boundary 
from the past DST construction, it looks still quite R&D oriented and policy-led attempt 
initiated by the central government. Its title still contains the term 'R&D'. Furthermore, 
the ministry of the central government in charge of this project is MOST which has 
already been in charge of DST. Designated geographical scope of this special zone 
contains DST and its surrounding area within Daejeon. In this regard, INNOPOLIS 
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project might be seen as an experiment to add another policy initiative to DST in the 
name of transforming it into more innovative cluster. This seems to be a typical path 
dependency in the development trajectory of Daedeok locked into 'R&D' rather than its 
commercialisation or business application. This point is not the main interest of this 
study but it was partly addressed through the empirical work. Spin-off start-ups in 
Daedeok, as a main actor in the Daedeok-RIS, have had a strong high-tech orientation. 
They showed, in the interviews, the expectation of continuous policy support to 
Daedeok. These tendencies represent their 'stickiness' to R&D and policy support. 
In summary, this chapter attempted an analytical review of path dependency in 
Daedeok-RIS and the policy support system for it. Policy intervention can produce 
expected outputs, but often unexpected consequences as well. In this regard, government 
dependency can be seen as a sort of unexpected policy consequence which can be 
induced by institutional legacies and economic structures. In the case of Daedeok-RIS, 
policy intervention has contributed to the agglomeration of R&D resources within a 
geographical area. At the same time, however, it produces R&D oriented and central 
government dependent regional legacy. The construction of DST and continuous 
subsidization for R&D activities in PRIs for a long time has played an important role in 
shaping a R&D oriented development path in Daedeok. In addition, the urban growth of 
DMC has been mainly pulled 'by strategic decision makings of the central government. 
This regional inheritance can also be seen influential in shaping a regional development 
path in Daejeon city. On the other hand, 'selectivity' in industrial policy has influenced 
on regional and entrepreneurial development in Korea. 'Select and support mechanism' 
which penetrates through Korean industrial policies has played a critical role in 
formulating corporate governance. The result of institutional analysis in this chapter 
suggests that this mechanism contributes to produce 'dependent culture' on government 
policy support in Korean economy. This legacy in traditional industrial policy 
influenced 'venture policy' to have the similarity in terms of select and support 
mechanism. These broad structural and institutional factors become influential in 
moulding entrepreneurial activities in actor level. Empirical field work in this study 
focused on investigating start-up firm's policy response. 
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7 EMERGENCE OF A DEPENDENT PATH: 
POLICY RELIANCE AND CHANGE OF RISK 
PERCEPTION DURING START-UP 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 provided an analytical understanding of institutional settings in order to 
explore policy induced government dependency in Daedeok. In terms of a systems 
approach, this institutional frame is seen as an enabler and/or constraint to influence the 
dynamics inside the black box of the innovation process. As stated already, this study 
opens and looks inside this black box with the conceptual framework of government 
dependency. Using this conceptual framework, the field study was designed to unveil 
start-up firm's risk perception changes and to explore behavioural persistence in benefit 
seeking from policy support. This empirical analysis at firm level can be helpful to 
delineate the path emergence of policy reliance and its reproduction in start-up firm's 
business behaviour. This chapter, first of all, discusses the emergence of a path which is 
shaped by the change of risk perception during start-up process. According to path 
dependency perspective, path formation has a significant meaning in that it is a starting 
point of path dependent process. As argued before (See Section 4.3), the risk perception 
of start-up entrepreneurs plays a crucial role in generating their reliance on policy 
support. Potential start-up entrepreneurs on whom this study focuses are the researchers 
or engineers in PRIs in DST. In this respect, spin-offs from PRIs can be regarded as 
relatively high-tech entrepreneurs. To look at their technology orientation in business 
becomes a basis for exploring changes in their perception of risk. It is because how to 
perceive risks in business depends on entrepreneur's values, knowledge or experiences. 
In case of high-tech entrepreneurs in particular, how they understand the importance of 
technology in business is seen as a crucial factor in exploring the relationship between 
risk perception and policy reliance. This is discussed in the first and second sections. 
What factors have influenced the change of risk perception in the process of start-up are 
discussed in the third section. . 
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7.2 Technology orientation of start-ups 
Potential entrepreneurs on whom this study focuses were researchers or engineers in 
PRIs in DST. Interviewed entrepreneurs were the start-up founders who transformed 
themselves from PRI researchers into business entrepreneurs. Their job as an occupation 
in Korean labour market obtained the reputation of being relatively good and stable. 
They were very proud of their roles, in that they had contributed to the past successful 
economic development of Korea. Their income level was quite high compared to other 
similar jobs, and the rate of leaving job was very low (Seal et ai, 1999). These potential 
entrepreneurs did not begin to create their own businesses until the end of the 1980s and 
the early 1990s. There were of course a limited number of spin-offs from PRIs before 
mid-90s when the goverrunent began to actively support start-ups. However, 
circumstances began to change dramatically after the IMF crisis in 1997, as an 
interviewee stated; 
"After the graduation of KA/ST, / decided to enter ETRJ among many good 
occupational choices because PRJ researcher as a job looked very attractive. I 
was so proud of my work in that I could contribute to the development of my 
country, but later this pride seemed to be gradually disappeared due to mainly 
the change of PRJ researchers in their social status." (CEO-6, OVG) 
As the influence of full-scaled reforms for overcoming the crisis, PRIs had undergone 
the pressure of restructuring. In line with this situational change, there was a sort of 
'start-up rush' in PRIs. This unprecedented phenomenon was mainly concentrated on the 
short booming period between 1998 and 2001. Many researchers, even policy makers, 
have struggled to reveal what made this happen and to understand what was going on 
during this period. However, it is quite rare in this field to approach theoretically on the 
basis of empirical data. 
Generally speaking, new start-ups in the USA, particularly in Silicon Valley, have been 
described as 'high-risk' firms .. This reputation came from the strong business culture of 
co-evolution between start-up firms and risk fmancing actors, like venture capitals or 
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business angels. On the other hand, in Korea, the 'high-tech' features of start-ups was 
been a decisive factor to identify target ftnns worth supporting or protecting by the 
government. The level of technology can be seen as one of the most critical factor in 
detennining whether newly established ftnns will survive or succeed in the market. 
Technology itself, however, does not necessarily guarantee their successful perfonnance. 
On the contrary, overly emphasised technology orientation may be often not helpful and 
even hannful in some cases. Start-ups in Daedeok, spin-offed from PRIs in DST in 
particular, have been generally regarded as 'high-tech' start-ups. Interviewed start-up 
founders have somewhat long period of working career in government funded PRIs 
which have advanced positions in high-tech R&D sector in Korea. They have experience 
to fulfil large-scale R&D projects. These peculiar profiles may be seen to endow them 
considerable advantages in plunging into business and competing with other finns in the 
market. Moreover, considering the policy support provided on the basis of technology 
levels in Korea, high-tech start-ups could easily access to necessary resources by 
exploiting policy benefits on the early stage of start-up in particular. 
However, the result of the interviews proposes quite interesting evidence against the 
above general assumption. Interviewees responded that their belief in the importance of 
technology in their business had considerably changed: before the start-up, they thought 
that the portion of technology in business was really big and significant, but they 
realised through their business history that technology was not so crucial for the success 
of business even though it was obviously necessary. This indicated that researchers or 
engineers in Daedeok started their businesses with an overstretched technology 
orientation to some extent. Even a few respondents confessed that if they had realised 
this earlier than their start-up decision, they would have not created their own businesses. 
This phenomenon can be partly attributed to the influence from their previous working 
career in research laboratories; 
"Researchers like me tend to think implicitly or explicitly that high-tech can 
guarantee high sales. In most cases of start-up founders including me in 
Daedeok, we tend to not make products to be sold well, but wait until these will 
be sold after the production. Successful firms produce something in terms of 
marketing, but we produce it in terms of high-technology. Is it natural that those 
firms are not successful in the market?" (CEO-I, SVG) 
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"In my case, I had worked for a start-up company for seven years before I 
started up this present company. I think that my experience in previous company 
has been much more helpful for my current business than the career as a 
researcher in ETR!. .., High level of technology is important to maintain my 
comparative advantage in the market. However, I learned from my previous 
business experience that 'time to market' of technology is much more important 
than high-tech itself. Strictly saying, now I think technology can be purchased if 
necessary." (CEO-4, SVG) 
This high 'technology-orientation' of start-ups in Daedeok was connected to a relatively 
low level of 'market-orientation'. Generally speaking, technological innovation has 
played a critical role in capitalist economic development. Entrepreneurs can be seen as a 
'heroic player' who transforms technology into marketable innovation through endless 
'creative destruction' (Schumpeter, 1934). This classical notion about the role of 
entrepreneurs indicates that they need to have a balanced orientation between technology 
and market. High technology level of start-up can be a powerful advantage to win 
market competition, but if only it can be backed by other capabilities such as marketing 
and management. In this regard, technology and market are inseparable in start-up 
business, but start-ups in Daedeok reveal different stories; 
"The value of a certain technology in business is determined in the market place 
by customers not by the technology itself. When technology is combined with 
other factors like financing or marketing, then it can access to customers. But 
CEOs from PR!s like us could not think about even this basic principle of 
business. We used to believe that customers will voluntarily come to us, if we 
hold high technology." (CEOI-0VG). 
Most of the PRIs in Daedeok had traditionally undertaken R&D activities which related 
mainly to basic technology or partly applied technology. More recently, R&D that 
resulted in technology transfer or commercialisation had been emphasised in DST. 
Researchers in PRIs faced no problem to work in these 'government funded' research 
organisations, even though they did not know much about the market related 
technologies which they were developing. Interviewees seemed to realise their ignorance 
about markets and the incompetence in business after start-up. According to them, such 
misguided overconfidence on their technologies may be conceived by their working 
experiences in the above mentioned environment far from the market in PRIs, and it 
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seemed to be exaggerated by technology-oriented policy support schemes in Korea. It 
indicated that they were gradually recognising their 'blind' technology orientation was 
becoming a risk factor threatening survival in the market. All interviewees responded 
that technology was surely the basis of start-up business, but they conceded that their 
technologies did not sufficiently reach to marketable levels in many cases, at least in the 
initial stage of start-up. This fmding gives a meaningful clue to address the problematic 
concern why start-ups in Daedeok have not been as highly competitive in the market as 
generally expected in spite of their high technology levels. 
7.3 Risk perception in occupational choice 
7.3.1 Reason for new firm formation 
In the meantime, the motivation of start-ups has been explored by several previous 
studies (Seol et ai, 2002; Kim, 2004; Park et ai, 2004; Kim and Jung, 2005). According 
to recent survey data, many start-up entrepreneurs who had worked in PRIs attributed 
their reason for start-up primarily to the desire for 'technology commercialisation'. In 
addition, a few other reasons such as the aspiration for making more money or running 
their own independent business were also identified. However the survey data does not 
provide enough understanding about more complex backgrounds or influences behind 
those reasons. In this study, the entrepreneurs were asked questions to capture more 
implicit contexts. 
No notable differences between different groups of SVG, OVG, IVCs and FVCs were 
identified with regard to start-up reasons. Interview results showed individual and 
situational specific variations in start-up motivation, but it can be summarised into three 
categories: dissatisfaction, anxiety, and aspiration. In the first instance, 'dissatisfaction' 
with a job in research institute as a researcher or engineer influenced the start-up 
decision. PRIs in Korea had a hierarchical and bureaucratic organizational culture. It 
was not easy for researchers with innovative ideas or special research interest to pursue 
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that in their labs. They had to conduct the research imposed by the institutes or the 
government, and they were evaluated according to the 'PBS'; an evaluation system 
based on the successful performance of project bids to the government ministries. As 
many entrepreneurship studies suggest, one of main features of start-up is self-
employment (See Chapter 2). It means most of start-up founders have a strong 
achievement motivation to be independent. This general characteristic was also similarly 
found in this interview result. As an interviewee stated; 
"I had worked for ADD. It has, as you may know, more closed atmosphere than 
other PRis because most of defence technology is related to national secrets. I 
could not do what I really wanted to do in such rigid hierarchical organisation. 
I could not bear this." (CEO-I, OVG) 
The above mentioned 'PBS' in R&D subsidising appeared to be one of main sQurces of 
PRI researchers' complaints.' This system was originally prepared to improve the 
efficiency in government funded R&D activities in PRIs, but it had faced serious 
criticism from many researchers as a symbol of imposing superficial effectiveness. To 
undertake as many R&D projects as possible from the government ministries, PRI 
researchers had to make R&D plans for next year beforehand, and keep trying to 
persuade government officials to include their projects in the government budget of the 
next year. As an interviewee (CEO-9, SVG) said, "this system may be necessary for 
boosting R&D productivity if it works well like its original aim intended", but as he 
added, "it seems to be gradually operated in distorted ways to show just quantitative 
effectiveness of organisation which can be crucial for getting more R&D budget in 
forthcoming year." It might be quite painful for active and dynamic people to prepare 
reports or proposals every day for just showing something to other people. Interview 
result reveals that most of complaints or dissatisfaction which led PRI researchers to 
start-up decision were closely related with structural problems of PRis such as 
organisational rigidity in the light of their personal value or confidence. 
'Anxiety' about the stability of a job was suggested by a few respondents. This reason 
looked to be the result of situational factors in that it was mainly expressed by the 
entrepreneurs who quit their PRIs around the time period of the IMF crisis in 1997. As 
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the Korean government pushed very strong and far-reached refonn policies after the 
crisis, the inefficiency of public sectors became a target of restructuring. PRIs were no 
exceptions. Most of the research institutes in DST tried to reduce their scale of budget, 
organisation, number of personnel, etc. However, it was very hard for PRIs to push 
coerced restructuring due to the existence of a strong labour union. PRIs encouraged 
researchers to accept voluntary or early retirements under the condition of paying a 
retirement lump-sum grant. It seemed to have contributed to triggering a start-up rush in 
PRIs like ETRI, but also created a concern for researchers that their jobs were not stable 
any more. Most of interviewees seemed to deny they were influenced by the pressure of 
PRI restructuring, instead they stressed the fact that they decided to quit PRIs voluntarily. 
As an interviewee (CEO-2, OVG) said, "I obviously did not apply early retirement 
although ETRl suggested considerable amount of retirement allowance. It was because 
of the matter of my pride. I couldn't accept that I had to retire for just getting more 
money." 
Another interviewee also well indicated researcher's anxiety about the future: "I 
couldn 'tfind the vision of my future any more in PRJ. I tried to look back my career and 
look forth my future position in the organisation through my predecessors' case. And 
then, I came to realize it will take more than at least ten years for me to take the position 
that my predecessor could get there in 5 years considering the situation of downsizing at 
that time." (CEO-7, SVG). Regardless of these responses being based on frank speaking 
or just bragging, it looks clear that the situational factor of restructuring threw a shadow 
to some extent over their expectation about job stability. 
'Aspiration' to be independent or richer was also seen as an important motivation of 
start-up. Entrepreneurs are self-employed people who decide something under their own 
responsibilities. Unlike the above two reasons, this could be a powerful driving force of 
risk-taking for start-up, even when researchers were satisfied with their job in the 
organisation. Desire to be ind~endent was closely related to the desire to be. richer in 
tenns of economic wealth. Making more money not as a wage-earner but as an owner of 
business might be basically a common dream of almost all start-up entrepreneurs. It 
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becomes an impetus for willingly undertaking risks of novelty and uncertainty during 
start-up; 
"/ was quite satisfied with my job as a researcher in ETR!. / had no big 
complaints about it. If my son thinks about his future after the graduation from 
engineering department in university, / would like to recommend him to think 
about entering PR!s. However, in my case, doing my own business was more 
attractive than staying in ETR!. / really wanted to make more money through 
commercialisation of my technologies and / thought / could take risks for my 
dream." (CEO-5, SVG) 
Some interviewees had experience of technology transfer involving in PRIs. As one of 
them stated, "/ was very interested in technology commercialisation, but SMEs couldn't 
succeed in business with transferred good technologies from us. So, / and a few my 
colleagues decided to try it for ourselves." (CEO-8, SVG). He also added that "in my 
case, more direct start-up motivation was the aspiration of doing really successful 
business with my own technologies rather than because of minor complaints about my 
organisation." Interview result revealed that start-up founders seemed to do 'risk-reward 
calculation' in their own ways, even though it might turn out to be incorrect later. It can 
be generally said that the bigger reward they expected or the stronger aspiration they had, 
the more risks they willingly bear. 
As mentioned above, these three factors were seen as major start-up reasons of 
interviewed entrepreneurs. However, looking at the reason of start-up decision seems to 
be not so simple in that several influencing factors may have often combined in potential 
entrepreneur's mind rather just a certain single factor. Moreover, some people did not 
choose the way of being an entrepreneur, even if they had some of these factors in mind. 
During the period of start-up rush, in the case of ETRI for example, hundreds of 
researchers quitted their job to join this rush but many more researchers stayed in ETRI. 
It was not because they did not feel any of these factors, but rather because they did not 
dare to transform their mind into action. Therefore, these factors need to be regarded as 
some of the necessary conditions but not as sufficient conditions. 
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7.3.2 Risk perception in the process of start-up 
The above mentioned three factors seemed to have some explanatory power in 
understanding entrepreneurship, but each of them seemed to be far from capturing the 
whole picture of entrepreneurship as a complicated and multi-dimensional phenomenon. 
Thus, a more comprehensive approach was necessary to examine the potential 
entrepreneur's occupational choice: how did researchers or engineers of PRIs in 
Daedeok decide to change their career as start-up entrepreneurs? As noted before, 
starting up a new flnn looks like risk-taking behaviour. The concept of risks can be a 
useful starting point in approaching start-up entrepreneurship. There have been a number 
of empirical studies of risk taking behaviour, but the results of them have frequently 
produced contradictory flndings. Some literature like Hull et al. (1980) showed more 
evidence of a higher propensity for risk-taking in entrepreneurs. Contrastingly, some 
researchers like Brockhaus (1980) cast doubt on the results of these studies with an 
empirical study which showed no signiflcant differences in risk-taking characteristics 
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, including managers or even the general 
public. This debate is related to the different point of view regarding whether the risk-
taking propensity can be a discriminating factor to distinguish entrepreneurs from other 
people. This might be an important issue in many disciplines, but it is not the main 
interest in this study. Risk-taking can surely be seen as a critical and useful facet to 
understand entrepreneurship, regardless of its differentiated power. 
Risk is a multi-dimensional concept, but this study particularly focused on 
understanding how entrepreneurs perceived and responded to risk. Accordingly, 'risk' 
needs to be accepted as a subjective concept, not an objective entity (Slovic, 1992; Renn 
and Rohnnann, 2000). It includes psychological, organisational, social, cultural and 
institutional aspects. First of all, risk was perceived by individual entrepreneurs, so it 
was necessary to focus on the cognitive structure of entrepreneur's risk assessment, 
which was influenced by many socio-cultural, political and institutional factors (Gould 
et a/., 1988; Clarke, 1989; Shubik, 1991). 
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Subjective perceptions are influential in shaping entrepreneurial motivations and 
objectives. Several reasons for the start-up decision were explored in the above section, 
and these were commonly identified even in the cases of researchers who did not start 
their own business. Likewise, not all researchers in PRIs with dissatisfaction, anxieties, 
or desires made the same decision. This section focuses on exploring the changes in 
potential entrepreneurs' risk perception that makes them transform into an entrepreneur. 
Interview questions about risk perception in the process of start-up were designed to 
capture how respondents perceived risks in start-up decision making, how their risk 
perception changed over time, and how they judged themselves in terms of risk 
propensity. 
People who are going to start a new business are likely to think about risks in many 
ways, either explicitly or implicitly. The start-up decision for researchers in uncertain 
situation can be very hard and risky, in that they invest 'all' in the new ventures. Thus, 
they no doubt try to reduce possible risks as far as they can. The results of interview 
showed that researchers made their start-up decision when they thought it seemed not so 
risky or the risk could be overcome within their capability to deal with risks. This risk 
evaluation might be the result of careful heuristics or abstract judgments; 
"When I was going to start my business, I did not think this way would be so 
risky. ... I knew it must be not easy but I thought I could manage it. ... Now, I 
realised that I did not understand even what risk is on earth." (CEO-I, OVG) 
"It seemed that I expected risky factors to some extent but I had a sort of over-
confidence to overcome it considering our high technology level. ... I had 
witnessed a real case of bankruptcy from my brother-in-law, but I seemed to 
believe that I am different from him, so I can succeed even though everybody 
fails." (CEO-5, SVG) 
Most of interviFwed entrepreneurs had no business experience before they created their 
own business. Just two ofthe~ (one in SVG and the other in OVG) had a short period of 
business experience in other start-up companies beforehand. They said this was very 
helpful in enhancing their understanding of the market even though their experience was 
limited. The rest had limited and/or abstract knowledge about markets and customers 
before involvement in start-ups. The lack of business experience in market seemed to 
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cause their vague and even unrealistic recognitions about risks. Most interviewees 
replied that they took the probability of bankruptcy into account as the most serious risk, 
but they had no detailed analysis of this. Regarding the source of risk itself, they were 
concerned mainly about money. For example, many PRJ researchers created their risky 
business even without having basic knowledge that 'cash flow is very important', or 
'borrowing money can be risky'. Bankruptcy or debt must surely be critical risk sources, 
but their perceptions about these risks seemed to have been considerably changed into 
more detailed and less abstract ones compared to the early stage of start-up; 
"/ knew money could be risky, and even / was afraid of borrowing other 
people's money. ... But / did not know well why loan could be really risky. I 
never expected that / myself could be entangled with the debt problem of my 
company because /, as a CEO, guaranteed it jointly with the company." (CEO-3, 
OVO) 
"Before start-up, / seemed not to think of possible risk factors. ... When / looked 
back on the past, it was really reckless challenge to start my business with such 
an insufficient preparation." (CEO-8, OVO) 
Respondents were asked in this interview to reflect their start-up decision from the 
present point of view in terms of risk perception in particular. They commonly replied 
that to some extent they underestimated the level of business risks, and also 
overestimated their capabilities to deal with risks. It might suggest that risks did not exist 
out there as objective phenomena, independent of people's minds and cultures (Slovic, 
1999, p. 690). Consequently, it made entrepreneurs respond in various ways to the same 
risks. So many external factors were likely to impact on the individual's risk processing. 
Risk perception, in this sense, can be regarded as a psychologically perceived and at the 
same time 'socially constructed' concept (Oarvin, 2001, p. 450). This issue will be 
examined in more detail in the following section. 
7.4 Factors influencing the change of risk perception 
There have been numerous empirical studies that examine the way people understand, 
perceive and manage risks in their real business life (Cool and Dierickx, 1989; Tufano, 
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1996; Davis et ai, 2000; Zwick, 2001). Most of them focus on quantitative analyses to 
measure probabilities or the consequences of risks, but a fundamental problem in this 
type of research is the qualitative nature of risk perception. As argued above, the 
interview result implicitly reveals that people have a level of risk with which they feel 
tolerable, and they tend to adjust their willingness to accept risks by considering the 
presence of safety measures (Botterill and Mazur, 2004, p. 3). This seems to be useful to 
explain a general phenomenon of why people tend to drive faster when they have 
airbags in their cars or they fastened their seat belts. It can be also connected to the fact 
that people feel more safety to do something when they carry insurances for driving or 
disease. According to Adams (1995), people have an individual's "risk thermostat". As 
mentioned before, interviewees commonly had a somewhat exaggerated confidence in 
their technology level which had formed in the process of government funded R&D 
activities in their mother PRIs. This overconfidence seems to have lowered their risk 
perception. However, the result of this interview shows that entrepreneur's risk 
perception was influenced by several factors besides this overconfidence in technology. 
The main factors revealed ·from the interviews can be summarised as personal 
experiences, social circumstances, institutions or policy support. 
7.4.1 Previous experience 
According to the results of the. interviews, the influence of previous career or experience 
varies between individuals of how they thought about the start-up decision making or 
current business. Some replied it was not so helpful and even harmful in some cases, but 
some contrastingly said it was quite helpful. This gap seems to come from the difference 
of individual recognition. For example, knowledge of technology or good human 
networks in research institutes were differently recognised. An interviewee said that "I 
have quite limited human network of mainly researchers or engineers, but it has not 
been very helpful to do my business" (CEO-2, OVO). But another interviewee said: "I 
think my previous career in DST is very helpful to develop new products or to sort out 
technological problems. I could easily get proper help from my human network in other 
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research institutes." (CEO-5, SVG). In this regard, how people recognise or 'perceive 
something is very meaningful to determine how people respond to it. 
People tend to integrate new information collected from the outside - which always must 
be interpreted subjectively - into previously acquired experiences with as little 
contradiction as possible (Zwick, 2001, p. 51). Previous experiences were likely to 
influence people's later perception. PRis in Daedeok carried out R&D in the field of 
mainly basic technology and large-scale of government endowed projects. As the role of 
PRis as innovative change-agents in the early stage of economic development was 
gradually decreased, the morale of researchers in DST began to wither. Interviewed 
entrepreneurs reflected that one of the most important jobs in PRis was to report 
research results. Most of government R&D projects were evaluated by these reports. 
Evaluation of research report was very important for all PRIs because it became the 
criteria for R&D budget allocation for the coming year. Under the system like this, if a 
R&D project failed, it might result in the cutback of budget for that project. A few 
interviewees confessed they had to always succeed in every project in PRIs for the 
survival of their department and budget. Thus, in some cases, they had to take a 
probability of the project into consideration in advance before they applied for funding 
for a certain project to the government ministries. It made them more likely to stick to a 
project which had a high probability of success. 
Previous experiences in carrying out R&D projects in PRis could be very useful to have 
chances to undertake those projects from their mother PRis even after start-up. They 
were quite familiar with making research proposals and giving presentations. Some of 
them had experience of proposal evaluation as members of examining panels. It means 
they would be more advantageous than other CEOs in advocating their proposals in front 
of panels. In this regard, it can be said that undertaking R&D projects can be at least a 
helpful strategy for survival on early stage of start-up. However, as a respondent 
described, "relying on R&D projects must be a sweet temptation which is really hard to 
overcome for young high-tech firms, but it might be poisonous for business growth." 
(CEO-I, OVG). This notion suggests that entrepreneurs might have chosen a non-
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business pathway, if they could fInance 'easy money' (~~ §) from their previous 
experiences. 
Working experiences as researchers seemed to contribute to their holding a sort of 
narrow 'tunnel vision' of the world. As an interviewee said, engineer CEO tends to think 
about only his/her own fIeld, so there is a tendency of continuously sticking to it, even 
though it goes wrong; 
" ... researcher or engineer like me is a person who has been familiar with the 
communication with machine for mostly over 10 years. ... Thus, we lack the 
relationship between people . ... we think we are the best in our field in terms of 
technology, but we don't know how to manage cash-j1ow, how to promote 
marketing, how to make customers happy, etc." (CEO-4, OVO). 
This notion points to the narrow focus or limited scope of engineer CEOs' ability to look 
at business world. Entrepreneurs needed to overcome this force of inertia arising from 
their previous career or experiences. It, however, seemed not to be easy. A respondent 
confessed: "my wife often teases me that you quitted your job in public research institute 
for doing business, but now you look running your own private institute again." (CEO-2, 
OVG). 
Researchers in PRIs do not usually care about the cost for their work in PRIs once they 
get involved with a project, due to the cost is managed by other department in charge of 
it. As interviewees stated, they did not have to negotiate fmancing matters for their 
project with other people. Even, they did not have to care about the possibility of 
commercialisation of their R&D results; 
"I think that we, researchers of PRIs, have never been exposed to the risks in 
terms of business. We just asked money ifnecessary to research institutes or the 
government . ... We did n~t have to think about sales or marketing in our career. 
It seems like an experience in green house which is not helpful for business in 
real world." (CEO-9, SVG) 
Once there was a fashion in using the expression of 'green house ventures' in Korea. 
This tenn was used to describe some start-up firms which were successful under the 
government protection or support, but wlnerable to severe market competition. Venture 
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capitalists pointed out that most of high-tech start-ups, particularly spin-offs from PRIs 
in Daedeok were recognised as typical 'green house ventures'. As a CEO of venture 
capital company told, "many start-up entrepreneurs in Daedeok tend to have a kind of 
exaggerated pride or confidence about their technology level and experiences as 
researchers. In my opinion. it made them underestimate the fact that business is much 
riskier than their previous R&D experiences" (CEO ofVC-4). 
7.4.2 Social circumstances 
As statistical data showed, the number of start-ups in Korea began to dramatically 
increase after IMF crisis in 1997. It reached a peak in 2000 and began to decrease from 
2001. This fluctuation reflects the socio-economic situation of those days. One of the 
most spectacular phenomena in the end of 1990s was the 'venture boom'. For only three 
year of this unprecedented booming period, over 10,000 small firms were newly created 
in Korea. KOSDAQ market played, without doubt, a critical role in this rapid growth of 
start-up sector. It made 'equity investment' possible by providing 'exit' opportunities for 
investors like venture capitalists or business angels. After the economic crisis, the flow 
of money in the market began to be converged into KOSDAQ. Many people could make 
huge money through start-up business and venture investment in a short period of time. 
Even a few start-ups surpassed existing large companies in terms of the value in stock 
market. 
This phenomenon in Korea seemed to be encouraged by the global IT boom that 
originated in Silicon Valley. Many internet based companies, the so-called 'dot com' 
companies, grew surprisingly. fast, and many CEOs of start-ups could become new 
millionaires. It was regarded as a myth of 'venture jackpot' (quoted frequently in news 
media in the name of '~X~ CH!2{' in Korean) for young potential entrepreneurs who 
were dreaming start-up. Many researchers and engineers were stimulated by this 
worldwide IT venture boom and a few successful stories, and joined to start-up rush like 
'gold-rush'. It, however, contributed to implant a sort of illusion in people's mind about 
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the future of infonnation technology and start-up. As an interviewed start-up CEO said, 
"during venture booming period, huge money could be attracted by just showing a few 
advanced technologies in the field of internet or software" (CEO-5, OVG). Most of 
start-ups established in booming period could successfully attract equity investment 
from the initial stage of starting-up; 
"Every start-up founder seemed to dream big success. Most of them could raise 
enough seed money for starting business. In my case, I did not face with any 
serious problems or difficUlties in at least initial fundraising, and I think it 
would be same to start-ups spin-ojJed from ETRI like us" (CEO-6, SVG). 
As previous survey data indicates, seed money was mostly raised by founders 
themselves, family, friends or colleagues. Research institutes provided extra money 
besides their normal retirement grants for researchers who intended to start-up if they 
applied retirement earlier. After start-up, founders could receive investment from 'start-
up investment companies' or individual angel investors with very favorable conditions. 
Even some firms could attract equity investment from the beginning of start-up. It was 
not rare cases in booming period that high-tech start-ups sold their stocks at dozens of 
times more expensive premium than the price of denomination; 
"It became a strong motivation for me to see my colleagues who worked 
together for same research institutes just a few years ago created their own 
business and attracted huge money easily. I simply thought I also could do that 
in this social circumstance." (CEO-8, SVG) 
Some research institutes like ETRI had their own financial support programmes for 
start-up. ETRI used to invest or lend money from its specialised fund for start-ups 
established by its researchers before 'venture boom' period. Research institutes usually 
invested money at no premium, but often added a few options not favourable for 
entrepreneurs such as the condition for the investment at the nominal value of the shares. 
Ironically, however, in booming period in Oaedeok, some researchers refused this 
money from research institutes due to better investment opportunities proposed by 
rapidly growing yes. Several interviewees acknowledged that the abundance or even 
plethora of money in the initial stage of start-up seemed to function harmfully in the 
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process of their business growth. To start business with too much or excessive money 
might dull the importance of keeping cash flow. 
Statistics after 2001 show the sensitivity of start-up entrepreneurship to the changes of 
socio-economic circumstances. As people became to recognise that there had been 
'bubble' or 'illusion' in venture business sector, the scale of venture investment and 
number of new firm formation began to drop sharply. At the same time, several cases of 
fraud incidents in KOSDAQ market functioned as a coolant in lowering the fever of 
speculative venture investment. Empirical evidences are found in the interviews to 
support the above mentioned statistical data. Most of interviewed ftrms that started their 
business after 2001 were faced with a totally different set of circumstances, particularly 
in fmancing. They could rarely fmd opportunities to attract equity investments. Even the 
ftrms who already got investments experienced difftculties in attracting subsequent 
investments. Entrepreneur's risk perception was likely to have changed under a given set 
of social circumstances. 
7.4.3 Supportive policies of the government 
As emphasised earlier, entrepreneurship has drawn much attention from policy makers 
as a crucial source of innovation. It has been generally accepted that governments 
influence the level of entrepreneurship through supportive policies or legislation or other 
regulatory measures (Storey, 1999; Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). In Korea, policy 
support for start-ups needs to be seen through two different flows of policy aim: one is 
general start-up promotion policies before the IMF crisis in 1997, and the other is special 
'venture ftrm' promotion policy after the crisis. The former focused on establishing 
institutional infrastructures, such as the legislation for preparing the basis of start-up 
investment companies, or the establishment of KOSDAQ market as their exit channel. 
The latter was strongly concentrated on providing more direct support for venture ftrms. 
To achieve this policy aim, special legislation was established and other supportive or 
protective measures were prepared. Among these policy measures, one of the most 
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significant approaches was 'the system to support start-up for researchers or engineers' 
(el -=?~ ~gj XI ~ Xii ~). This system seemed to contribute to the rapid growth of high-
tech start-ups in Daedeok. Several exceptional benefits and preferential protections 
could be offered to researchers or engineers through PRIs by this frame; 
"Institutional support from the government influenced on start-up founder's 
thought and decision making in many ways. If not these exceptional supports, 
who could give up stable job in PRIs and adopt riskier pathway of start-up?" 
(CEO-IO, SVG) 
PRI researchers could suspend their duties for maximum three years if they wanted to 
start their businesses. It means they could get back to their job as researchers when their 
businesses went wrong. At the same time, researcher could practice start-up within the 
labs. They could use expensive facilities of research institutes to make prototype 
products and test them. The necessary budget and space for this sort of, business 
simulation were also provided. If the result of this practice was successful, they could 
start their own businesses with it, but if the result was not good, then they could safely 
return to their previous labs. This support offers great business opportunities and safety 
measures for the people who are going to start risky business. There are of course 
variations in receiving these measures by entrepreneurs. Some researchers quit their jobs 
to utilise 'retirement grants' (or seed money, although they could leave their jobs just 
temporarily to make 'occasional excursions' into the realm of business. In this case, 
interviewees said that benefits from this system were not so helpful for their start-up 
decision making, but they still could take advantage of some other support measures. 
Contrastingly, some interviewees said that they enjoyed most of these supports and it 
was really helpful for starting their new businesses. These varied recognitions seem to 
be arising with differences in individual situations. 
Some research institutes like ETRI allowed their researchers to buy some patents 
developed by them or their teams at a cheap price. The government has encouraged PRIs 
to commercialise their R&D results. In particular, PRIs needed to sort out impending 
pressures of restructuring after the crisis, through the cutbacks in budget and 
organisation. Start-up might look the best solution for the above-mentioned PRI's 
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concerns: technology transfer and restructuring. Many start-up founders used this 
support in venture booming period. As some interviewees confessed, the fact that PRI 
like ETRI transferred its teclmology to a start-up could be quite attractive for investors 
to select a target in those days. According to interviewees, however, this policy became 
unpopular later due to the misguided implementation. Most of PRIs tried to seek the 
higher performance of it in short term point of view. As research institutes asked higher 
price for technologies for seeking their own interest, potential entrepreneurs became 
gradually indifferent to receive technology transfer from research institutes; 
"I bought over 20 patents from ETR! when I quitted research institutes for start-
up. All purchased patents were developed by me in ETR!. But now 1 realized 
that most of those technologies were far from making money. " (CEO-!, SVG) 
"A few my colleagues did not get technology transfer from ETRJ. but I did. ... 
Now I'm thinking they were much cleverer than me. They told me that core 
technology is already embedded in our brains, then why we have to pay royalty 
for using the patent for it which we developed. We can easily modify it if 
necessary for business with no legal problems." (CEO-8, SVG) 
There have been many policy measures to promote start-up in Korea. The government 
struggled to overcome impending economic crisis after 1997. To promote new high-tech 
firm formation was regarded as effective policy prescription to 'chase two hares at once'. 
One was to create more jobs for unemployed people, and the other was to redeem lost 
economic vitality. Above all, policy makers focused on stimulating potential 
entrepreneur's start-up motivation. Accordingly, the above-mentioned supportive 
measures were prepared. As many interviewees said, those supportive measures and 
institutions must be seen as reliable 'insurance' for start-up founders alleviating the level 
of possible risks they need to venture. Moreover, researchers or engineers could take this 
assistance more easily because high-teclmology was the most important criterion in 
order to select target fIrms worth supporting. Following mention seems to describe well 
how policy support functioned in people's mind in terms of risk perception during start-
up; 
"I think that the government support played a role to make us not to realise the 
level of real risks exactly. '" In other words, even though real risk level was not 
changed, we could feel it less risky. ... It might be varied to what extent people 
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feel this, or to what extent this perception would last. I'm just saying such a 
tendency has been there in at least Daedeok." (CEO-5, SVG) 
7.4.4 Overarchlng Influence of policy intervention 
Among the above proposed three factors, the most notable influence seems to be policy 
initiatives by the government. Start-up entrepreneur's previous experience as a 
researcher or engineer was enabled by the PRI establishment of the government and 
accumulated through the R&D investment from the government. Continuous learning 
takes place through all working careers, in the process of applying, doing, presenting 
government R&D projects in PRIs. Technology gained from the experience in PRIs 
became the source of too much technology-orientation. It seemed to make these people 
overconfident about their capabilities to overcome possible risk factors in start-up. 
Experience of carrying out government R&D projects provided people with the 
recognition that they can depend on the government grant/subsidy for survival through 
undertaking R&D projects as they have done if they face fmancial difficulties after start-
up. 
Any social circumstances that motivated people to start their own businesses were 
largely induced by the government intervention through various policy measures. 
Opening the KOSDAQ market by the government in the mid of 90s played a vital role 
for the emergence of venture boom afterwards. It became a fundamental institution in 
Korea for the 'co-evolution' between venture capitals and start-up firms. After IMF 
crisis in particular, legislation of the special law by the government for promoting 
'venture firms' and strong supportive policies triggered the rapid growth of start-up 
sector. Money converged on high-tech venture finns in the market. In this regard, it can 
be said that government initiatives were always in the middle of 'boom-bubble-bust' in 
start-up sector. It is not so strange that potential high-tech entrepreneurs perceived risks 
lower than reality under the favorable institutions and supportive policy measures. As 
many interviewees said, the influence of government support on their start-up decision 
making was really vital. It seemed to make people experience a great initial advantage 
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(whether it influence their later businesses positively or negatively) in the process of 
transformation from potential entrepreneurs to start-up entrepreneurs. 
In summary, the risk perception of potential high-tech entrepreneurs was changed 
toward recognizing the risk factors of start-up business lower than real risks. In this risk 
perception change, policy support from the govenunent played a central role. The 
govenunent support for R&D activities of PRIs contributed to the reproduction of 
overconfidence on technology in entrepreneurs' mind. It also influenced their 
expectation about continuous exploitation of policy benefits even after start-up. In this 
respect, it can be said that a path of start-up firm's policy reliance emerged from the 
overconfidence of high-technology; the lack of business experience and knowledge 
about markets; and the expectation about continuous benefit exploitation from policy 
support. There can be, of course, another influence of the mode of intervention. In other 
words, how to support start-up business can influence the emergence of a path of policy 
reliance. This aspect seems to have an importance in terms of the causality between 
influencing factor and its consequence. However, the purpose of this chapter focuses on 
exploring the emergence of a path rather than identifying the cause of it. This issue will 
be discussed again in conclusion chapter. 
212 
8 PERSISTENCE OF THE PATH: BENEFIT-
SEEKING FROM POLICY SUPPORT IN 
BUSINESS BEHAVIOUR 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the behavioural persistence of policy reliance in the business 
history of start-up finns. Even after the critical stage of start-up, entrepreneurs face 
continuously with a range of difficulties and risks in every comer of their entrepreneurial 
activities. On the extended line of policy reliance produced in the process of start-up, it 
can be assumed that they tend to keep seeking benefits from policy support when it is 
continuously provided for them. In this regard, the purpose of this chapter is to examine 
how start-up firms have responded to support measures of the government in getting on 
their business and why they come to respond in that way. According to the path 
dependency perspectives suggested in classical models like Arthur or David's works, it 
is significant to examine if the initial advantages were persistent in the future. As 
examined in above chapter, ~risk perception' can be regarded as a critical factor to 
generate entrepreneur's psychological reliance in starting up new risk business. Policy 
support in general, financial assistance in particular, plays a role in lowering the 
entrepreneur's perceived risk level compared to the real one. It is because the 
exploitation of policy benefit functions like insurance or a safety measure. As argued 
above, this beneficial effect can be a source of reliance. In addition, this reliance can 
also be a source of the perSistence of benefit seeking behaviour. The concept of 
'persistence' indicates that policy reliance can be reproduced in firm's business history 
through a self-reinforcing feedback mechanism. This chapter highlights four reactions of 
the interviewed start-up firms in response to the government support: response to the 
venture certification (Section 2); financing choice according to growth stages (Section 
3); behaviour in seeking gove~ent grant (Section 4); and choice of business location 
(Section 5). These responses were examined in this chapter to unpack the 'persistence' 
of government dependent behaviour in tenns of self-reinforcing expectation. 
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8.2 Response to the 'venture certification' 
8.2.1 Motivation of initial certification 
The venture certification system was first introduced by 'the special law for venture 
business promotion' in 1997. In the earlier stage of it, most start-up firms wanted to get 
venture certification which was regarded as a sort of "license" (CEO-2, OVO) or 
"qualification" (CEO-s, IVCs) for being an eligible 'venture firm' in Korea. The 
government needed a certain criterion to be met by finns for it to provide the exceptional 
benefits and protection to these 'start-up' firms, which were seen as a newly emerging 
growth engine replacing existing 'chaebols'. Under the IMF economic crisis, however, 
policy makers could not have sufficient time to prepare an appropriate policy scheme to 
support this new form of corporate entity. There have already been varied types of 
certification for firms provided by the government ministries such as 'certification for 
promising SMEs', 'certification for high-tech leading companies'. In this situation, as an 
interviewee stated, the Koreari government seemed to introduce just a new version that 
looked quite similar to these previous certification schemes; 
"The introduction of venture certification looked quite natural from the 
viewpoint of policy makers like me in that we adopted very familiar way of 
selecting target for policy support as we have done so far." (Director general, 
5MBA). 
Newly established finns are likely to face with serious shortages and difficulties in every 
comer of initial business. Any benefits from the government must be very attractive for 
these 'new born babies'. The merits of venture certification expressed by interviewees 
are as varied as its kind of benefits. Certified venture firms could usually win 'added 
points (point-up), in the screening of applications for government R&D projects or 
getting credit guarantees for b8nk loans. This merit was commonly suggested by many 
respondents as a biggest benefit of venture certification. Even though this premium was 
not big in itself, it could endow certified finns with big potential advantages in 
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competing with other firms under the same conditions. Some start-ups could be certified 
in the process of firm creation through the institution of 'preliminary start-up' 
(OU tll ~~ A~ Xii £) even while they still stayed in their labs and did not quit their jobs. 
Then, they could enjoy all benefits provided for certified venture firms from the initial 
stage of start-up. Tax benefits were also big enough for entrepreneurs to motivate them 
to apply for venture certification. Some entrepreneurs recognised tax exemption or 
reduction (particularly corporate tax) could be a great merit, but they also realised it 
could only be beneficial when they made big money later because corporate tax depends 
on profit. However, it must have been a big motivation of certification at early stage 
start-ups. 
When considering the scheme of venture certification and the social circumstances 
during venture booming period, most start-ups wanted to get a certification if they could 
meet one of four criteria for being a certified venture firms. As mentioned earlier (in 
Section 6.2), the criteria of certification were largely technology oriented, so most of 
high-tech start-ups could get venture certification with no difficulties. According to 
statistics from 5MBA, the largest proportion of venture firms were certified by the 
criterion of 'technology evaluation' by 2001, when this scheme was transfonned into 
more a business oriented one. It means that certification was not a difficult job for high-
tech start-ups in Daedeok, particularly spin-offs from PRIs. As interviewees admitted, 
there was no reason why they would be refused venture certification; 
"It is not hard to get a certification and we can expect many possible benefits. 
Then, who want to give it up? I thought venture certification would be definitely 
helpful later in some ways, and I could be confident that it would be at least 
never harmful for my business. Furthermore, I seemed to seek a certain 
psychological relief from the anxiety about strange business world through the 
certification." (CEO-I, OVG) 
Certification was also necessary for start-up founders to make their firms more attractive 
to potential investors. It was not easy for venture capitalists to select target companies 
worth investing among high-tech flnns due to the relative lack of knowledge about the 
high-tech products compared to the knowledge of the entrepreneurs. Most VCs in Korea 
showed a lack of experience in equity investment due to their short history of growth. In 
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general, 'infonnation asymmetry' between investors and start-up founders can be a 
cause of market failure in equity investment of high-tech start-ups. While start-up 
founders know their high technology well, investors are usually not so familiar with it. 
In this situation, venture certification might be regarded as a meaningful 'signalling' by 
the government of businesses deserving of investment. According to the interviews, 
most ofVC respondents denied that their investment decision making was influenced by 
venture certification. However, they recognised that the meaning of venture certification 
by the government, particularly at the initial stage, was influential not only to the public, 
but also to the existing fmancial institutions like banks. Start-up founders seemed to be 
motivated by this circumstance. Even if they were not sure to attract investment with 
venture certification, they seemed to need it at least to appeal to investors; 
"/ thought the title of venture certification could be helpful to value-up my 
company at least externally by way of ornament. We needed to be seen more 
attractive to potential investors. . .. Non certification might be a big excuse for 
them not to invest. .... / thought there was at least no reason to avoid 
certification intentionally." (CEO-9, SVG) 
In the interviews, no particular differences were found in tenns of the motivation of 
venture certification between ·'still venture group' and 'once venture group', and also 
between IPO companies and failed companies. 
8.2.2 Bifurcate responses to the certification over time 
Certified venture firms showed two different ways of responding to the certification over 
time. According to statistics issued by 5MBA every year, 322 finns among 503 certified 
ventures in 2001 were categorized as non-certified finns in 2005. The rest of the 181 
finns kept maintaining certification up to 2005. The fonner case is referred to the 'once 
venture group' (hereafter referred to as OVG), and the latter case is referred to the 'still 
venture group' (hereafter referred to as SVG). What made start-up founders respond 
differently like this? What happened in their mind to alter their perception? Answers to 
these questions would be a starting point to understand how start-up founders have 
responded to supportive policies over time, in that venture certification played the role 
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of a selection mechanism in picking up target firms for support. On the other hand, an 
interesting assumption is also possible: the reason why firms in OVG did not extend 
their certification might have arisen from their recognition that they did not need the 
government certifIcation any more. If this assumption is true, then 'once ventures' can 
be seen more market-oriented fIrms than 'still ventures'. Did they really become market-
oriented? 
There were varied reasons why start-up founders decided not to maintain their 
certification any more. Some could not meet the criteria for certification which became 
tougher from 2001. The level of technology had been the most decisive criterion until 
2001, but some factors like fInancial or managerial conditions were added to the criteria 
from 2002. Some founders attributed the reason to the negligence of their attention for 
extension. After the valid period of venture certification was introduced in 2001, it had 
to be extended within one or two years. If certified venture firms did not apply again 
after the given expiration date, they lost the status of a certified venture firm. On the 
other hand, some firms gave up the extension of certification because they foresaw it 
would be replaced by another .' inno-biz' certification by the government. As a matter of 
fact, 5MBA launched this similar scheme of certification under the cloak of supporting 
innovation-oriented firms in 2002. According to interviewees, however, it did not seem 
to be effective in transforming venture firms into more market oriented ones. Instead, it 
caused the unexpected behavioural responses that many certified venture firms were 
enforced to apply to the albeit similar 'inno-biz' certification separately; 
"Many venture firms expected that venture certification would be disappeared 
in the near future. It was because the mother law of certification was scheduled 
to be expired in 2007. Moreover, because the government launched a new 
certification of 'inno-biz', we had to move on to it." (CEO-6, OVG) 
Whatever they proposed as the reason of non-certification, interviewees in OVG seemed 
to have disappointing or even negative expectations of the real benefit of venture 
certification. However, it is interesting that this phenomenon was also found in the 
interview of SVG. Many firms extended their certification up to 2006, even though they 
were also skeptical about direct benefits of venture certification. Furthermore, even 
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interviewed CEOs oflPO finns maintained their certification up to the date of interview. 
According to some interviewees in SVO, venture certification had been extended 
naturally by a team of the finns, and as a consequence, even some of them became not 
aware whether it was already extended. This contrasts to an interview in OVO; 
"I remembered that the first extension of venture certification was quite easy 
after the initial certification was expired. ... By the way, I missed the timing for 
the second extension because of my negligence. I could not afford to employ a 
staff in charge of it yet, and I myself could not pay attention to do it after the 
business became bad." (CEO-4, OVO) 
Finns in SVO showed positive attitudes to venture certification. As an interviewee 
(CEO-10, SVO) said, any possible benefits might be available by the certification, as 
long as the government kept implementing supportive policies for venture finns'. 
Interestingly, most of 'once venture finns' had problems or poor business perfonnances 
compared to 'still venture finns'. But did this poor perfonnance provide a general 
explanation for non-reapplication? It seems to be an interesting issue, but it is not easy to 
simply answer in this section since other explanations were given. As an interviewee 
(CEO-9, OVO) said, he had not reapplied to venture certification, but at that time, he 
was unaware that interest rate for bank loan could be lowered in case of certified venture 
fInns. This indicates that the lack of enough infonnation on the certification can be 
connected to entrepreneur's perception that venture certification is not necessary any 
more. Another interviewee (CEO-4, OVO) said he failed to extend venture certification 
due to his negligence, but he applied for it again and was waiting for the result of his 
application. On the basis of these interview results, it is possible to say that non-
certification of OVO does not directly mean any changes in their mind to more market-
oriented direction. 
A few interviewees in OVO, who already gave up the extension of venture certification, 
got 'inno-biz' certification. It points out that they did not think government certification 
is totally wmecessary. At the same time, it explains indirectly why above phenomenon 
can not be said as just coincidence. Interviews of IPO finns are also underpinning this 
argument; 
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"1 think some of once venture firms 'could not' get certification rather than 'did 
not '. . .. As far as 1 know, these cases must be found largely among the firms 
which are currently in trouble." (CEO-3, IVCs) 
"Venture certification can give benefits for 1PO firms like us. For example, we 
can be classified as 'venture firms' not as 'general firms' in KOSDAQ market, 
only when we keep maintaining the status of venture certification. ... Then we 
can be seen more attractive to investors." (CEO-4, IVCs) 
Interviewees in SVG and IVCs argued that their venture certification was maintained by 
a sort of 'inertia' from the initial certification. According to them, preparing documents 
for venture certification must be a tiresome job at first, but later it could be easy work to 
keep doing. For them, venture certification was still necessary in many cases, and it 
would be helpful in the future even though it seems to have no benefit now. 
8.2.3 Recognition of certification effect 
As mentioned already, venture certification by the government was a unique institution 
in Korea. However, it was not a totally new invention in terms of its basic institutional 
frame. An interviewed government official acknowledged: "Frankly speaking, there 
were few experts who know well what is 'venture' exactly even in 5MBA which was in 
charge of supporting it. So, in the case of venture certification, it was just a similar 
application of existing selection mechanism to filter target venture companies for 
support rather a really nove/'idea" (Director general, 5MBA). Certification is usually 
done by the market mechanism in a more market-oriented economy like US. A venture 
capital backed company was usually regarded as a certified one in the market. As 
discussed in earlier chapter (See Section 3.3.3), the 'start-up ecosystem' operated on the 
basis of co-evolution between start-up firms and venture capitals. It is often referred as 
providing vital impetus for a Silicon Valley-type success. VCs are willingly taking risks 
in investing money for new born small firms. Their high risk takings can be 
compensated with potential high returns. If market mechanism is well operationalized 
and market forces are sufficient, this co-evolution can take place spontaneously. 
However, in Korean start-up sector, there seemed to be the lack of a mature financial 
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market to facilitate this virtuous circle. In this vein, the market failure perspective can be 
applied to the case of the early start-up sector in Korea. The government tried to 
cultivate start-ups by means of a positive policy intervention. Venture capitals in Korea 
had a short history and weak experience of equity investment. They were also a target of 
policy support by the govemnient. As interviewed venture capitalists confessed, VCs in 
Korea had too much dependency on funds from the government to have independent and 
self-sufficient capability. 
Any 'certification effect' becomes different according to who evaluates start-up finns 
for certification. VCs usually undertake this role in a well-operating capital market. 
They provide start-ups with not only the source of fmance but also other managerial 
assistance. In this respect, the title of 'VC-backed Company' can be regarded as a 
meaningful certification in the market. In other words, VCs can "help start-ups to 
overcome the costly signalling through third party certification." (A vnimelech and 
Teubal, 2004, p. 37). Contrastingly, the government has undertaken this role in Korea. 
The institution undertaking this task was set up by the government through the 
legislation of special law, and evaluation for venture certification was also conducted by 
the government-established organisations. 5MBA, which was in charge of SME policy, 
has operated this type of certification system. 5MBA prepared lots of new assistance 
programmes for certified venture finns, and also transformed some of existing policy 
measures for SMEs into more favourable ones for certified venture firms. Exceptional 
benefits and advantages for certified firms were added to most SME support 
programmes. Venture certification was the most fundamental condition for start-ups to 
receive all the government support. In this unique mechanism, not surprisingly 
certification effect must be different from market-oriented one by VCs. With respect to 
such a government-led certification system, it can be assumed that most of actors, 
particularly fmancing actors lilce bankers or VCs, might be influenced to some extent by 
the government signalling of certification. However, interviewed venture capitalists did 
not agree with this assumption that they might be affected by the certification in 
selecting target companies for investment. Nevertheless, this result seems to be 
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contestable considering the interview results of start-up founders that they wanted to get 
venture certification for being eligible in financing from VCs or banks. 
VC investment was one of four criteria of venture certification according to the original 
scheme. If a start-up attracted equity investment from VCs for over 10% of its share, 
then it could be easily certified by presenting evidences ofVC investment. This criterion 
means 'market certification' that indicates the VC-backed companies. According to 
previous survey data referred in this study, however, the proportion of certified ventures 
by this VC-backed criterion was much smaller (just around between 12% and 13% as of 
2004) than the one of technology evaluation criterion. Even in some cases, start-ups 
which could meet VC-backed criterion did not choose this way, and got certification by 
the criterion of technology evaluation. Interview data proposes very meaningful 
implications to understand this interesting phenomenon; 
"In my opinion, certification by the technology evaluation criterion rather than 
VC-backed was preferred by many start-up entrepreneurs including me. It was 
because we thought evaluation as a high-tech company by the government could 
be more helpful for lifting the external reputation of the company. ... This seems 
to be linked to the 'government dominant system' deep-rooted in our culture." 
(CEO-5, IVCs) 
The recognition of a certification effect has changed over time. All interviewed start-ups 
expected at first and to some extent that the benefits of venture certification would be 
very big and helpful. However, this expectation has weakened by several factors. 
Accordingly, the overall scheme of certification was changed as time passed, and a new 
type of certification like 'inno-biz' was launched. As mentioned before, this changing 
environment around the government policy must have influenced their expectation. But 
the more influential factor seemed to be the change in their standpoints. As an 
interviewee (CEO-5, IVCs) said, people who already benefited from something at a 
certain point of time, even though they were much assisted by it, tend to feel it is not 
very helpful from the current point of view. In other words, certified firms could not feel 
any necessary for its extension, if they already enjoyed most of benefits offered by the 
certification, and if they thought potential benefits by extension would not so big. 
Interview results show that all interviewees were to some extent skeptical of the attitudes 
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about the effect of government-oriented venture certification. However, their decision 
makings whether they extend its expiration dates are not clearly linked to their skeptical 
expectation. 
In case of SVO, a sort of inertia was found in maintaining venture certification. This 
inertia could be interpreted as a path dependent phenomenon. Then, can we say OVG 
finns adopted path breaking ways? It can be in some sense, but interview result show it 
was not true in terms of a 'government dependency' perspective. Some finns (CEO-I, 
CEO-3) in OVO suggested that the government should reinforce technology evaluation 
system of venture certification as a proper way of its improvement. An interviewee 
(CEO-6, OVG) said the scale of benefits, such as fmancial assistances for certified 
ventures, should be enlarged, if the government wants to make it more substantial 
support measure. Contrastingly, interviewed venture capitalists said the main function of 
venture certification should be gradually shifted from the government to the market 
actor like ves. They, however, did not deny the importance of the government's role in 
start-up promotion. One of the most important roles of government was that it 
emphasised the need to make the flow of money in the market converge with that of the 
venture capital industry. Thus, it can be said that firm's responses to the venture 
certification depended on the situation they stood or the interest they had. Even in case 
of the firms in OVG, the fact that they did not extend their position as certified finns 
does not directly mean they became non-dependent on government policy supports. 
Although interviewees in OVO presented various reasons of their decision, they seemed 
to still show some extent of dependency on support. Moreover, most of them revealed 
more interest in any changes of government support policies such as the introduction of 
inno-biz certification. 
8.3 Financing choice and capital structure 
8.3.1 Risk perception In financing choice 
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Start-up fInns are, generally speaking, typically characterised by high-risk and 
consequently exhibit high probability of failure. They require substantial capital to 
develop products and marketing activities, but the demand for fundraising used to 
exceed the internally generated cash flows or their own funds (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Start-up entrepreneurs need to access external funding sources to pursue their 
opportunities, but they are usually faced with the lack of collateral and established 
reputation in their business. As a result, it is not easy for them not only to borrow money 
from banks but also to attract equity investment from venture capitals. These fInancial 
constraints may lead to a problem ofunderinvestment in start-up businesses. 
The government tried to tackle this problem through positive policy intervention. To 
offer more opportunities for borrowing money to start-ups, policy loan programmes 
were developed on the basis of a credit guarantee scheme. Loans were offered on a 
lower interest rate and longer pay-back period than other general bank loan. However, 
the lack of collateral made it difficult for start-ups to receive debt fmancing. The credit 
guarantee scheme was introduced to sort out this constraint by the government. At the 
same time, the government made an effort to vitalize equity investment for start-ups 
through mainly fostering venture capital companies and establishing public funds. There 
was significant funding assistance for VCs from the government. This effort contributed 
to rapid growth ofVCs within a short period time and more equity fmancing chances. 
Start-ups were usually given the chance to make a choice between alternative fmancing 
sources. As mentioned above, financing can be broadly categorised into two ways: debt 
fmancing and risk financing. After start-up, or even during start-up, entrepreneurs are 
faced with crucial fmancing choices between bank loan and equity investment. In the 
real world of business, however, their choices are usually done in the fonn of mixed 
portfolio between two. Interview data shows that the pattern of fInancing choice shifted 
according to the changes in situations they stand. Before the venture booming period, 
equity investment was quite rare, even the government set up first four venture capital 
companies between 1974 and 1984 in an attempt to help commercialisation of 
technologies developed by state-financed research institutes (mainly PRIs). However, it 
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became easily accessible particularly between 1998 and 2001. Many high-tech based 
start-ups could receive risk financing from rapidly grown VCs. At the same time, start-
ups could raise money through debt financing as well. Money in venture business sector 
seemed to be overflowing during venture boom period. As an interviewed CEO of IPO 
company illustrated, financing choices at that time was often cited as "pleasant worries" 
(~~~ :i2e.l) (CEO-I, IVCs). But, when venture boom phenomenon began to wither 
after 2001, venture capitalists sharply reduced their investment in start-up companies. 
Almost 50% of venture funding decreased during 2001, when compared with 2000. 
As equity investment ran 'dry' in the market, bank loans became a very significant 
source of financing for start-ups. Equity investment is usually accepted as risk financing 
in terms of VC's point of view. On the contrary, loan must be much riskier than equity 
from start-up entrepreneur's view point. In the cases of start-ups which could not attract 
follow-on investment from VCs after the first-round of funding, the proportion of debt 
financing began to inevitably 'increased. The government offered several incentives to 
attract capital to VC industry. For example, the capital gains tax was lowered by the 
government in VC investment. At the same time, the government invested public money 
to VCs if they wanted to establish external investment funds for venture firms. The 
government also encouraged big potential investors like pension funds to join in 
establishing public venture funds. This government-leading system in VC sector caused 
strong dependency on government support. As a venture capitalist (CEO, VC-2) said, 
"VCs in Korea had no self-sustaining basis as it would be collapsed if there was no 
government support." He added that ''public funds from the government were the only 
reliable source of venture capital funds because private sector or pension funds did not 
play active role to establish venture funds." In this situation, VCs could not help 
following the guidance or control of the government in their investment decision making. 
After consecutive moral hazard and fraud incidents in venture business sector took place 
in 2001, so-called 'sprinkling type of government support' (~ ~ 2.1 J 16l ~!:F AI ~ ) 
began to be faced by controversial criticism. Many supportive policy measures were re-
screened and adjusted. In this process of policy adjustment, VC investment declined 
considerably, and as a consequence, start-ups had to experience significant changes in 
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their financing environment. Receiving equity investment became almost impossible 
like "waitingfor dead men's shoes" (o~ ~ ~ ~ m J I) (CEO-9, SVG). 
A sharp decline of equity investment enforced entrepreneurs into searching for a way of 
debt financing. As many interviewed CEOs said, policy loan and credit guarantee were 
really helpful for managing their business. An interesting phenomenon can be found 
from the interview data in association with entrepreneur's risk perception about debt 
fmancing. Interviewed entrepreneurs tried to borrow money from banks through, first of 
all, applying to policy loan programmes represented as lower interest rate and longer 
pay-back period. As mentioned before, the lack of collateral could be sorted out by the 
'credit guarantee' issued on the basis of teclmology evaluation by the government 
established 'TCGF'. This perfect-looking support scheme for debt financing seemed to 
lower entrepreneur's risk perception about bank loans; 
"I used to borrow money from banks. But I did not know well how fearful bank 
debt could be in the future because of its favourable condition in particularly 
case of policy loan programmes. It was very helpful in bad financing 
situation . ... but its scale was getting bigger and consequently became really big 
burden threatening survival." (CEO-3, OVG) 
Above mention is telling that beneficial policy loan programme can influence the 
lowering of entrepreneur's ri~k perception about debt financing. This phenomenon is 
quite often found in OVG, SVG, IVCs, and FVCs. It is also closely linked to business 
failure like bankruptcy. In Korean banking system, there is a uncommon institution in 
western countries which is called 'joint and several surety' (e1 CH 5:!. ~). Even if 
entrepreneurs can successfully get 'credit guarantee' through technology evaluation, 
they have to personally stand 'surety' for their bank loan. It is an additional and personal 
liability entrepreneur had to take besides the one as a CEO. As interviewees indicated, 
start-up CEOs had to take nearly 'unlimited liability' for their company unlike the 
countries like the US where they take just 'limited liability'; 
"I could really never expect that bank debts made me fall into the mire like this 
devastating 'credit failure' situation. ... Now I can not resume any business 
because of the stigmatic credit delinquent record in all banking system resulted 
from 'joint and several surety'." (CEO-2, FVCs) 
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Most of failed start-ups in Daedeok could not close down their businesses due to above 
mentioned problem. Interviewees in FVCs say that declaring bankruptcy is not easy 
unless their debt problems are sorted out clearly: "it is not so easy to decide even going 
into bankruptcy in Korea because of institutional shackle put on my ankle, so I can 
neither go back to research institute again nor get another job." (CEO-3, FVCs). 
At the same time, however, they say they could not aware of its devastating risks when 
they tried to borrow money from banks. In this situation, it would be not so strange for 
start-ups in trouble to struggle for survival even under the favor of policy support. 
According to them, many troubled start-up entrepreneurs had to keep going into 
foreseeable dead-end for just bare subsistence by relying on all available policy 
measures. In this process, some entrepreneurs made the scale of debt bigger through 
continuous challenges by borrowing policy loans, even though many people advised 
them to stop it up to there. As a failed entrepreneur stated, "if the condition of policy 
loan programme was not so favourable and it was not so easy to borrow, then I might 
a/ready give up my business long time ago." (CEO-I, FVCs). 
A few CEOs of SVG and IVCs have quite sophisticated debt financing strategies; 
"Banks always want to lend money. Then why it is hard for firms to borrow 
money from banks? I think it is because we, CEOs do not manage our credit 
properly. . .. I regard my credit as a vital asset. . .. I could borrow considerable 
amount of money on the basis of my credit." (CEO-2, SVG) 
"I think bank loan is not appropriate for launching uncertain projects. It is 
because company can be bankrupted if the project goes wrong. ... Enough 
money financed by equity investment can make risk-taking possible." (CEO-3, 
IVCs) 
However, even these start-up CEOs have often used policy loan programmes. They 
insist that it is important to choose proper financing ways according to the purpose and 
business situation. They also add there is no reason of refusing policy loans with low 
interest rate which are easily accessible. 
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Start-up entrepreneurs are usually seen as risk-takers but interview results show that they 
want to reduce risk levels as far as possible when they face with risky decision makings. 
An interviewee interestingly stated, "nobody might willingly take high risks on purpose 
particularly in the case of critical decision like start-up which is usually done on 'all-in' 
basis, rather everybody might try to hedge or avoid possible risks as far as possible." 
(CEO-5, SVG). Start-up entrepreneurs want to get equity investment which is less risky 
than bank debt, but the accessibility of equity fInancing has been changed over time. In 
post-IMF crisis, venture booming situation induced mainly by the government 
intervention contributed to the enlargement of equity investment chances. However, 
venture capital investment began to rapidly wither after the bust of venture bubble. Bank 
debt could fIll the gap of fmancing capabilities, but its risk has often been 
underestimated. The government intervention could make improvement in both 
availability and accessibility of debt fmancing through policy loan programmes and 
credit guarantee schemes. The government has undertaken the role of risk sharing 
considerably in start-up sector in particular. As an interviewed venture capitalist 
acknowledged, "the government has willingly taken the large portion of risks in 
promoting start-ups and venture capital industry in Korea, but venture capitals couldn't 
play the role sufficiently in risk taking due to our short history and weak financing 
capability." (Former Branch Chief, VC-l). The government tried to lower possible high 
risks in start-up sector through spending public money. In case of 'Primary CBO' for 
example, since 2001, over two trillion Korean won was poured into the policy attempts 
to revive moribund venture fIrms after the bust of venture bubble (SERI, 2004). 
However, a large proportion of the beneficiaries under the credit guarantee programmes 
like Primary-CBO went bankrupt in the end, ultimately just saddling the government 
with an even greater fiscal burden (Lee and Rhee, 2007). As a venture capitalist said, 
unlike the original policy aim, this type of intervention seemed to give actors a sort of 
'distorted recognition' about the public money; 
"At that time, many people used to call it as so-called 'blind money'(tEf!! E). 
It was often recognised as easily accessible money to be served on a 'finders 
keepers' basis (f!!kI ~ AI~O/ gJXI) .... It might be regarded as a fool from 
entrepreneur's point of view if not received such 'easy' money." (Branch Chief, 
VC-4). 
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Interview results show that this type of intervention is likely to make entrepreneurs 
perceive the risk of debt lower than reality. This lowered risk perception in debt 
fmancing can be linked to serious business failures later. But the result of this 
phenomenon is not same in every individual fIrm. 
8.3.2 Change of capital structure according to growth stage 
Start-ups grow in varied ways and their capital structures change over time. As 
discussed in earlier chapter, 'stage model' has been adopted in many literature to 
illustrate the growth of start-up fIrms although there has been criticism on it. Most of 
interviewees agree that there can be certain stages in growing process of start-up 
business, but they do not agree with clear distinction according to simple criterion like 
business career. An interviewee (CEO-6, SVO) argues that "it is meaningless to say 
start-up's growth stages in Korea", in that start-up's business fluctuation is too severe. 
However, it does not mean he deny stage model itself. In the present study, interviewed 
fIrms belong to OVO and SVO were selected among start-ups which can be once 
recognized as growing stage fIrms between 5 years and 10 years in terms of business 
career. Interviewed CEOs both in OVO and SVO recognised themselves as fIrms in 
'expansion' or 'growing' stage. This result is fItting with the sampling criteria for 
interviewees. However, interviewees diagnosed their location on business stage in 
various ways: "We are just about to enter into very critical 'market-penetration stage'." 
(CEO-I, OVO); "J think we are in a sort of 'trap stage' or 'chasm stage' existing 
between each stage." (CEO-6, OVO); "We are now entering 'early period of growing 
stage '." (CEO-9, SVO). Even !PO fIrms (IVCs) say that they are not on 'matured stage' 
but standing in front of a new 'starting point'. 
Financing choices and capital structures look quite fIrm specifIc phenomena. 
Furthermore, it depends largely on situational factors particularly in rapidly changing 
business environment like in Korea. Institutional changes in policy regime, as mentioned 
above, directly affect entrepreneurial choices. Interview results showed that many fIrms 
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which already succeeded in securing equity fmancing in early stage of start-up, 
experienced difficulties in attracting second-round investment of all occasions after 2000, 
when most of venture support policies began to undergo large-scale adjustments. Thus, 
it is hard to fmd a certain typical financing route for start-ups. However, interviewees 
agree with the fact that more equity financing was normally requested as start-up grows. 
As cited above, it is because risk-taking for business expansion or challenging new 
business opportunities needs to be done preferably by equity financing rather than debt 
financing. In cases of well gro~ing firms in SVG or IPO firms, most of respondents say 
the proportion of equity financing has been increased as a whole. But they are saying 
bank loan has also been very useful for survival or enduring the lack of funds while they 
could not access to equity financing. Coincidentally, most firms in OVG show relatively 
high proportion of debt fmancing. A few firms among OVG which have financed 
considerable funds in early stage of start-up from VCs failed to get consecutive rounds 
of investment and faced with financial difficulties recently. Even some firms have never 
attracted VC investment after start-up, and in these cases, their current business situation 
is sluggish or stagnant. This result itself may have no significant meaning considering 
this study is not employing quantitative approach. However, this phenomenon might be 
underpinning the above mentioned finding in the cases of SVG and IPO firms. In other 
words, the failure of continuous equity financing and the increase in debt fmancing 
(scale and frequency of it) seem to be at least associated with the downturn of start-up 
business. 
Changes in capital structure of start-up can also be explained by changing purposes of 
domestic money according to business growth. Focusing on the 'purpose' of funding 
often provides more meaningful information than paying attention to the 'structure' of 
funding although these two facets are, of course, one side of same coin; 
"In my opinion. the purpose of money changes in the process of business growth. 
In the early stage. money is used mainly for R&D or recruiting. As the company 
grows. the proportion of investment for facilities or marketing activities is likely 
to increase. . .. The scale of money as a whole seems to be getting bigger and 
bigger." (CEO-5, SVG) 
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It indicates that more money is necessary when a firm is about to leap one stage further. 
This increasing need of fund· may enforce start-up to enlarge the proportion of debt 
fmancing. Some interviews of firms both in SVG and OVG show that their fmancing 
risks have been increased by large scale of bank debts for facility investments such as 
factory building. In case of manufacturing based high-tech start-ups in Daedeok, this 
purpose of investment can be critical to make big profits through mass production. 
However, the problem is that most of equity investors are reluctant to put their money 
into this huge investment unless the prospect of capital gain looks quite certain. Then, 
entrepreneurs are likely to rely on alternative debt fmancing. The government offers a 
special support scheme with very favoured conditions for firms which want to build their 
own factories. It is provided firms through lowered interest rate and prolonged pay-back 
period like general policy loan programmes. Land and factory buildings are also offered 
to banks as collaterals for debt guarantee. The evaluation of this special scheme of debt 
fmancing varies in different interviewees. Some interviewed IPO firms have used it to 
build their factories and attributed one of their success factors to this policy support. 
However, on the contrary, some interviewees in OVG and failed companies said that it 
brought devastating damages to their businesses. Even this case is found in SVG firms, 
but the result looks less serious than the former cases. Common cause of these. negative 
consequences seems to be big' burden of huge debt fmancing and its bad effect in cash 
flows. 
"It was really risk-taking for me to borrow such a big money for building a 
factory. It didn't look so dangerous because I thought if my factory was 
completed and began to manufacture products, then I surely could undertake 
such level of risks. ... But, its burden turned out to be beyond my imagination, 
once product sales didn't increase as fast as I expected . ... I finally had to suffer 
from serious crisis in caSh flow, even after selling my factory to other company 
at quite low price." (CEO-3, OVG) 
When it comes to capital structure, it can not be fully illustrated by just two contrasting 
sources of financing such as VC investment and bank loan. Actually many start-ups can 
finance necessary money through various ways in general. For all types of firms, profit 
from product sales is generally regarded as a fundamental source of fmancing. However, 
in case of small and young start-up, it is not easy to produce profits from marketing 
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activities on a full scale. According to interviewed firms, it takes often a certain period 
of time in proceeding additional R&D to commercialize their technologies. It means any 
considerable profits can hardly be expected during this period and consequently, as 
many CEOs say, survival strategy becomes really important. From the entrepreneur's 
point of view, government grant for R&D projects might be very useful and significant 
way of fmancing. It would be examined more in next section in detail. 
8.4 Grant-chasing behaviour 
8.4.1 Inertia in seeking grant for government R&D project 
Government R&D project has a great significance for start-up firms particularly in 
Daedeok. As suggested before, most of spin-offed CEOs from PRIs have experienced 
R&D activities funded by the government through their working career as researchers. 
Even after start-up, they have been interested in joining government R&D projects. 
Many start-up CEOs have tried to meet the needs for R&D expenditure required for their 
entrepreneurial activities through the grant for government R&D projects. In case they 
got involved with these projects, they could effectively fmance necessary money for 
their domestic R&D needs. As interview results show, many entrepreneurs used to 
regard it as a significant source of financing. Start-up founders are, generally speaking, 
seen as people who successfully changed their previous paths into new ones in business 
world. There are many differences between wage employment and self employment. 
Start-up founders are usually expected to think and behave differently from their 
previous career. However, from path dependency perspective, it can also be assumed that 
a sort of 'inertia' may exist in their mind and behaviour even after their career 
transformation. 'Grant seeking' looks one of the typical cases representing this inertia. 
There are different kinds of grant schemes for supporting R&D activities in Korea, but 
their delivering mechanisms in terms of policy implementation differ according to their 
aims and targets. Providing R&D grant has been basically concentrated on PRIs in DST 
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since early 70s in Korea. After mid 90s, however, spin-off fInns emerged and could have 
a chance to join government R&D projects in mainly the fonn of sub-contractors, as 
PRIs were enforced to pursue restructuring. At the same time, start-ups could undertake 
R&D projects through participating cooperation programmes between university, 
industry, and PRI. The government has encouraged PRIs to strengthen cooperation with 
SMEs in general, certified venture fInns in particular. In this case of cooperation 
programmes, start-ups apply for them directly to government ministries or associated 
organisations. As far as these government projects concerned, spin-off start-ups seem to 
have extraordinary advantages in that they are familiar with following necessary 
processes. Interviewed CEOs have experiences of getting involved with government 
R&D projects to some extent. Interview results show that they have a higher proportion 
of project undertaking particularly in early phase of start-up. Some fInns are hardly 
involved with government programmes currently, and some said they gave up any grant 
seeking through these programmes. Most of them recognised that there has been a sort 
of inertia with regard to this issue in their business history. However, the purpose of 
doing it and its persistence turned out to be different according to individual fimls. 
First of all, main motivation of grant seeking seems to be aiming to meet domestic cash 
flows. More specifically, it can be helpful for entrepreneurs to finance R&D 
expenditures or running costs, even in some cases, it can be also used for just measure of 
survival. As many interviewed CEOs point out, grant-seeking through R&D projects 
might be natural and even necessary entrepreneurial activity, unless it lasts too long or 
its scale becomes too big. For start-up entrepreneurs, especially on the early phase of 
start-up business, government grant can be seen as a great initial advantage. In 
consequence, entrepreneurs are often likely to rely on it in later phase of business. This 
tendency includes two aspects: 'reliance' and 'persistence' which are closely fitted with 
main interest of this study. Here, reliance becomes the source of persistence. Once the 
path of grant-seeking shapes, it can gain 'momentum' to some extent in the process of 
its accumulation. Then, as interviewees admitted, breaking this path later seems not easy 
at all; 
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"When il comes 10 granl-:-seeking, once taste it, then hard to forget il because it 
is easier than increasing sales. ... That's why spin-offs from PRIs like us are 
regarded as not easy to fail, but simultaneously hardly to bear big success." 
(CEO-I, SVG) 
The origin of this inertia goes back to their previous working career in PRIs. They surely 
created a new path in tenns of occupational choice, but they seem to be still staying on 
previous path in tenns of behavioural pattern. As an interviewee (CEO-2, OVG) 
described well, some CEOs appear "not to clearly understand their changed job" as 
entrepreneurs. 
This inertia is found in both SVG and OVG and it is no exception in cases of IVCs and 
FVCs. But as mentioned already, the extent of its 'reliance' and 'persistence' looks quite 
fInn specifIc. Some fInns which already quitted grant-seeking through government 
programmes are currently suffering from business difficulties. In contrast, some start-
ups which are still involved with government projects are showing relatively good 
business perfonnances. It provides meaningful implications. A path of grant-seeking is 
seen flexible in tenns of its rigidity. It means this path can be developed into path 
dependency or lock-in, but simultaneously can be broken and replaced with another path 
by a certain 'mindful deviation' or exogenous factors. At the same time, it is hard to say 
that the consequence of this path dependency is inefficient in tenns of business 
perfonnance. With regard to this issue, it would be argued further in next section. 
In the mean time, providing government R&D projects for start-ups has been criticized, 
in that it can just foster' green house ventures' (g ~ ~ ~ X~) which indicate the start-
up flnns which have never tasted the 'bitter cup' of business in harsh market under the 
glass of government protection and support. This type of fInn represents the lack of self-
reliance and the weakness in competitiveness in the market due to strong reliance on 
government support. Unlike this general perspective from the public, however, 
interviewed entrepreneurs sho~ quite flexible point of view on this issue. Most of them 
insist that seeking government R&D project can not be harmful for business growth, if it 
does match up well with their business direction. But some argue that it can be negative 
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in business view points regardless its field fits well with business, because grant-seeking 
can not be basically seen as real profit-seeking behaviour. 
8.4.2 Survival strategy or poisonous temptation 
As argued above, 'inertia' can he found in start-up's 'grant-seeking' for government 
R&D projects. Grant-seeking may be, at a glance, seen as 'non-entrepreneurial' 
behaviour in terms of 'profit-seeking' entrepreneurship which represents firm's 
fundamental justification for existence. Interview results, however, reveal that this 
general assumption may not be always valid in Daedeok start-ups at least on the basis of 
their own perception. Some interviewees say that grant-seeking is necessary particularly 
on early phase of start-up or iIi the case of financial shortages in that it can be helpful to 
overcome these temporary difficulties. On the contrary, some respondents insist that 
grant-seeking can he harmful for business growth in long term based perspective in that 
it can make start-ups not to concentrate resources on main business domain. This 
bifurcating view indicates that grant-seeking has a 'Janus-faced' appearance. In this 
study, 'grant-chasing' is used as a distinguished notion from 'grant-seeking'. Some 
extent of grant-seeking might be natural and helpful if it is confmed for the purpose of 
early stage survival or escaping from temporary difficulties. However, if this inertia lasts 
long or its portion gets bigger in later stage, then it can be described as 'grant-chasing'. 
Some interviewees admitted the impact of grant-chasing may be negative; 
"If we become dependent on carrying out government projects, we may not have 
our own products, and more strictly saying we may manage to just live from 
hands to mouth." (CEO-2, SVG) 
"Actually winning government projects was never hard for me because I have 
been the best in my field. . .. But as my firm grows, we can't afford to carry out 
government projects. . .. and I came to know most of 'project-oriented start-ups' 
(~.!F II.£ ~I E E/ e ~ I!f! xl J/ gj) are finally facing with serious business 
stagnant or crisis . ... So, I thought this was really like 'sweets '( t;¥ Sf). I should 
not do this any more, and quit it as soon as possible. After then, I intentionally 
didn't apply it." (CEO-5, SVG) 
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Above notions point out implications, as an interviewee describes, that "government 
grant can be 'medicine' as it originally aimed, but simultaneously be 'poison' which 
may cause devastating impact on business growth if it goes beyond a certain line" 
(CEO-I, OVO). It means that 'grant-seeking' which can be possibly positive up to a 
certain extent might be transfonned into 'grant-chasing' which can be negative if it 
exceeds that extent. However. it seems to be meaningless to detect the location of this 
critical extent because it looks quite fIrm and context specific. 
In cases of IPO ftnns, they show relatively flexible attitude about grant-seeking, even in 
case they hardly carry out government projects at the moment. Some say it should be 
undertaken in selectively manner as follows; 
"If a start-up wants to develop a new technology, and if I were the CEO, then I 
will finance the cost of this uncertain project through winning government R&D 
support programmes. ... I think this is a kind of business strategy rather than 
reliance or dependency. If government support is helpful for further growth. I 
believe we should take advantage of it." (CEO-3, IVCs) 
But, they are well aware of its potential problem as an interviewee said; 
"In my case, R&D projects from ETRI were quite helpful for around three years 
after start-up. ... I could pay wages for two employees with grants from ETRI 
projects. But it seemed to make me unconcerned about risks of money in that I 
could make money quite easily." (CEO-I, IVCs) 
It implicitly means that they do not completely deny or refuse grant-seeking, and they 
have a certain selection criteria in screening projects worth carrying out. This tendency 
found in IVCs gave a significant implication in developing arguments with regard to the 
issue of 'path inefficiency'. In other words, the consequence of 'government 
dependency' might be not always associated with inefficient outcome. As seen in the 
interviews of IV Cs, even IPO companies have exploited policy benefIts and they 
suggested this utilisation of policy support as one of driving forces of IPOs. 
The common reasoning why they became not interested in projects is linked to their 
business capacities to conduct those 'time consuming' and 'non-profitable' works. The 
environment of carrying out government R&D projects has been largely changed. For 
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example, government grants are often offered as a joint scheme with a fonn of loan 
rather than pure grants. Furthennore, fIrms should pay a certain percentages out of their 
own pocket in many cases. Thus start-ups which do not manage it well may have to pay 
grants back to the government, and consequently they may experience big damages due 
to its shockwave. This growing sense of concern makes some fInns give up grant-
chasing even they have a positive expectation about grant-seeking. 
In cases of failed flrms (FVCs), on the other hand, they also have similar but stricter 
perspectives about continuous grant-chasing; 
"There are many start-ups in Daedeok which can manage somehow to survive 
indebted for government R&D projects. Those companies do not make money 
from sales profit. ... Strictly saying, they should not be regarded as real start-
ups." (CEO-2, FVCs) 
According to them, most of failed start-ups need to be understood as 'failed challengers' 
(CEO-3, FVCs) in that they dared to quit grant-chasing for pursuing real 
entrepreneurship in spite of its 'sweet temptation' (~~ ~ ~ ~). They also said that it 
was not easy to return to grant-seeking again, once the result of this challenging was 
becoming not as successful as they expected. It was because, as they acknowledge, 
whole organisational system of fIrms were already moved on to more market-oriented 
activities like production, sales, marketing, etc. This indicates a sort of 'irreversibility' in 
turning back to profIt-seeking from grant-chasing may exist. 
To sum up above arguments, grant-seeking by carrying out government R&D projects 
can be a reliable strategy for survival particularly on early phase of start-up. However, it 
can also be led to grant-chasing behaviour which might produce negative impact on 
entrepreneurship. It would be impossible in this study to say clearly that grant-seeking or 
grant-chasing should be regarded as a single aspect of the above mentioned two between 
necessary survival strategy and sweet (but maybe poisonous) temptation. This can also 
be extended to the argument that grant-seeking (or chasing) is to take advantage of 
government support, or otherwise to be accustomed to rely on it. In conclusion, it seems 
clear that inertia can be found in grant-seeking for government projects, but its impact or 
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development process in start-up's business history looks quite firm specific and context 
based. 
8.5 Choice of business location 
8.5.1 Spatial identity of 'Daedeok' 
In this study, Daedeok is regarded as a regional innovation system rather than 
geographical territory. There is Daejeon metropolitan city as a local authority and a 
surrounding region of DST. Interviewed entrepreneurs were asked how they think about 
the meaning and the range of Daedeok. According to regional innovation systems 
approach, the regional dimension has been argued to have key importance in following 
several reasoning. Regions differ with respect to their industrial specialisation pattern 
and innovation performance. Knowledge spillover which plays a critical role in the 
process of innovation is often spatially bounded. The exchange of tacit knowledge, 
regarded as a crucial factor for successful innovation requires close personal contacts 
which can be facilitated by geographical proximity. Additionally, policy competences 
and institutions (formal or informal) are also bound to sub-national territories. Policy 
actors are seen to play a crucial role in shaping or facilitating regional innovation 
processes. 
Daedeok in the present study, considering the above mentioned arguments from RISs, 
needs to be understood in both regional and systemic contexts on the basis of actor's 
conceived regional identity. As expected before the interview, most of respondents 
pointed to DST and its adjacent area as 'Daedeok'. Adjacent area here was a bit 
differently mentioned by interviewees: some said 'Daedeok Techno Valley' as an 
industrial complex for technology commercialisation should be included in the concept 
of Daedeok, but some insisted existing 3rd and 4th industrial complexes should be also 
regarded as the broader boundary of Daedeok. Even some interviewees argued Daedeok 
needs to be understood as a wider concept including some part of 'Yuseong-gu' district 
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and 'Dunsan-dong' area in which the 3rd government complex is located. They proposed 
'functional links' of these areas to DST as the reasoning of conceptual expansion, but 
they opposed more expansion in a wider sense beyond the administrative boundary of 
Daejeon Metropolitan City. In other words, their regional identity of Daedeok does not 
extend to neighbouring regions such as 'Chung-nam' province or 'Chung-buk' province 
instead it is confmed into Daejeon. This result seems to be partly because interviewed 
entrepreneurs have the same working experiences in PRIs of DST. As an interviewee 
stated, "DST is the place like woman's womb for spin-offs from PRIs" (CEO-3, IVCs). It 
seems that Daedeok is still being conceived for them as a technology or R&D intensive 
place rather then business oriented one. This interview result is quite contrasting to the 
broader concept of 'Daedeok Valley' illustrated in Daedeok Valley Master Plan (2001, 
Daejeon Metropolitan City). It was introduced to include neighbouring regions which 
can be functionally interrelated with DST beyond the administrative boundary of 
Daejeon. It implicitly points out perceptional difference about Daedeok between 
nonnative perspective of scholars or policy makers and realistic perspective of 
interviewed entrepreneurs. 
An interesting finding with regard to regional identity of Daedeok is that most of 
interviewees are quite well aware of the limitation of Daedeok in terms of regional 
innovation system or industrial cluster. As a respondent stated, "the most ideal place for 
running business in Korea is not surprisingly 'Kyung-gi' province (the Capital region 
encompassing Seoul) considering the effect of firm agglomeration" (CEO-to, SVG). 
According to him, the fact that research institutes are simply agglomerated in a certain 
geographical area like Daedeok does not always mean it can automatically become an 
innovative place to run businesses. In systemic context, Daedeok may be characterised 
as 'the imperfect but potential RIS' which is on the way of transition from 'implanted 
R&D oriented NIS in a region' to 'well functioning and dynamic RIS'. When it comes 
to the imperfection of Daedeok on the basis of interview result, first of all, 'the lack of 
actor diversity' can be blamed in that there are just relatively thick R&D related 
organisations and several supportive formal institutions, but no large firms and other 
business related organisations such as VCs, law firms, marketing firms. This pr,oblem is 
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more related to the lack of actor diversity in the system than the matter of 'organisational 
thinness' (Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2003). It is consequently connected to the problem 
of start-up's limited networks confined into R&D related organisations. Another 
problem was 'the lack of voluntary interaction' among actors on the basis of self-interest. 
Although there have been many cases of cooperation between university, research 
institutes and industry, as an interviewee claimed, those can be described as a sort of 
"coerced or manipulated cooperation" (CEO-3, IVCs) by policy intervention. 
Furthermore, there was not enough motivation for close interaction or collaboration 
among PRIs because they have always looked at the government as if sunflower faces 
the sun. These problems or limitations look the phenomenon of system failure, but 
policy measures in the mean time seem to be focused on increasing inputs for innovation 
from market failure perspective rather than correcting the above mentioned system 
failures which block the functioning of the innovation system. 
8.5.2 Tension between divergent and convergent forces 
Daedeok can be seen as an innovative cluster in some sense in that R&D resources have 
been agglomerated and start-ups have steadily increased. There have been debates in 
regarding Daedeok as a cluster in that it has no strong industrial basis. To look at 
Daedeok as an industrial cluster might be of course not enough, but it looks gradually 
transforming into more innovative one as many spin-offs have been emerged. According 
to location theory, 'agglomeration effect' plays a critical role in the formation of a 
cluster. Initial location of some firms in a certain region is likely to work as catalyzer to 
induce other firm's location decision in that region. This phenomenon is found in several 
cases of successful clusters in the world like Silicon Valley. Daedeok is not an exception 
of it in terms of agglomeration effect. The existence of DST made it possible to 
concentrate many R&D resources on Daedeok for last three decades. From mid-90s, 
many spin-offs from DST have been spawned around DST. As a result, some support 
institutions for start-ups were established, and some moved into Daedeok from Seoul. 
However, according to Daejeon Metropolitan City, about 60 start-ups left Daedeok to 
mainly Seoul for the period between 1998 and 2002. There are, of course, some start-ups 
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(around 40 fIrms) which moved into Daedeok from outside for the same period. It means 
that many start-ups established in Daedeok are leaving Oaedeok. 
Then why start-up fInns go and come like this? How it can be translated in terms of 
agglomeration effect? To answer these questions, fIrst of all, the matter of 'proximity' 
needs to be considered. 'Geographical proximity' has been usually regarded as an 
important factor to produce innovation through interactive learning among actors. 
However, the case of Daedeok shows that geographical proximity artifIcially formed by 
government planning does not always guarantee close interaction among actors. In this 
regard, Daedeok is seen to have weak 'relational proximity' due to its man-made and too 
much R&D oriented characteristics of agglomeration. The operating system of DST has 
been largely dependent on central government, and PRIs have had no strong motivation 
of cooperation with other organisations in private sector and even each other. This 
matter has caused the lack of business related interaction in Daedeok. Moreover, there 
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are no 'large fIrms' which have strong influences on regional economy in Daedeok; 
"As a matter of fact, there are only research institutes here. It is not enough for 
Daedeok to be good business destination. ... I think the attraction of leading 
companies like large firms would be one of possible solutions for making better 
business environment." (CEO-3, IVCs) 
This notion points out the limitation of Daedeok in terms of' actor diversity'. According 
to evolutionary perspective, diversity is really vital in dynamic process of innovation. 
Daejeon City has tried to vitalize OST through high-tech clustering for last couple of 
years on the basis of central government policy scheme. This policy was initiated by 
MOCIE (Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy), but it has been combined with 
other policy measures from different ministries and implemented in the level of local 
authorities. Daedeok has drawn much attention from policy makers as the most potential 
region to be developed into successful innovative cluster. However, as an interviewee 
well illustrated below, this policy expectation seems to be still far from real self-
sustaining cluster; 
"Cluster can produce synergy effect and last long when the organic relationship 
should exist between people who can give money and who will take it in various 
fields, but there are only people in same field who want to take money in 
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Daedeok. ... it is like many gold fishes are gathering together to eat even a 
small piecefirst when people throw bread to them." (CEO-3, SVG). 
On the other hand, there seem existing two forces functioning around Daedeok which 
make firms move out or move in. These forces are associated with geographical location 
of Daedeok. One is 'divergent' force. This force works like 'centrifugal force' which 
enforces start-ups created in Daedeok leave their birth place to outside, mainly capital 
area. The other is 'convergent' force to make firms move into Daedeok from outside. It 
functions like 'centripetal force' to Daedeok. These two forces seem to operate counter 
to each other. Interview data shows that converging force is coming from advantageous 
factors of Daedeok, and diverging force is stemming from disadvantageous given 
conditions of it. Most interviewees were well aware of this phenomenon, but their 
interpretation about it varied according to their situation. Some say they are still doing 
their business in Daedeok because residential environment or living condition is better 
than capital area in terms of some advantageous factors such as lower house price or less 
traffic congestion. On the other hand, some respondents point out nice R&D 
environment as a significant merit of Daedeok. It seems plausible in that there are lots of 
high-qualified PRIs in various technological fields. As some interviewees emphasise, 
entrepreneurs in Daedeok can sort out their R&D related problems relatively easier than 
others by using well-connected human networks in the field of R&D that they already 
have through their working career in DST. They said this could be very helpful for their 
business in general, on the stage of product development in particular; 
"/ didn't have to worry about freak demands from buyers on the specification of 
our products because / thought / could meet their needs at least technologically 
through my expert network. ... / could meet the very experts and solve my 
problems through one or two steps of contacting efforts even in case / didn't 
know them directly." (CEO-2, SVG) 
Above mentioned merits of Daedeok are mostly related to R&D activities. Amenity in 
living condition is also seen as one of well-known necessary factors of R&D centre, and 
it looks quite natural considering the fact that DST was originally designed to have 
environmental amenity from the beginning. 
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However, many interviewees emphasised demerits of Daedeok as the business location 
of start-ups. These disadvantages or defects seem to stem mainly from geographical 
condition of Daedeok that it does not belong to capital area. Thus, most non-capital 
regions in Korea may have same problem to some extent considering uneven or 
unbalanced development process for last four decades. Seoul and neighbouring capital 
area has been a single growth pole in terms of both regional and industrial development. 
Even though Daedeok has the biggest R&D resources agglomeration, other vital 
resources and infrastructures, particularly business related ones, such as the existence of 
marketing or financing organisations are largely concentrated on Seoul. Interviewees 
point out several specific disadvantages of doing business in Daedeok including nearly 
whole business domain such as marketing, financing, recruiting, outsourcing, IR 
(investor relation). It means Daedeok is not seen as a good business destination from 
start-up entrepreneurs at least from the current point of view. Many firms already left 
Daedeok to Seoul, and many seem to be currently preparing to move due to these 
disadvantages. However, many firms are interestingly still staying and doing their 
business in Daedeok. Then what factors are holding them in Daedeok? Why they do not 
leave Daedeok in spite of several problems? Interview result exhibits a sort of inertia 
exists in start-up entrepreneur's decision making in business location choice. It is still 
unclear to conclude whether this inertia can be seen as path dependency phenomenon 
because the scale of interview data in this study is too small to explore this issue, and 
also the present interview was basically not designed to address this issue. This study, 
however, can suggest that a few factors like big transition costs indicating important 
sources of path dependency are found in interviewee's location decision. 
"Daedeok has some merits in spite of many demerits, but it is clear that there 
are more disadvantageous factors than advantageous ones in Daedeok. ... By 
the way, we keep staying here for a while because those disadvantages are not 
yet too much/atal." (CEO-2, SVG) 
"The gap between Seoul and Daedeok is really big in terms of making money in 
particular. My company is located here in Daedeok, but I make money mainly in 
Seoul. ... I may leave Daedeok when I can afford to move sooner or later. In my 
opinion, it seems to be inevitable because there is no market here in Daedeok." 
(CEO-3, SVG) 
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When it comes to business location in terms of land price, Daedeok has relative 
advantages compared to Seoul, but it becomes disadvantageous compared to 
neighbouring agricultural areas. Some finns argue that cheap land price for factory 
building is really significant factor for business location, as an interviewee says; 
"The reason why I had to leave Daedeok and move into neighbouring town was 
because I couldn't find any available space with reasonable price to build 
factory here. But I returned to Daedeok again because I could buy cheapest 
space in this industrial complex." (CEO-3, IVCs) 
To sum up this argument, location choice of start-up looks quite finn specific decision. 
Any notable differences are not found in each interview groups. Some firms can endure 
a certain extent of disadvantages of Daedeok, but some can not. At the same time, some 
companies may feel no disadvantages of doing business in Daedeok according to the 
characteristics of their business. In this regard, it can be said that a location decision 
depends on the entrepreneur's value or other finn specific factors that regulate which 
one is bigger between convergent and divergent forces. Finns, in other words, may leave 
Daedeok when attraction power to pull them from outside becomes stronger than its 
'gravity' which is gripping them in Daedeok. 
8.5.3 Expectation of policy benefits and location choice 
Regional attraction as a business location can be shaped to considerable extent by policy 
support and intervention. Except Seoul and capital area in Korea, Daedeok is seen it has 
received in the mean time relatively big support from central government. Daejeon 
Metropolitan City, the administrative region surrounding Daedeok, has been developed 
by some significant exogenous factors. DST was built in Daejeon, and international 
EXPO was held in Daejeon. A part of government ministries and other military 
institutions moved into Daejeon. A series of these historic events based on political 
decision makings contributed to considerable improvement of infrastructure in Daejeon. 
Furthennore, the government decided to designate Daedeok as 'the specialized R&D 
zone' (INNOPOLIS) recently. in 2005. This ongoing huge project on national level is 
243 
expected to bring various additional policy supports to Daedeok particularly in the field 
of technology commercialisation and DST globalisation. 
Considering the development process and recent policy direction, it is not so strange to 
assume that entrepreneurs in Daedeok must be influenced by the expectation of policy 
support. As mentioned in above sections, interviewed CEOs recognised their 
advantageous position as spin-offs from DST in several business areas such as seeking 
government R&D grants or utilizing expert network of PRIs. Business location in 
Daedeok endows entrepreneurs with these attractions, and it can be the source of 
gripping power to hold start-ups in Daedeok. On the other hand, according to interview 
result, entrepreneur's positive expectation on any benefits from policy support can also 
be very important reason of business location in Daedeok. 
"In my opinion, if there are some firms moving into Daedeok recently, it may be 
because 0/ growing expectation on benefits as Daedeok was designated as the 
special R&D zone." (CEO-I, SVG) 
This can be similarly found in OVG firms; 
"A government organisation which is in charge 0/ operating and supporting the 
special R&D zone was established only in Daedeok. ... So, we may receive 
much more benefits/aster than firms in other regions." (CEO-I, OVG) 
This expectation on policy benefits can be connected to location decision not to leave 
Daedeok. Even in case entrepreneurs do not currently expect too much about benefits 
from the designation of special R&D zone, they seem to stay in Daedeok with the 
expectation that one day they will be able to receive any help from it (CEO-4, OVG). 
A few interviewed firms have their offices or branches in Seoul for mainly r;narketing 
activities and some firms have'their factories for mass production in other regions. They, 
however, do not move their main offices yet. Operating two business sites in different 
regions must be redundant and inconvenient in terms of management. The reason why 
they dare to choose this inefficient strategy seems to be their path dependent way of 
expectation. As mentioned before, start-up founders from PRIs in Daedeok are quite 
familiar with government support. They can win government R&D projects more easily 
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than others, if they want. Furthermore, additional policy benefits are continuously 
expected from ongoing govenunent planning such as the designation of special R&D 
zone. They seem to have a certain vague expectation about policy benefits on the 
extended line of DST case in the past. This expectation is seen in both OVG and SVG, 
even in IVCs. In case of FVCs, however, interviewees show quite skeptical expectation 
about policy benefits from doing business in Daedeok. Even some failed CEOs have 
negative feelings on govenunent support as follows; 
"It is like 'drugs' to rely on government support. It seems to have a sort of 
'addiction '." (CEO-2, FVCs) 
"I don't expect much about so-called 'in-house company' in PRIs which is one 
of support scheme by the policy of special R&D zone . ... Business is totally 
different from government supported R&D in PRI . ... If I can have a chance for 
start-up again, I will not start in Daedeok." (CEO-4, FVCs) 
Some extent of positive expectation on policy benefits in Daedeok looks quite common 
phenomenon, but it does not mean that this expectation always influence on 
entrepreneur's decision making on business location. It seems to follow the above 
mentioned principle that business location is decided in the tension between converging 
and diverging forces existing around Daedeok. When the forces to attract firms from the 
outside of Daedeok become stronger than the forces to grasp them in Daedeok, firms are 
likely to deviate from their current trajectory in business location and eventually will 
leave Daedeok. From the path dependency perspective, it is indicating that path 
dependent inertia in location decision can be destroyed when 'change-based momentum' 
is bigger than 'stasis-based momentum' (Jansen, 2004). As Jansen argues, when 
"change is going to occur, the energy directed at maintaining the current trajectory 
must be redirected, replaced, or overcome by the momentum in the new direction" (ibid, 
p. 277). However, these two forces commonly exist together in entrepreneur's mind, as 
Jansen claims that "even if change-based momentum has been established, a tension 
between stasis- and change-based momentums may remain" (ibid, p. 279). Thus, its 
direction can always be changed and also return to previous trajectory again according to 
hislher choices. Interview results, as mentioned above, show that Jansen's argument can 
be applied to start-up's location decision in Daedeok. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
9.1 Summary of Research Findings 
This study attempted to open the black box situated in the middle between input and 
output in the systemic model of innovation and look at what is going on inside. The 
pwpose of this attempt was to explain the fundamental concern raised in research aim of 
this thesis: why government policy intervention does not necessarily result in an increase 
of regional innovation capacity. The government dependency of high-tech start-up firms, 
such as that found in Daedeok, can be understood as a sort of unexpected policy impact 
in that it is far from the policy objectives for facilitating innovation. Until recently, start-
up firms have been accepted in much literature as a main actor in innovation systems 
(Feldman, 2001; Wagner and Sternberg, 2004; Koch and Stahlecker, 2006). In particular, 
the high-tech start-up ftrm has attracted attention from a high expectancy of rapid 
growth on the basis of technological innovation, and policy support to promote this 
promising actor can be found in many countries. Daedeok in Korea was such an area in 
that there was active policy concentration by the government and an accumulation of 
high-tech based start-ups. Analysis presented earlier has shown that start-ups in Daedeok 
had not produced 'very successful' business outputs compared to the relatively high 
technology levels. This phenomenon appears to be problematic considering the unique 
position of DST as a national R&D hub. 
This thesis has addressed two primary research questions and four sub questions. This 
set of questions has a layering in analytical and methodological terms. Each primary 
question matches with its coupled sub questions. Firstly, this thesis examined the 
question of the production of policy reliance: How and why has the reliance of start-up 
ftrms been produced in the process of starting their business? From this question, two 
more speciftc sub questions were asked: What makes potential high-tech entrepreneurs 
become start-up founders? How has policy support influenced changes in the perception 
of risk during the process of start-up? Secondly, this thesis addressed the question about 
the persistence of this dependent path in business behaviour: how have start-up ftrms 
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responded to support measures of government in getting on their business and why they 
came to respond in that way?· This question was addressed through two sub questions: 
What sort of entrepreneurial responses have been induced by this change in risk 
perception? How has these responses been reproduced as a form of behavioural 
persistence in their business history? The analysis of interview data has provided 
substantial evidence of government dependency on a micro level, and showed that the 
change in entrepreneur's risk perception in starting up process could be connected to a 
certain behavioural pattern of start-up firm in later business history in terms of reliance 
and persistence. 
Chapter 7 revealed the emergence of a policy reliant path through changes in risk 
perception during start-up. Firstly, the ignorance or underestimation about market and 
business often caused many trial and errors in start-up businesses. Interview results 
showed that this phenomenon mainly came from their high-tech orientation and the 
belief in the power of technology in business. Start-ups in Daedeok were generally 
recognised as high-tech ventures in Korea due mainly to the influence of DST. The 
interviewed firms in this study were spin-offs from PRIs. They showed high technology-
orientation in their overall start-up business. This was seen as being inherited from their 
long working experience of government funded R&D in PRIs. It played a significant 
positive role in their start-up decision making. Their belief that they have high level of 
technologies in their R&D fields seemed to be connected to a sort of overconfidence 
about their capabilities in business. However, as interview results showed, their high 
technology orientation was often connected to low market orientation because they had 
undertaken R&D under non-market environment in semi-hierarchical government 
funded research organisations. Secondly, interview results revealed that policy support 
furthered the underestimation of business risks and overestimation of their capability to 
bear these risks. This changed risk perception triggered self-reinforcing expectation of 
policy benefits. Policy support could provide considerable initial benefits and 
advantages for start-up firms. As argued already, the potential entrepreneurs in PRIs in 
particular could be seen as policy recipients who were relatively more· familiar with 
policy support. For them, policy support was recognised as a sort of safety measure to 
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lower risks in start-up business. The analysis has therefore clearly shown that these two 
factors of high-tech orientation and policy assistance have functioned for start-up 
entrepreneurs to underestimate risks and to overestimate their capability in bearing risks. 
In Chapter 8, start-up entrepreneur's benefit seeking behaviour from policy support was 
analysed. This showed that a path of policy reliance emerged in the process of start-up 
and settled into continuing business history as a sort of behavioural pattern. Government 
dependent business behaviour could be found in major entrepreneurial decision making 
in interviewee's business history. More specifically, it was described into four main 
types of dependencies: 
- following government certifications 
- financing through bank debt and credit guarantee by government support 
- grant-seeking for winning government R&D projects 
- making location decision according to the expectation of further support 
Entrepreneurs sought venture certification to be eligible to receive policy benefits from 
the government. In the early stage of start-up, most entrepreneurs considered this 
government certification to be a 'license' or a 'qualification' as real venture firms. As 
the direction of policies changed, they responded to the certification in various ways. 
Some gave up the extension of it while others still maintained their certification. Among 
the former firms (once venture group), some could not meet changed criteria of 
certification, and some could not afford to think about its extension due to bad business 
situations. More often, however, extensions were not sought because of new types of 
government select and support initiatives like 'Inno-biz'. This showed that even the 
firms who gave up government certification can not be regarded as finns who became 
less dependent on the government support. Government dependent business behaviour 
was identified in each group of interviewed firms (OVG, SVG, IVCs, FVCs) in the form 
of benefit-seeking behaviour in their business history. However, it was also explored 
that the variation in extent or aspect of government dependency depends heavily on firm 
specific contexts rather than group differences. At the same time, it can be said that the 
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reproduction of government dependency was significantly influenced by regional and 
institutional factors in the Korean case. 
9.2 Government Dependency and Policy Learning 
This thesis sought to explain why government intervention for the promotion of high-
tech start-ups did not necessarily result in an increase of regional innovation capacity. 
Korea has a long legacy of active state intervention, but it has gradually transfonued 
from a Keynesian interventionism into a more market-mechanism oriented intervention. 
In the field of venture policy, the government realised the possibility that intervention 
may hinder the proper working of the market mechanisms and fail to facilitate the 
entrepreneurial activities of start-ups and VCs (Lee, 2000). However, the inertia in the 
mode of intervention, like 'selection and support mechanism', seemed to be long lasting 
in the Korean policy regime due to institutional path dependency. This study started with 
the implicit assumption that the reproduction of government dependency can hinder 
regional innovation. This section addresses this assumption through a discussion of the 
meaning of reliance and persistence in this reproduction. The circulating path 
dependency model (see Section 4.3) underpins this discussion and provides a means to 
expand the research findings in a wider context of path dependency theory and policy 
learning. 
Policy change is seen as a critical concern raised in the research aim. As argued in 
Chapter 4, policy matters to both path dependency and new path creation. As reviewed 
in Section 6.3, the emergence of high-tech start-ups can be seen as a new path in tenus 
of the career change at individual actor level and the structural change at a policy or 
systemic level. However, the promotion of start-up as a new path can also be seen in 
some sense just as the evolution of existing paths. Although new institutions for start-
ups were newly introduced, many of the institutions of old paths continued as before, 
and some old institutions just .transfonued to new purposes. This does not mean it was 
not a new path. Instead, it was obviously considered to represent a new path in that start-
ups emerged as a key actor in the market. It must be a really meaningful change in tenus 
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of economic transfonnation. The logic of sub-systems of Korean economy has been 
significantly changed due to the rapid growth of start-up sector. Incentive structures and 
patterns of strategic interaction among actors also changed following this shift. The 
government initiative and policy intervention played a vital role in bringing about all this 
significant change. 
Likewise, policy intervention can be regarded as a critical factor in institutional change, 
particularly in Korean context. As examined already, institutions are likely to be 
changed along path dependent ways. Even if policy makers conceive a radical and 
structural change through deliberate intervention, it is hard to produce expected 
consequences due to institutional inertia and many other unexpected factors. Moreover, 
their capabilities to intervene· may often be limited by 'bounded rationality', and the 
timing and ways of intervention are more likely to be influenced by political factors 
which may be often non-rational. Institutions can influence political decision makings. 
In this regard, policy itself has also changed in path dependent manners. Policy 
influences diffusion processes of individual actor's cognitive or behavioural patterns at 
the micro level. At the same time, it influences institutional changes and it can be 
influenced by institutions at the macro-level. 
The purpose of this study was to explore the reproduction of start-up firm's 'government 
dependency' induced by policy support in Daedeok. As far as government dependency 
was concerned, 'policy matters' a lot to start-up businesses, but it seemed not a single 
factor of it. The concept of path dependency helps to understand why policy intervention 
designed to bring about radical change often results in incremental change or produces 
unexpected outcome. As quoted in the example of QWERTY keyboard design, it has 
been introduced to explain why technological choices occasionally lead to sub-optimal 
solutions. To put it somewhat differently, it has been used to explain the rationality of 
behaviour that at first sight might appear irrational if one assumes utility maximizing 
behaviour. The construct of 'government dependency' in this study, however, stands on 
a somewhat different basis. Start-up firm's reliance on policy support is not seen as 
simply 'irrational' in terms of risk-reward calculations. These businesses are usually 
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regarded as facing more uncertainties and risks than other entrepreneurs. They are used 
to the lack of resources in every comer of their business. In this vein, it may be taken for 
granted in some sense for start-up entrepreneurs to seek policy benefits continuously, as 
far as they expect those benefits to be helpful for their business, and reduce the level of 
business risks. To keep seeking policy benefits may be a very rational choice for 
entrepreneurs under uncertain situations, unless the expected outcome of their risky 
challenges guarantees bringing certain and clear successes. They may be willing to 
pursue 'small but safe' improvements in business perfonnance through benefit seeking 
rather than risky challenges for 'big but uncertain' successes. This path of policy 
reliance can often go unnoticed due to its own rationality and convenience. As shown in 
the interview results, even though they were aware of the fact that their choice was not 
the best one, there may be a certain rationality to keep adopting this dependent pathway. 
At the same time, start-up firm's behavioural pattern of policy reliance is not only 
influenced by institutions, but also linked to institutional stability and change. In 
summary, policy can really matter in shaping the path of 'government dependency' and 
its reproduction over time both in micro and macro levels. 
For example, as mentioned in Chapter 8, start-up finns in Korea had to take big risks of 
business failure due to a few specific institutional settings associated with debt financing. 
Even though the government provided credit guarantee for bank loans for start-ups on 
the basis of technology evaluation, entrepreneurs had to bear a huge danger of credit 
failure because of 'joint and several surety' scheme imposed by banks on the 
entrepreneur personally as a· CEO. It reflects why many dying start-ups could not 
relinquish their business and take another opportunity again. The analysis showed that 
entrepreneurs tend to adapt themselves to policy changes as a survival or business 
strategy. It can be seen as a sort of reflective learning process from policy intervention, 
where the individual fum's risk perception and the systemic risk sharing structures 
played critical roles in this learning process. In this regard, start-up firm's policy 
learning can be seen as a natural phenomenon like 'conditioned response' to policy 
benefits. It seems accumulated evolutionary adaptation for survival is likely to be 
embedded in business history. This policy learning process looks like a typical path 
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dependent process as the term of 'learning' itself is a path dependent phenomenon. 
Policy reliance gradually gains momentum through start-up entrepreneur's self-
reinforcing expectations, and consequently produces behavioural persistence. Empirical 
analysis shows that benefit seeking behaviour from policy support emerged as policy 
reliance arose from risk perception changes. It can also be persistent over time through 
the process of mindful and institutional reproduction. 
The outcome of policy intervention depends largely on the mode of intervention (see 
Section 3.4). There are two typical rationales for policy intervention in the process of 
innovation: market failure perspective and system failure perspective. According to 
these two different perspectives, policy prescription becomes different and consequently 
the outcome of intervention also occurs differently. As examined in Chapter 7, policy 
schemes and measures for start-up support in Korea have been initiated by the central 
government. During the presidential tenn between 1997 and 2002, start-up policy was 
focused on promoting the supply of entrepreneurship. Various supportive policy 
measures on the basis of venture certification were introduced to facilitate new finn 
creations. Most of them seemed to be prepared according to the logic of correcting 
market failure. Thus, provision of subsidy or grant for certified venture firms was the 
most representative and powerful schemes of intervention. The following presidential 
term from the end of 2002 saw the direction of policy intervention begin to change. 
Balanced regional development and regional innovation became the central themes of 
nearly all policies. The government emphasized the importance of cooperation or 
collaboration among actors, particularly between industry and universities (or research 
institutes). Establishing regional innovation systems on the basis of the enhancement of 
regional innovation capacities began to be highlighted as the way for accomplishing 
balanced regional development. As a result, innovation through cooperation has been 
more emphasised than before in the case of start-up policy. It seems to be a notable 
policy change from a market failure perspective to a system failure perspective. 
However, policy measures are still seen not deviating from subsidy or grant regime. 
Although a new certification called 'Inno-biz' was introduced, venture certification also 
existed. Even though cooperation between industry and universities was emphasized 
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rather than simple new finn creation, incentives for facilitating cooperation still focused 
on direct support such as subsidy or grant. 
The provision of subsidy or grant can be quite efficient and rational in political tenns. 
Politicians or policy makers are usually keen to display clear policy effects to the public 
(or voters) in short period of time. They are also interested in efficient distribution of 
scarce resources. As a result, policy making can be often changed by political or non-
economic logic, and consequently certain inertia can be produced in policy changes. In 
other words, once adopted, policy measures are not easily changed even if policy makers 
or politicians come to recognise problems with existing measures. The policy changes in 
the mean time in venture support show that the government has recognised the necessity 
of policy correction. But interview results reveal it is not so simple. Due to the pressure 
of deregulation on the market, the direction of venture support policy such as venture 
certification was changed into a more market oriented and indirect one, at least explicitly. 
However, government-guided policy intervention, such as Primary CBO, was also 
implemented even amid such ongoing policy changes. It means that direct policy support 
was common in promoting start-up sector in Korea. In this regard, it can be said that the 
production and reproduction of 'government dependency' in Daedeok has been 
considerably influenced by this type of path dependent policy changes. 
Policy is not prepared in a static and unchanging environment; instead it always changes 
through feedback processes. Learning effects can be produced not only on the demand 
side but also on the supply side. This study focused more on demand side policy 
learning ('learning from policy' as discussed above). Once the path of policy reliance 
was established, a cumulative process of policy learning started which brought big 
benefits to start-up finns, in that they could operate their business under less uncertainty 
(Meyer-Stamer, 1998). This notion points to why the path of policy reliance continues to 
be pursued by start-up entrepreneurs, despite the fact that there are obviously non-reliant 
paths which might produce better perfonnances. This means that there is a positive and 
self-reinforcing feedback loop that brings a momentum and makes dependent behaviour 
persistent. However, interview results show that there may also be a negative feedback 
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loop as well. As seen in the case of continuous grant-seeking, entrepreneurs who feel the 
necessity for deviation from reliance do not always turn it into immediate action, due to 
many practical constraints and the lack of confirmation about the new path's outcome. 
This indicates that entrepreneur's policy reliance and behavioural patterns may have 
become embedded into organisational routines over time through the process of learning 
from policy. 
On the other hand, supply side policy learning ('learning in policy') also needs to be 
taken into account in understanding government dependency. Unlike the illustration of 
learning mechanisms in demand side, self-reinforcing processes in the reproduction of 
'government dependency' can be fostered by the feedback effects from unintended 
outcome of policy intervention. Policy makers used to pursue specific institutional 
changes through conscious policy intervention. It may not always result in intended 
outcomes as they expected, then they may try to intervene again with adjusted policy 
schemes. As a matter of fact, start-up policy changed a lot according to situational 
change in start-up sector. Many social and political factors seem to have had an 
influence on this change. For example, criteria of venture certification underwent a big 
change in 2001, and new type of certification for start-ups called 'Inno-biz' was 
introduced afterwards. As the analysis in Chapter 8 showed, start-up entrepreneurs have 
fitted themselves to this policy change. Reasons of their policy adaptation seem quite 
simple: they wanted to get more policy benefits continuously, or they did not want to 
lose any possible opportunities for sucking 'easy money' from policy support into their 
business. In Korea, policies for promoting start-up sector including venture firms, yes, 
and the KOSDAQ market changed along the direction of more indirect and market-
oriented support. As stated above, this does not mean the outcome of this policy change 
resulted in intended effects. Sometimes it contributed to the diffusion of dependent 
culture on policy benefits. In some cases, it influenced some start-ups to deviate from 
their dependent business pathways at a certain point of time. Thus, it can be said that 
start-up's 'government dependency' in Daedeok has been reproduced under the 
influence of policy changes induced in the process of policy feedback. 
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To sum-up, the dependency on policy support can be individually interpreted: some 
fInns accepted it as policy reliance but others regarded it as policy utilization. In this 
regard, a critical juncture between reliance and utilization could not be clearly identifIed 
on actor's level. At the same time, it could be said that critical juncture of government 
dependency in tenns of regional innovation was also not easily identifIed. Policy does 
not exist in vacuum. Rather it was continuously changing through the process of policy 
learning. Thus it can be said that policy support produced 'government dependency' 
both on actor and regional level, and it was reproduced variously depending on different 
institutional settings. However, it is hard to say clearly that government dependency 
hindered innovation more than non-intervention. Instead, it can be said that the expected 
policy effect in innovation might be reduced by a crowding-out effect due to the 
government dependency at an actor level, and this effect can be connected to a failure to 
increase regional innovation capacity. 
9.3 Path Dependency and Regional Innovation Policy 
The contribution of this thesis sought to build knowledge about regional development 
processes. More specifIcally, it expected to contribute to the knowledge about the role of 
high-tech start-ups, the rationale for policy intervention, the systemic understanding of 
regional innovation and, most signifIcantly, the theoretical expansion of the path 
dependency approach. The earlier three contributions are intertwined with each other, in 
that the role of high-tech start-ups, policy support for them, and regional impacts in 
tenns of innovation system have the relationship of biting at each other's tail. Path 
dependency theory was employed to address this interrelationship between business, 
policy and locality. Thus, the theoretical expansion of path dependency can be seen as a 
main contribution of this study. This study tried to modify traditional path dependency 
approach from a linear and non-flexible one to a non-linear (circulating type) and more 
flexible (less detenninistic) one. This attempt provides an improved basis to analyse the 
process of innovation in any policy regime, since it delineates the repetitive relationship 
between new path creations from path dependency by policy intervention, and the 
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eventual recurrence to path dependency or lock-in from this deviation. In this regard, 
government dependency as an analytical construct can also be a useful criterion for the 
evaluation of the impact of innovation policy. 
9.3.1 Government dependency trap 
Path dependency in its classical version, as mentioned before, challenges the assumption 
of neo-classical economics where interactions between economically rational actors will 
always lead to efficient outcomes. Instead, it argues that the result of rational choices by 
rational actors can lead to inefficient equilibria, and this outcome may be stable. In such 
situations, inefficiency or sub-optimality can persist over time, even when actors are 
economically rational and they are aware of this problem. It means that a finally reached 
equilibrium may not be the most efficient one, and the taking of this sub-optimal path 
may be influenced by early moves. The matter of this path inefficiency is one of the 
most fundamental claims in path dependency theory. It is, however, difficult to be 
clearly stated in this study because the outcomes of 'government dependency' can not be 
simply regarded as an inefficient path. Generally speaking, grant-seeking or policy 
reliance may look far from an American style entrepreneurship. Start-ups are with no 
doubt required to be continuously competitive and innovative for their survival in harsh 
market. They are always struggling to maintain their competitive advantages. The notion 
of 'innovator's dilemma' well represents the climate of high competition in high-tech 
start-up sector. Many countries have struggled to foster start-up entrepreneurship 
through various policy interventions. Even in Silicon Valley, many policy measures 
focused on enforcing market forces, facilitating fair competition, eliminating 
unnecessary regulations, or providing soft infrastructure like managerial consulting 
services. 
Contrastingly, the Korean government used resources to provide policy measures in the 
way of direct intervention. For implementing these supportive measures, a unique 
selection mechanism called 'venture certification' was prepared. This type of support, as 
mentioned in above chapters, has been often described as 'sprinkling' public money. 
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Serious waste and inefficiencies have happened, but these have often been recognised as 
an inevitable side-effect of the recovery from the IMF crisis (Crotty and Lee, 2002). 
Political factors and inertia in policy regimes seemed to bring about persistence of 
inefficient policy measures. Interestingly, their impact on individual firm's' business 
growth has been positively evaluated in the mean time. This tendency is also identified 
in the interview results of this study. Most interviewees showed positive attitudes to the 
overall performance of policy support for start-up promotion over the decade since 1997. 
Although a few aspects were seen as negative impacts, such as grant-chasing behaviour, 
the outcome of 'government dependency' was not seen to be absolutely inefficient. 
According to interviewed CEOs of IPO firms, they have always tried to take advantage 
of government support properly at the required time. Moreover, they added it was a 
significant driving force in leading their business to the successful performance of IPO. 
Actually, IPO itself is not seen as the final destination of start-up business, but it can be 
seen as a great achievement in the market. If the business performance of start-ups could 
be observed over a longer term perspective beyond the stage of IPO, this judgement may 
be different. 
This thesis suggests a possible consequence of policy induced government dependency 
on the basis of above discussion. Theoretically it can be expected that once actors 
experience some benefits from policy measures, they are faced with a critical juncture 
whether to follow a dependent way or breakthrough this dependency. As discussed 
above, actor's choice is influenced by various factors such as individual (organisational) 
innovative capacity, regional legacy conditioned by institutional settings, type of policy 
intervention, and others. If a path of start-up firms' policy reliance becomes persistent in 
their business history and the reproduction of this path dependent phenomenon has an 
inefficient impact on increasing regional innovation capacity, it can be said that the 
effect of policy intervention' is likely to be eroded by the crowding-out effect of 
'government dependency trap' as seen in Figure 11. 
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Crldcal juncture 
Figure 11. Possible 'government dependency trap' 
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Actor's risk-avoiding attitude was seen, in some sense, as a natural and rational business 
strategy in uncertain environmental changes. Policy support might be accepted in order 
for firms to reduce their risks or uncertainties in seeking entrepreneurial opportunities. 
This can induce more risk-taking by actors, for example even risk-averse actors can dare 
to start up their own risky business motivated by policy support. As empirical data 
shows, policy support can tempt a fIrm to move beyond its competences to bear risks in 
starting up business and, consequently, this excessive risk-taking influenced by policy 
support may be associated with an increased risk of business failure. Policy evaluators 
may think that excessive risk-taking has positive effects overall if the social benefIt from 
the growth of start-ups exceeds the cost from business failure. However, evaluators also 
need to take the possible inefficiency into account due to an unexpected 'dependency' 
on government policy. When entrepreneurs gradually become benefIciaries, this 
dependency can undennine their self-reliance at micro level and also erode 
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entrepreneurship or enterprise culture at macro level. It may cause a sort of 'X-
inefficiency' (Leibenstein, 1966) in overall entrepreneurial spheres, whe~eby the 
provision of assistance gives finns an incentive to rely on it and to seek a comfortable 
life under state protection. 
This phenomenon can be understood as the result of reflective learning, and not 
surprisingly it may reduce the intended effect of policy intervention. Thus, the 
government dependency trap can be prevalent not exceptional, but its extent differs in 
each case. In general, government support is provided on the basis of non-market 
selection which can be distinguished from market selection. The process of market 
selection plays an important role in driving out inefficient or less progressive finns from 
markets. Contrastingly, the mechanism of non-market selection may work towards the 
direction of disturbing a natural 'eco-system' in markets. Thus, a policy implication is 
that the appropriate mode of intervention in this situation might be the 'stick' of 
competition rather than the 'carrot' of assistance. This study pays attention to the mode 
of policy intervention. The most common and powerful mode of intervention in S&T 
policy, industrial policy, regional policy, even recent innovation policy has been the 
combination of government selection and direct fmancial support for selected targets. 
This specific mode of intervention is pursued to some extent in many countries due to its 
effectiveness or efficacy. Nevertheless, this type of intervention may cause serious 
distortion in market mechanism due to its inevitable selectivity. Policy can affect the 
incentive structure in the actor's mind through its influence on institutional change, 
which also means change in the rules of the game. In this respect, government 
dependency can be seen to be the consequence of this specific mode of intervention. 
In line with this discussion" a nonnative question may be asked: Is government 
supportive intervention fundamentally necessary for facilitating innovation? This issue is 
highly contestable. Even if policy support produces government dependency and its 
consequences can result in inefficient or negative effects, government intervention could 
be still justified in the name of its prescriptive potential in promoting innovation. In 
other words, if the result of intervention is not worse than the result of non-intervention, 
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government intervention may keep its footing. Furthennore, it can be also argued that 
government dependency could be avoided by applying a different mode of intervention 
or by fine-tuning policy implementation. Thus, government dependency needs to be 
interpreted by giving consideration to the specific regional, institutional, political, and 
socio-cultural contexts. 
9.3.2 Criterion for policy impact evaluation 
Policy occupies a critical position in the reproduction process of start-up finn's 
'government dependency'. This phenomenon can be seen as a policy impact in that it is 
induced by policy intervention. This study, however, is not a policy impact evaluation 
study, although the concept of 'government dependency' might be a useful criterion in 
evaluating the impact of innovation policy. Policy impact evaluation is to estimate 
whether or not interventions produce their intended effects (Rossi and Freeman, 1993). 
In this regard, policy impact evaluation is usually undertaken in long tenn perspective 
and by experimental comparative analysis to estimate the net and gross effects of 
intervention. Comparing what happened with what might have happened without 
intervention, or comparing how different country or regional specific impacts arise from 
the same policy are very hard to accomplish (Parsons, 1995). In this respect, there has 
been an increased interest in many countries in the issue of evaluation of government 
policies in tenns of the need to better allocate scarce public resources. This issue is, 
more fundamentally, associated with the appropriate role of government and market 
mechanisms across a number of policy areas (Papaconstantinou and Polt, 1997). 
Recently, the focus of innovation policies put an increased emphasis on knowledge 
diffusion, organizational changes and innovative behaviour. This has raised new 
methodological challenges for evaluating the impact of these policies. 
Most of previous studies on innovation policy during 1970s and 1980s mainly focused 
on empirical analyses of policy effects through historical investigations or quantitative 
methods, such as multiple regression analysis and input-output models (Ashcroft, 1982; 
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Diamond et ai, 1983; Folmer, 1986; Nicol, 1982). By the 1990s, some researchers tried 
to use more comprehensive evaluation methods such as cost-benefit analyses, survey-
based approaches targeting companies which received political assistance (Bovaird et ai, 
1991; Foley, 1992; Anderson and Feller, 1994; Swales, 1997). However, this research 
has some basic problems: the lack of appropriate quantitative data sources and relevant 
analytical tools, the difficulties of quantifying some qualitative factors and comparing 
policy impact before and after. To estimate the net effects or the intangible benefits of 
the policies with sufficient accuracy are nearly impossible. The effects of policies can be 
revealed not only via economic impact on well-defined concepts such as 
competitiveness andlor other indicators connected with market exploitation, but also 
through non-economic effects on the behaviour of companies and institutional changes 
(Diez et ai, 2000). The effects of the latter may be much more important than the direct 
economic effects in some sense. However, these effects are not easily transformed into 
measurable criteria of policy impact evaluation. Thus more qualitative and more 
political evaluations are emphasised in recent policy evaluation studies. Adopting the 
appropriate criteria to be used for judging policy programmes becomes a crucial issue in 
policy impact evaluation. 
As stated already, this study did not attempt to evaluate policy impact directly. Rather it 
sought to develop an analytical construct for policy analysis that can be used to 
understand unintended policy impacts. Therefore, this study expected to contribute not 
only to the theoretical development of path dependency, but also to f practical 
implications for policy makers, of why and how policy support produces unexpected and 
suboptimal impacts. Government dependency can be a useful criterion for policy impact 
evaluation in terms of 'additionality' in particular (Buiseret et ai, 1995). This concept 
has been considered as a central factor that indicates the changes in behaviour and 
performance which would not have occurred without the policy intervention. The 
construct of government dependency in this study was investigated through the two 
concepts of policy reliance and behavioural persistence. Generally speaking, policy 
makers can expect that firm behaviour will be changed through policy programmes in a 
desirable direction. However, policy intervention can also induce unexpected perverse 
261 
effects as well, for example encouraging firms to take risks that they cannot afford 
(Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). These unexpected effects on behavioural changes need 
to be included in consideration of 'behavioural additionality' that indicates the 
difference in firm behaviour resulting from a government intervention. Government 
policy support can encourage start-up firms to engage in more entrepreneurial and 
innovative activities. However, this study suggests that the effect of government policies 
can be eroded by the reproduction of government dependency. In this regard, the 
expansion of path dependency theory which combines with the construct of 'policy 
induced government dependency' can be a useful criterion to provide more persuasive 
insight in the evaluation of innovation policy. 
The empirical study in Korea suggested a few implications that 'direct and continuous' 
fmancial supports for high-tech start-up firms have contributed to the reproduction of 
government dependency in Korea. In particular, this phenomenon has emerged and 
deepened notably in case of the start-ups in Daedeok due to not only their long term 
experience of R&D subsidization in PRis from the government but also government 
dependent and R&D oriented regional legacies. Considering the case of successful 
policy intervention in the US, policy intervention in proper timing and appropriate ways 
can play a critical role in region.al innovation and economic development. In the US, 
policy intervention to stimulate innovative activities on early stage in the market through 
multiple institutional interfaces could successfully function. However, this could be 
possible on the basis of specific conditions in the US such as sufficient market forces 
and enterprise friendly business climate. As many existing empirical studies revealed, 
this successful case has not been easily transplanted in elsewhere. In Korea, active role 
of the government in promoting high-tech start-ups using mainly public spending was 
once considered as a successful case of policy intervention on its early stage at least 
from 1997 to 2001. But this rule of fmancial support began to be reviewed critically 
from 2001. Since then, as seen in policy documents of that time, the government seemed 
to realize problems caused by 'direct' financial support for start-ups and attempt to 
address them by using more indirect and multiple support measures. Nevertheless, it 
seems to be still in big debatc:s in Korea that start-up sector including venture capitals 
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could have grown in such a rapid pace if there were no active initiatives of the 
government. This phenomenon implies that the result of policy evaluation may also 
depend largely on when it is done. Thus it can be said that proper timing and mode of 
intervention according to specific environmental conditions or institutional settings in 
different countries and regions can be suggested as a successful policy initiative so as to 
ameliorate the risk of government dependency. 
9.4 Critical reflections and Concluding remarks 
One of the research objectives of this thesis was to construct the conceptual framework 
of govenunent dependency and the other to apply it to the case of Daedeok in Korea. 
Although this study conceptualised govenunent dependency in a generalised sense, its 
reproduction is likely to be largely based on regional and national specific contexts. 
High-tech start-ups and policy support for promoting regional innovation are commonly 
found in many countries, but the mode of policy intervention varies greatly in each 
region and country. In addition, the impact of policy intervention might be differently 
produced due to the difference of institutional settings even though same policies were 
implemented. This study reported on the case of Daedeok in Korean context and the ten-
year period of economic readjustment since 1997. Thus, it can be said that the 
reproduction of government dependency must be variously presented in different 
contexts, although government dependency is expected to exist to some extent wherever 
policy support is provided. 
At the same time, the competitiveness of govenunent dependent start-ups can also be 
differently understood in terms of different time periods. Those firms which have been 
quite successful in the domestic market may not be continuously successful in global 
market because government protection and policy support may bring about vulnerability 
in limitless and borderless competition. Likewise, the label of currently sllccessful 
business performance may not last long in a rapidly changing business environment. 
Considering the traditional concept of entrepreneurship, the outcomes of 'government 
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dependency' are much more likely to be inefficient, but as mentioned above, this study 
did not reach a clear judgement of this matter. As the interview results show, the firms 
that have utilised government support often demonstrate better business performances. 
In contrast, the firms that tried to quit grant-seeking behaviours or gave up policy 
benefits to exploit bigger business opportunities in the market, often record relatively 
poor business performances. Even in some cases, the firms that intentionally deviated 
from grant-seeking often fell into business failures. Thus, with regard to the 
consequence of 'government dependency', the result of empirical investigation might 
provide different interpretations if it was to be conducted over a longer study period. 
This study suggests two meaningful directions of further research. One is to evaluate the 
impact of innovation policy through the construct of government dependency developed 
in this study. The other is to investigate the consequence of government dependency in 
terms of regional path dependency. As discussed earlier, the construct of government 
dependency can be used as a useful criterion for policy impact evaluation. To apply this 
construct to different contexts will also provide a wider lesson for policy makers who 
want to develop more desirable policy measures. On the other hand, the construct of 
government dependency can be applied to further studies to examine whether it has 
shaped a government dependent path in regional development process. Regional path 
dependency is likely to result in regional lock-in. To observe regional development 
trajectories needs a longer term perspective. 
The role of institutions in shaping regional trajectory was also examined in this thesis. 
The importance of institutions is emphasised in most studies of RISs to determine 
contexts of innovation. Business start-up can also be considered a type of context-
dependent social process. Their entrepreneurial behaviour and learning capacities are, on 
the one hand, heavily dependent on regional institutions and culture, but on the other 
hand, these factors are also shaping regional trajectories through institutional changes. 
'Government dependency' is understood in this study to be mainly induced by policy 
support from governments. As mentioned before, most policy measures for supporting 
start-ups in Korea were prepared by the central government. There was, of course, a role 
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for local authorities in the implementing processes, but their roles were merely 
complementary in most cases. It means that national policy mattered a lot in the 
reproduction of 'government dependency' in Daedeok, but the influence of regional 
policy initiatives was quite limited. However, it does not mean that the influence of 
regional factors or ingredients can be neglected in shaping the path of 'government 
dependency' and its reproduction. If so, there would be no differences or variations in 
the aspect of 'government dependency' across the regions. However, this assumption 
looks quite unrealistic. This study did not attempt comparative work aiming to explore 
variations in government dependency between different regions. However, it seems 
likely that regional specific factors such as regional history, regional institutions, or 
regional business culture have influenced the reproduction of 'government dependency' 
over time. This issue can be an interesting source of further studies. At the same time, 
this argument can also be linked to the already mentioned matter of persistence of 
'government dependency' as a regional path or trajectory. 
As noted before, Daedeok has quite extraordinary characteristics in terms of national 
R&D resources, the agglomeration and continuous policy concentrations in this field. Its 
inheritance and endowments were also led by exogenous government initiatives. The 
results of institutional analysis and empirical investigation fit together quite well. It was 
argued in Chapter 6 that the institutional settings in Daedeok-RIS changed towards R&D 
oriented and government dependent ways. Interview results analysis (Chapter 7 and 8) 
revealed start-up firm's high-tech orientation and benefit-seeking behaviour in Daedeok. 
In this regard, it can be said that start-up's 'government dependency' was reproduced 
along the government dependent regional trajectory in Daedeok, and also this 
contributed to the formation of such a trajectory. The matter of this regional path 
dependency needs to be examined in further studies. 
This study looked at start-up finn's entrepreneurial behaviours through the combined 
lens of path dependency and path creation under conditions of policy intervention to 
facilitate innovation. From this point of view, government dependency can be seen as 
the aggregate result of a series of start-up finn's individual and rational calculations. 
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Each assessed the incrementa. benefits of receiving policy support in an environment 
characterized by uncertainty and limited information. High-tech start-ups and their 
technological entrepreneurship are increasingly considered to play a crucial role in the 
generation of both regional innovation and economic development. As witnessed in the 
case of Silicon Valley, there has been significant interest in the agglomeration of 
'technopreneurial' activities and their contribution to regional transformation and high 
economic growth. Governments in many countries have attempted to promote 
'technopreneurship' by pursuing various policy initiatives. Policy intervention is 
expected to influence knowledge workers' start-up decision in that it affects the 
incentive structure of their career choices, whether they remain in incumbent research 
organizations or create their own new companies. Governments have various roles to 
play in encouraging start-up decision and supporting start-up firm's growth. Often they 
use regulative and protective measures. They sometimes provide direct assistances by 
public spending. By these attempts, innovative ideas or technologies can be moved into 
markets. 
However, as many empirical studies demonstrate, the survival rate of such ventures is 
quite low. It means that the introduction of high technologies into markets does not 
always result in business success. Lots of business studies suggest there can be various 
pitfalls or traps in the pathway between laboratory invention and market innovation. In 
similar vein, it can be assumed that there is a black boxed section between 
technopreneurship and entrepreneurship. Considering the notion of 'grantrepreneurship' 
induced by government supports, it can be illustrated there may be a critical juncture to 
be chosen for 'technopreneurs"' between the two possible pathways of entrepreneurship 
and grantrepreneurship. This illustration may be too simplified but it can provide a 
useful insight for understanding start-up finn's government dependency as a sort of 
unexpected policy outcome. As argued already, policy support can produce beneficial 
effects by filling a finance gap between social optimal levels and real investment level in 
the market. At the same time, however, it can erode the self-reliance of start-up firms 
and lead them to the way of dependency. In this case, an innovation system can fall into 
the government dependency trap at macro level. On the other hand, at micro level, 
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policy intervention might enable entrepreneurs to deviate from a path dependent 
business trajectory, but simultaneously to fall into the trap of benefit-seeking behaviour. 
Institutions play an influential role in entering one of these two possible ways at this 
branching juncture. Regional endowments and inheritance could make the institutional 
settings different in every region and it might have significant influences on the 
production and reproduction of government dependency. 
In this regard, the construct of government dependency developed in this thesis is 
expected to provide a very useful insight in explaining the concern raised in the research 
aim: why government intervention does not necessarily result in increase of regional 
innovation capacity. It would also contribute to open up new horizons in studying multi-
dimensional changes such as entrepreneurial, regional and policy changes on the basis of 
integration between self-reliance and dependency, market failure and system failure, 
path dependency and path creation. 
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1: The list of secondary sources 
Governments and public organisations documents 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (Centre for Economic Information KDI), 'Economic 
Bulletin', 2000. 
5MBA, 'Venture White Paper', 2000. 
5MBA, 'The countermeasurefor promoting technology-oriented start-ups', 2005. 
MOST and Daejeon MetropoHtan City, 'Designing the Daedeok Special R&D Town: 
Legal Backgrounds and Policies', 2004. 
MOST, 'Science and Technology Yearbook', 2003, 2004. 
MOST, 'Master Planfor R&D special zone (2006-2010)', 2005. 
Daejeon Metropolitan City, 'The Development Strategy and its Performance of Daedeok 
Valley' , 2000. 
Daejeon Metropolitan City, 'Daedeok Valley Master Plan: The Ideal and Realization 0/ 
Daedeok Valley', 2001. 
Daejeon Metropolitan City, 'A plan for revitalizing venture businesses', 2005. 
The Bank of Korea (Daejeon-Chungnam Regional Branch) 'A Survey series of Regional 
Economy: Recent tendency ant! the direction o/future development in Daedeok Valley', 
2002. 
KlET - Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, 'The plan for regional 
industry promotion', 2003. 
KlTA - The Korea Industrial Technology Association, 'Industrial Technology White 
Paper', 1998. 
The Korean Intellectual Property Office, 'Intellectual property statistics', 2002. 
Daedeok Science Town Management Office, 'Daedeok Science Town', 2004. 
Daedeok Innopolis Headquarters, 'The handbook of Daedeok R&D Special Zone', 2006. 
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Korea Venture Capital Association, '2006 KVCA Yearbook & Directory', 2006.12. 
Korea Exchange (KRX), 'Performance Analysis of KOSDAQ for the last 10 years', 
2006.6. 
Secondary survey data 
'A Venture Business Survey in Daejeon' (DSSC, 2001) 
Survey of science and technology statistics (2002, MOST) 
'The Report of research in demand or trend ofDaejeon R&D' (DSSC trusted by DlllPF, 2003) 
'Report for the trends investigation of regional industry: A target for small and medium-
sized venture business of Daedeok Valley', (DSSC trusted by DHIPE, 2004) 
'Swvey on the needs ofnwketing on demand in venture~' (DSSC, 200S) 
Survey report of science, technology and research activities (2004, MOST and KISTEP) 
Websites 
MOFE (Ministry of Finance and Economy) - http://www.mofe.go.kr 
MOST (Ministry of Science and Technology) - http://www.most.go.kr 
5MBA (Small and Medium Business Administration) - http://www.smha.go.kr 
Venture net - http://www.venturenet.or.kr/vnetlindex.do 
NSO (National Statistical Office) - htq?:llwww.nso.go.kr 
Daedeok Innopolis - http://www.ddinnopoiis.or.kr 
KVCA (Korean Venture Capital Association) - http://www.kvca.or.kr 
KOVA (Korea Venture Business Association) - http://www.kova.or.kr 
KOSDAQ market - http://wwW.kosdag.or.kr 
KRX (Korea Exchange) - http://km.krx.co.kr 
KOSEF (Korea Science and Engineering Foundation) - http://www.kosef.re.kr 
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Appendix 2: Interview details 
I. Interview Outline 
1. Fieldwork period: 28/02/06--01105106 (63 days) 
2. Total number of interviewees: 37 
- Still Venture group: 10 1 Once Venture group: 9 
- lOP (KOSDAQ) companies: 5 1 Failed companies: 5 
- Venture Capital: 5 1 Government Officials: 3 
II. Once venture group (OVG) - arranged by alphabetical order of company name 
1. Founder and CEO of OVG-l 1 Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 04/03/06, 11 :00-12: 1 0 (70 min.) 
2. Founder and CEO of OVG-2 1 Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 06/03/06, 10:00-11:35 (95 min.) 
3. Founder and CEO ofOVG-3 1 Spin-offed from ADD 
- Date 1 Duration: 07/03/06, 14:00-15:36 (96 min.) 
4. Founder and CEO of OVG-41 Spin-offed from KAIST 
- Date 1 Duration: 06/03/06, 10:00-11:35 (95 min.) 
5. Founder and CEO ofOVG-S 1 Spin-offed from ADD 
- Date 1 Duration: 30/03/06, 16:40-18:00 (80 min.) 
6. Founder and CEO ofOVG-61 Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 07/04/06, 13:00-14:28 (88 min.) 
7. Co-founder and President ofOVG-71 Spin-oITed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 30/03i06, 15:00-16:05 (65 min.) 
8. Founder and CEO ofOVG-81 Spin-offed from KRISS 
- Date 1 Duration: 03/04/06,09:30-10:43 (73 min.) 
9. Founder and CEO ofOVG-91 Spin-oITed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 28/03/06, 14:00-15:56 (116 min.) 
III. Still venture group (SVG) - arranged by alphabetical order of company name 
1. Founder and CEO ofSVG-ll Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 14/03/06, 14:30-15:53 (83 min.) 
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2. Founder and CEO of SVG-2 / Spin-offed from ADD 
- Date / Duration: 16/03/06, 16:00-17:30 (90 min.) ... 
3. Founder and CEO ofSVG-3 / Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 16/03/06, 16:00-17:30 (90 min.) ... 
4. Founder and CEO of SVG-4 / Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 02/03/06, 14:20-15:54 (94 min.) 
5. Founder and CEO ofSVG-5 / Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 24/03/06, 14:00-15:27 (87 min.) 
6. Founder and CEO ofSVG-6 / Spin-offed from KAERI 
- Date 1 Duration: 10103/06, 16:00-16:57 (57 min.) 
7. Founder and CEO ofSVG-7 1 Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 17/03/06,10:00-11:40 (100 min.) 
8. Founder and CEO ofSVG-8 1 Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 08/03/06, 15:00-16:42 (102 min.) 
9. Founder and CEO ofSVG-9 / Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 09/04/06, 14:00-15:33 (93 min.) 
10. Founder and CEO ofSVG-lO / Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 15103/06, 14:00-15:21 (81 min.) 
... 2 & 3 interviews were jointly conducted. 
IV. IPO companies (IVCs) - arranged by alphabetical order of company name 
1. Founder and CEO ofIVCs-ll Spin-offed from KRIBB 
- Date 1 Duration: 16/04/06, 10:00-11:57 (117 min.) 
2. Founder ofIVCs-21 
. Spin-offed from the Technical Research Institute, Shin-Sung E&G 
- Date 1 Duration: 03/03/06, 14:00-15:20 (80 min.) 
... Didn't record but did note-taking 
3. Founder and CEO ofIVCs-31 Spin-off cd from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 11103/06, 15:00-16:22 (82 min.) 
4. Founder and President ofIVCs-41 Spin-offed from KRIBB 
- Date 1 Duration: 14/03/06, 10:30-11:40 (70 min.) 
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5. Founder and CEO ofIVCs-51 Spin-offed from KAERI 
- Date 1 Duration: 09/03/06,14:00-15:27 (87 min.) 
V. Failed companies (FVCs) - arranged by alphabetical order of company name 
1. Founder ofFVCs-l! Spin-effed from the Korean Machinery Lab (KlMM) 
- Date 1 Duration: 20/03/06, 14:00-15: 10 (70 min.) 
2. Founder of FVCs-2 1 Spin-offed from KRISS 
- Date 1 Duration: 18/03106, 14:00-15:20 (80 min.) 
3. Founder ofFVCs-3! Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 10/03/06, 14:00-15:37 (97 min.) * 
4. Founder of FVCs-4 1 Spin-offed from ETRI 
- Date 1 Duration: 10/03/06, 14:00-15:37 (97 min.) * 
* 3 & 4 interviews were jointly conducted 
5. Founder of FVCs-5 
- Date 1 Duration: 27/03/06,16:00-17:00 (60 min.) 
VI. Venture Capital 
1. General Manager ofVC-l 
. Former chief of Daejeon Branch, Muhan Investment Co., Ltd. 
- Date 1 Duration: 09/04/06, 14:00-15:30 (90 min.) 
2. CEO ofVC-2 
- Date 1 Duration: 05104/06,.13:30-14:50 (80 min.) 
3. Chief of Daejeon Branch, VC-3 
. Former founder ofTelephus, Inc. 
- Date 1 Duration: 27/03/06, 15:00-15:52 (52 min.) 
4. Chief of Daejeon Branch, VC-4 
- Date 1 Duration: 04/04/06, 10:00-11 :30 (90 min.) 
5. Former CEO ofVC-5 (KTB: Korea Technology Bank) 
. Executive Director of Technology Commercialization Center, DAEDEOK 
INNOPOLIS 
- Date 1 Duration: 28/03/06, 11:00-12:15 (75 min.) 
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VI. Government Officials 
1. Director General of Technology Assistant Bureau, 5MBA 
. Fonner Director of Venture Policy Division, 5MBA 
- Date / Duration: 29/04/06, 16:00-17: 10 (70 min.) 
2. Director of Business Partnership Division, 5MBA 
. Fonner Assistant Director of Venture Promotion Division, 5MBA 
- Date / Duration: 20/04/06, 16:00-17:00 (60 min.) 
• Didn't record but did note-taking 
3. Director of Management Evaluation Office, Daejeon Metropolitan City 
. Fonner Director of Science and Technology Division, Daejeon Metropolitan City 
. Fonner Assistant Director of Business Support Division, Daejeon Metropolitan City 
- Date / Duration: 28/04/06, 14:00-14:40 (40 min.) 
• Didn't record but did note-taking 
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Appendix 3: Interview guide with set of questions 
After brief introductory remarks, 
I'm interested in the perception of entrepreneurial risks in start-up's business history. 
As far as I know, you had worked for a public research institute (PRI) and started your 
own business in the mid 1990s. I would like to know your experiences associated with 
decision making or challenges in risky and harsh venture business markets. 
Let's begin with the process of firm formation. 
• Could you tell me when and how you started your venture business? 
I'm wondering why you gave up your previous job as a researcher of PRIs and created 
risky business. 
• How long have you worked there? 
- What was your main responsibility (or role) in there? 
- What were you satisfied with in your previous job? (Or complain?) 
- (If necessary, ask this), Could you tell me your previous job before PRJ? 
• What was your motivation of start-up? . 
It's been said that people usually face many uncertainties when they make a decision of 
start-up, and making a decision in uncertain situation could be very risky. I'd like to 
listen to your experiences in this process. 
• Did you experience any trouble? 
• What kinds of risks you recognised at that time, and .. 
- What was a serious risk(s) you faced in your firm formation process? 
• Do you think how the risk you had experienced as a start-up entrepreneur is 
different from the one other existing firm's entrepreneur experienced? 
• How did you deal with those risks? 
- Particularly, how did you finance the seed money for start-up? 
• Did those experiences change you? And how? 
You were a researcher (or an engineer), so I think you are fully aware of the importance 
of technology in venture business. 
• How did you deal with necessary technology developments for initial business 
setup? 
• Were there any supports from a research institute for which you worked? 
- For example. were there any support schemes from your PRJ to encourage 
starting-up or technology transfer like ETRJ's patent allocating system? 
• Do you think it was helpful to lower the level of risks you perceived? 
- Do you think you could behave differently if there were no such support scheme 
from your PRJ? 
There was the government policy support to encourage start-up particularly from 1997. 
The government provided varied policy measures for start-up entrepreneurs. I think this 
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strong policy support influenced on potential entrepreneur's risk perception and decision 
making in any way. 
• What did you think of the government policy support for start-up? 
• Could you tell me how it influenced on your risk perception and decision 
making? 
You have _ year of working experience in _ (the name ofPRI) as a (senior) 
researcher (or engineer). So people can think you have high technologies for your own 
business and it might be a good advantage for starting up. 
• Do you think your previous career in DST was helpful for your start-up? 
• (If so, could you tell me about it?) 
Now, I would like to ask some questions relating to a venture certification system. 
As you may know, it began in 1997 when a special legislation for supporting venture 
firms was enacted. It has been changed a little in the meantime and is now likely to be 
transfonned into more market oriented one before its expiration at the end of 2007. 
There have been big debates about the contribution and the problems of this 
government-oriented certification. 
• Could you briefly tell me when was your company certified and what was the 
type of certification? 
- Why did you want a venture certification at that time? 
- Why did you choose that type of certification? 
• Is your company still a certified venture firm? 
If yes (still ventures ifQup), 
• I'm wondering why you have maintained the status of a certified venture firm. 
Would you tell me abo~t that? 
• Do you think why some of once certified venture companies gave up the 
extension? 
If no (once ventures group), 
• When and why did you give up for the extension of venture certification? 
• Do you think why other companies are still maintaining their certification? 
As far as I know, there was a big change in the criteria and the way of venture 
certification in 2001. 
• Could you tell me whaiyou experienced after this change? 
- Were there any changes in your strategy to keep venture certification? 
Venture certification particularly by the government has been seen as a very unique 
institution in Korea. I'd like to suggest that it is nearly impossible to review the history 
of venture business in Korea without mentioning this policy. 
• What do you think of current venture certification system? 
• Do you think venture certification affected on your perception of business risks? 
- If yes or no, could you tell me why do you think so? 
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• How would you like to assess it in terms of business support? 
- Could you tell me about any changes caused by it in your firm's businesses? 
There recently have been big debates whether its expiration date needs to be extended, 
and more recently the government is trying to transform it into more market oriented one. 
• What do you think of this? 
- Do you think its expiration needs to be extendedfurther? 
• Could you tell me your idea who is more appropriate for venture certification 
between the government and the market? 
(Why do you think so?) 
Now, I'd like to move on to some questions about the survival and growth process of 
your business. 
You told me you started your own business in __ _ 
• What is the criterion at that time to say it as the beginning of your business start-
up? 
There of course might be different points of view, but some literature says that the stage 
of start-up' s growth can be divided into three phases such as start-up phase - growing 
phase - mature phase. This point of view is mainly based on the business career of firms. 
• What do you think of this idea? 
- Do you think you can position your firm among these three stages? 
- /fyes, then where? 
• Could you tell me your opinion about how to describe the growing stage start-
ups in terms of business career? 
- Or, do you agree with this idea that firm's growth stage can be divided by the 
single criterion ofbu~iness career? Why you don't agree with it? 
I think there were many difficulties in your business history up to now, particularly in 
growing stage considering the statistics ofstart-up's survival rate in Silicon Valley. The 
probability of its survival for initial 3 or 5 years after start-up is reported to be very low. 
We can imagine varied risk factors in business growth: financing, R&D, production, 
marketing, recruiting, management, etc. But, first of all, 'financing' might be very 
closely related with business risks because it is the matter of money. Thus I'd like to 
start from the different fmancing structure. 
• Could you tell what your capital structure is as of now in 2006? 
- What about your portfolio between equity investment and loan? 
- Are those equity investments from venture capital or public venture funds? 
- How about loans? (General bank loan or policy loan program?) 
• What about the capital structure in the initial stage of start-up? Are there any 
changes compared to now? 
• What different risks do you think are associated with those changes? 
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I can assume that your company will move on to mature stage in the (near) future like 
IPO stage. 
• What do you aim to matured company in capital structure? 
• What different risks are associated with these changes? 
Generally in United States, 'venture business' is regarded as 'high-risk / high return'. 
In UK, 'high-growth / high-job creation' is being accepted as the most important factor. 
But, considering the criteria of venture certification and other government supports, 
'high-tech' has been more emphasised in Korea than 'high-risk' in US or 'high-growth' 
in UK. 
• Do you think how technology is important in start-up business? 
• How have you procured necessary technologies for your business? 
• Do you think your previous career in DST was helpful to source technologies 
and do continuous R&D? 
• What about getting a venture certification and government supports? 
(If so, could you tell me about it?) 
• Do you think the high level of technology can lower business risks? 
According to varied statistics, Daedeok is well known for the region of knowledge 
agglomeration. But some people say that start-ups in Daedeok have been too 
technology-oriented rather than market-oriented. 
• What do you think of this saying? 
- Do you think high technology can guarantee the successful business in 
markets? 
- Even though not guarantee, but can be very helpful? 
• What do you think of the start-up's level of technology in Daedeok compared to 
the global level? 
- What about other levels such as sales and marketing, management, etc.? 
• Do you think the start-ups in Daedeok have been too reluctant to be challenging 
risks in their business? 
As you may know, according to the statistics from Daejeon city, many companies 
moved into Daedeok for a last decade, but also many start-ups in Daedeok, even spin-
offs from DST, moved out to mainly Seoul. 
• Do you think why some companies moved in and some moved out? 
- Advantages from proximity, any social networks in Daedeok? 
• Do you think this is associated with entrepreneur's risk perception? 
- Which one seems to be riskier between staying in Daedeok and moving out 
Daedeok? (Why do you think so?) 
• Do you think 'staying in Daedeok' can be advantageous for your company to get 
government supports? 
- Do you think 'moving out Daedeok to Seoul' can be advantageous for doing 
sales and marketing? 
• If we describe Daedeok as a regional innovation system, how do you think the 
meaning or boundary of 'region' can be defined in the Daedeok innovation 
system? 
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Finally, I'd like to ask some very basic questions about you and your business. 
It might be not easy to answer ~learly, but, 
• Do you think you are a risk-taker or risk avoider? 
- Do you think such a position of your risk perception was influenced by your 
career in PRls? 
• What do you think of the competence (merit or demerit) of yourself as a start-up 
entrepreneur who has the background of research or engineering? 
- What do you think of a few recent cases of other firms in Daedeok that they 
attracted the experts of management as CEOs? 
Thank you very much for your time and kind acceptance of my interview. 
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